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PRESS

A HORIZON OF (IM)POSSIBILITIES

A CHRONICLE
OF BRAZIL'S
CONSERVATIVE
TURN

EDITED BY
KATERINA HATZIKIDI &
EDUARDO DULLO

A Horizon of
(Im)possibilities

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A Chronicle of Brazil's Conservative Turn

Edited by Katerina Hatzikidi and Eduardo Dullo



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A rich, eclectic set of essays about the causes and consequences of the rise of the new ideological right in Brazil. Based largely on ethnographic research, the essays strike a careful balance between emphasising the role of historical continuities and more recent developments in the 2018 election that brought Jair Bolsonaro to the presidency. It is unlikely that anybody will read this book without gaining new insights into and uncovering new questions about an important phenomenon – the rise of a new, authoritarian, and populist right – that is both distinctly Brazilian and global.

— **Anthony W. Pereira**, Department of International Development and the Brazil Institute, King's College London

A ground-breaking volume that sheds light not only on Brazil's current affairs but on the Global South as a whole. By arguing that the contemporary conservative turn is not a turn – but a 'return' – the authors advance our understanding of the authoritarian features that have persisted in several developing and emerging countries, and how they gain new contours in the twenty-first century. Written by leading scholars, this interdisciplinary book brings original, fresh arguments to understand how what was once 'the country of the future' turned into 'the country of the past'. Yet, more than looking at the past, this edited collection also presents several contributions that look ahead and help us to envision new horizons of hope and possibilities for Brazil and for the world. This book is an original contribution that will impact the field of far right and Latin American studies.

— **Rosana Pinheiro Machado**, Lecturer in International Development, University of Bath

*Anybody interested in Brazil, from professional researchers in the country to readers who like to follow its many complicated lives, will want to read this magnificent volume. Through a series of detailed chapters which offer much factual and most updated information, the anatomy of a political event is carefully and collaboratively carried out. Many of the possibilities and impossibilities that Bolsonaro's election created, the horizons opened and closed to Brazilian citizens, are interwoven in order to understand both how we arrived at that precise moment and what it meant for the immediate future. The book does not offer a direct cause-and-effect explanation but rather scrutinizes the conditions of possibility that led to the political predicament we are now in. In so doing, the flash-bulb moment gradually vanishes and a *longue durée* with more continuity than rupture suddenly appears in our understanding. History becomes very important because this is indeed a*

historical moment. The different perspectives on the event and on its pre-existing conditions culminate in a powerful and poignant afterword in which an indigenous perspective on the monopoly of legitimate violence confirms, from an unusually fresh angle, many of the points made by the authors of the preceding chapters. The book is thus not only very informative, but becomes a model of how collaborative social science can be conducted in the decolonial world of today.

— **Ramon Sarró**, Associate Professor in the Social Anthropology of Africa, University of Oxford

A Horizon of (Im)possibilities offers a rich and diverse collection of perspectives on the Brazil of Bolsonaro's presidency. With authors from across the social sciences, and wide-ranging themes – from the work of Brazil's quilombola and indigenous activists to that of its far-right bloggers and elite philanthropists – the volume is fundamental reading for understanding the rise of the far right in contemporary Brazil.

— **Sean T. Mitchell**, Associate Professor of Anthropology, Rutgers University-Newark, and author of *Constellations of Inequality: Space, Race, and Utopia in Brazil*

This book is a must-read for all those who want to understand the recent success of neo-populist, conservative movements in Brazil and beyond. Avoiding facile conclusions that portray the election of president Jair Bolsonaro as a radical break with earlier conservative movements or a simple continuation of these, the authors of this enlightening volume uncover and analyse the particular entanglements of political and cultural dynamics that offered Bolsonaro and his allies a chance to present themselves as messianic saviours of the moral and political order. Collectively, the contributors of this book show how deep-seated authoritarian structures that appeared to be deteriorating since Brazil's democratic turn were rebashed within the neoliberal economic and political orders that prevailed. Anti-progressive gender and sexuality politics, promoted amongst others by popular evangelical groups, resonated forcefully with imaginations of societal catastrophe, caused by corruption and criminality. Meanwhile, persistent resentment against the Workers' Party nurtured the ground on which a neo-conservative project could be cultivated that presented Bolsonaro and his companions as uncontaminated political outsiders who would cleanse the nation and rid it of crime. While the authors paint an illuminating and grim picture of the illiberal tendencies in Brazilian society, they also highlight the bastions of progressive democratic politics and thus offer the reader some hope for Brazil's immediate future.

— **Martijn Oosterbaan**, Associate Professor of Cultural Anthropology, Utrecht University

Jair Bolsonaro's rise during 2018 – from a fringe member of parliament to leader of Brazil's new right and ultimately the president – came as a shock to domestic and international observers. How could this seemingly tolerant and democratic country elect a leader who flaunted violent insults at women, the LGBTQ community, the indigenous, and racially marginalised Brazilians? This rich and insightful edited volume explains the rise and consequences of Bolsonaro's far-right administration, bringing together chapters from promising new as well as prominent senior scholars, many of them Brazilians. Diverse chapters contribute ethnographic and anthropological perspectives from quilombola communities, indigenous groups, and workplaces in small towns – but also evangelical and Pentecostal communities, online alt-right forums, and elite philanthropic networks. Reading across these chapters, one thing becomes clear: although Jair Bolsonaro's presidency is harming marginalised communities, his rise is not an aberration in Brazilian political culture. Rather, he is the natural-born son of this beloved but paradoxical country deeply marked by inequalities, violences, and a long authoritarian tradition.

— **Amy Erica Smith**, Associate Professor of Political Science,
Iowa State University

In A Horizon of (Im)possibilities, an international network of researchers from different parts of the northern and southern hemispheres, and who belong to various research centres, present their thoughts about the conservative turns in Brazil. This is one of the first strengths of this work, where the reader can learn about Brazilian political reality – past and present – through a distinct ethnographic and empirical focus. Each chapter indicates that the authors conducted deep investigations and careful data analysis to achieve their conclusion about their subject of discussion. Nevertheless, I want to highlight the introduction. The editors of the work in a short number of pages are able to discuss how the last Brazilian political events led to the election of Jair Bolsonaro. Unlike many works on the subject, which, in my view, present a 'denouncement' perspective, in the introduction to this book, the editors are able to demonstrate the complexities of this scenario. They carefully reveal how the emergence of a new conservative right in Brazil is actually not a new phenomenon, but the continuity of an authoritarian culture that inhabits Brazilian society and sociability in a diffuse and perennial way. Recognising this allows one to understand where it comes from, how it is currently manifesting, and in what directions it may take Brazilian politics.

— **Roberta Bivar C. Campos**, Associate Professor in Anthropology,
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Foreword

Carly Barboza Machado

A Horizon of (Im)possibilities undertakes an exploration of the conservative turn and of Bolsonaro's rise to power in Brazil. Bringing together a collection of excellent studies, the volume not only enters into dialogue with the urgency of the present moment, in which far-right movements and governments are emerging around the world, but is also able to make use of historical analyses and prospective exercises to think about how we got here and where we are going – two central questions that guided the editors' structuring of the book.

The reader who begins this study thinking that, at the end, he or she will be able to find all-encompassing answers that attempt to explain the most recent events in Brazil may possibly get frustrated by this endeavour. Page by page, chapter by chapter, *A Horizon of (Im)possibilities* offers complex, multifactorial explanations, but also brings new questions to the political scene, which are often unexpected, and therefore disconcerting.

I have decided then, in this preface, to present the volume at hand based on the questions that its reading provoked in me. And this is also, in my understanding, one of the book's main intentions: to present disconcerting questions. I will follow the style of the editors, and propose here two further questions and, through these, I will make a brief reflection on this work: who are we? and How do we move?

Who are we? Nearly every analysis of political processes deals with the formation of more or less fixed fields and positions. Starting from the question 'How did we get here', the volume points to a 'we' that projects itself on different scales. 'We', Brazilians: the nationality of many of the authors who contributed to the book, and who live today under the government of Jair Bolsonaro, performing the challenging task of making analyses while facing, on a daily basis, the effects of this harsh reality. Added to these, in this 'we' there are researchers who are dedicated to thinking about Brazil, and who therefore follow the political scenario of this country closely and are being impacted by its direct consequences. Another 'we' that is constructed with the publication of this book is one comprising a broader international community, which finds itself bewildered, facing a wave of far-right authoritarian governments around the world. Within this international collectivity, we can think particularly of the social scientists, historians and other researchers who have been following such processes, in part through their historical continuities (e.g. of

inequalities, racism, sexism and authoritarianism), but also by being surprised by less predictable, articulated and, many times, unwanted facts. Certainly this 'we', like the others, is made up of non-homogeneous aggregates of people and ideas, but they are summoned by this book for a reflective conversation about the conservative turn in Brazil and Jair Bolsonaro's rise to power, in an effort to understand what is happening in contemporary Brazil, but also on a global scale.

Everyday political life in Brazil is permeated by the question of what 'unites us', and how far the envelope can be pushed. The support for Bolsonaro in Brazil, after two years in office and a pandemic, mobilised resources of the most diverse orders which, on the one hand, consolidated him and, on the other, opened many fissures. The same is true of the opposition to his government. If the analyses that lead us to the year 2018 culminate in Jair Bolsonaro's victory, and are guided by it in order to explain the convergence of events that yielded this electoral result, in 2021, the year of this book's publication in anticipation of the 2022 presidential elections, the questions that arise are different. It is time to discuss the convergences that remain, the ruptures perceived so far, and how the field (or fields) of supporters of, and opponents to, Jair Bolsonaro are behaving politically. This volume already presents important pointers about this future moment, and hence alludes to (im)possible horizons.

Finally, still on the question of 'Who are we?', the present book offers a relevant analysis of the issue of difference. I highlight here two aspects of this discussion. The 'problem of difference' is at the heart of conservative turns, which represent efforts to 'keep things as they have always been', for 'the same people'. Among other elements in common, the national 'we' of conservatism has a racial, gendered and social class profile, and 'defends' itself (through its attacks) from the public presence of those 'different' from itself, and their initiatives in the field of social rights. This is one facet of the debate. But, on the other hand, the long-term analyses presented in the book – and, in particular, in its afterword – point to the fact that the relationship between difference and inequality is a historical one in Brazil. Political confrontations with the 'lost rights' agenda, which have been accentuated for some groups under Jair Bolsonaro's government, have already been faced by minority groups in the country over centuries. The 'loss of rights' has hit the Brazilian population unequally in recent years, given that the rights guaranteed and won have not been equally distributed. Even if we consider that the loss of rights in conservative turns and under far-right governments is sweeping, some always lose much more than others. The least impacted by this loss are either those so vulnerable that they did not have any experience of their rights in the first place, or those most privileged, for whom a set of rights is specially devised. In this way, the asymmetry and radical inequality that structure Brazilian society are being confirmed. The present book does not let us forget this fact.

My second and final question is: how do we move? In dialogue with the question ‘where are we going?’, formulated by the editors, I consider that *A Horizon of (Im)possibilities* contributes not only to thinking about the destination of political actions (where to?), but also about their forms (how?). The field of debate presented in this volume involves the moral, communicational and aesthetic dimensions of political mobilisation. In this domain, something new has happened in Brazil in recent times, and became more strongly visible in 2013, in the scope of street protests that took over the country and brought millions of Brazilians onto the streets.

The theme of political mobilisation has taken on new contours since then, based on some questions that work well when articulated, but which also present quite different qualities: what makes Brazilians take to the streets? Who has the capacity to organise protests? What is the place of social networks in this dynamic, and who operates them? How are political collectivities organised? What is the role of political parties and social movements in recent years? What new collective actors are emerging in the political field? How should we understand the relationship between electoral behaviours and political mobilisations today?

These and other questions are discussed through some overarching themes in the chapters that follow. One of them is the theme of communication. The production and dissemination of narratives about truth has arisen as a salient issue in the public sphere. The effect of the construction and circulation of images for political communication reached another level of complexity from the moment digital environments became its main realm of activity. Research in and on social media became the empirical field of study for social scientists around the world, and the political agency of algorithms gained relevance. Institutions that spent some years as invisible actors in this digital political field started to be named and studied, and their activities and strategies documented and discussed.

But the question remains: how do we move? Are the communication practices used by far-right conservative camps a model to be followed? Which political communication strategies makes people mobilise, and in what directions? Is it possible to disentangle form from content in political communication? Can communication strategies be shared by opposing camps, differentiating only their contents?

Thinking about communication and political mobilisation implies making ethical and ideological decisions about the objectives of these mobilisations: urging people to the streets, to the polls and/or to the formation of a long-lasting democratic field requires forms of political communication that are certainly very different, or at least very carefully and consistently combined.

We thus come to a second theme analysed in the volume, which is fundamental to thinking about political mobilisation: the centrality of the debate on moralities. Race, gender, sexuality, family and religion are recurrent

themes in this book, and structure an arena of political debates that configure entirely different possible and impossible horizons for Brazil in the coming years. The future desired by a conservative far-right camp is radically different from that dreamed of, imagined and disputed by that part of Brazilian society that fights for a more democratic, just and egalitarian society.

Visions of the future move people and collectivities. Possible horizons are fundamental to political mobilisation. The absence of hope for the future is absolutely paralysing. *A Horizon of (Im)possibilities* insists, from beginning to end, on an approach to Brazilian political reality as constituted by people, collectivities and ideas in movement. The breadth of the movement may change: small steps, large actions, stops. Those who walk side by side may vary. The direction of the movement may be more or less uncertain. But there is movement. I conclude by underscoring the following value in the book you are here invited to read: the fact that *A Horizon of (Im)possibilities* does not necessarily present conclusive answers, but produces disconcerting questions, confirms that this work has as its central politico-epistemological positioning the movement of people, collectivities and ideas. And where there is movement, there are disputed visions of the future. And where there is dispute, there is hope.

Preface

Katerina Hatzikidi and Eduardo Dullo

The idea for this book arose during the seminar 'A horizon of (im)possibilities: Reflecting on the social implications of recent political upheaval in Brazil', which took place on 22 February 2019. The seminar was organised by Katerina Hatzikidi and co-hosted by the Institute of Latin American Studies (ILAS), University of London, and the King's Brazil Institute, King's College London, with the kind support of the Society for Latin American Studies (SLAS). Organised in the aftermath of the 2018 presidential election, the seminar was a response to the need of many social scientists working on Brazil to come together and discuss the electoral coda to a highly polarised political period in the country. The seminar was well attended and sparked lively and thought-provoking discussions, both among the discussants and between them and members of the audience. We wish to thank all those who attended and/or participated. Unfortunately, due to space restrictions, we were unable to include here longer versions of all the papers presented, their merit notwithstanding. We are grateful to the authors who contributed to this volume and we thank them for their patience throughout this process. We would like to extend our acknowledgements to the director of ILAS, Professor Linda Newson, and the former director of the King's Brazil Institute, Professor Anthony Pereira, for their invaluable support in its organisation.

Tapping into the notion of possibility and acknowledging that the October 2018 election was but the outcome, or culmination, of a series of transformations that had been taking place over several years, this interdisciplinary seminar invited researchers to consider and critically reflect on current political events and their social implications. Due to the high quality of the papers presented and the great interest the ensuing discussions generated, organisers and participants agreed that an edited collection would be an effective way for the papers to reach a wider audience. In order to better grapple with the urgency and magnitude of some of the issues in question, the editors decided to organise two main published outcomes of the seminar. The first and more immediate outcome is the publication of a special issue with the *Bulletin of Latin American Studies (BLAR)*, organised by Katerina Hatzikidi. The second and more extensive publication is the present collective volume.

Drawing on the main questions that animated a productive debate in the seminar, the present edited collection wishes to continue and deepen some of the conversations that started there. More specifically, the chapters that comprise this book explore the temporal and spatial dimensions of recent

social and political developments in Brazil, focusing especially on the period starting in 2013, but also considering earlier developments that might have contributed to the 2018 election result. While many of the chapters are dedicated to the years preceding the last presidential election, the post-election period is also considered. Situating their analyses in distinct geographical and thematic loci, the contributors set out to unravel and understand the political, social, economic and religious conditions in place, as well as their dynamic development over recent years, which eventually led to a major political shift.

Although it does not aim for an exhaustive analysis of the recent Brazilian authoritarian turn, the volume offers a unique interdisciplinary synthesis of a wide range of issues that eventually determined the result of the 2018 presidential elections. With its publication, we hope to contribute to ongoing debates and scientific analyses of the multiple crises in recent years, while reaching anyone who wishes to better understand contemporary Brazil.

Introduction: Brazil's conservative return

Katerina Hatzikidi and Eduardo Dullo

The 2018 presidential election result in Brazil surprised many. Since then, numerous debates and a growing body of texts have attempted to understand this result and unearth the seeds that sowed what was understood by different analysts as the country's 'conservative turn'. In this introduction, we will not elaborate on all the factors that constitute or contribute to this conservative turn; instead, after briefly sketching out key insights from recent studies on Brazil's political and social transformations before and after the 2018 election, we focus on some relevant issues which we consider helpful in comprehending the historical moment of Bolsonaro's ascendance to power. Alongside important disruptions, we place emphasis on continuities in relation to the country's authoritarian tradition, an aspect which has been significantly overlooked in academic debates. In this sense, we argue that Brazil did not experience a sudden conservative turn, but rather a 'conservative return'. In doing so, we stress the particularity of Brazil's transformation in relation to an authoritarian and far-right rise at the global level, often with distinctly populist characteristics, while acknowledging their common ground. Finally, we briefly introduce each chapter in turn, discussing how their interdisciplinary perspectives allow us to approach the complex conditions in place from different, and often complementary, analytical angles.

An extraordinary election

A great number of analyses have focused on the factors that brought Jair Bolsonaro to power, and as the first mandate of his presidency is still unfolding, there will certainly be many more. In their discussion, Wendy Hunter and Timothy Power suggested that the 'meteoric rise' of Bolsonaro was made possible by 'a combination of fundamental background conditions' (such as economic recession, corruption and crime), political contingencies (especially the weakness of rival candidates) and 'a shakeup in campaign dynamics produced by the strategic use of social media' (Hunter and Power, 2019, p. 70). Many emphasised endogenous factors that purportedly determined Brazilians' voting behaviour, such as the effects of economic and political events on people's 'conservative subjectivity' (Pinheiro-Machado and Scalco, 2020) and a collective yearning for change and security (Singer and Venturi, 2019). While

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some regarded the political climate that led to the election as conjunctural and possibly temporary, others tied it to larger socio-political processes and a chronic ‘pendular movement’ (Avritzer, 2018) between democratic and anti-democratic political structures and forces in Brazil. Some underlined cultural and moral aspects behind voters’ support for Bolsonaro (e.g. Almeida, 2019) and the seismic effect of major corruption scandals that first broke out in 2005 (i.e. the so-called Mensalão, referring to the monthly allowance paid to deputies for loyal voting, which profoundly shook the first Workers’ Party government: see e.g. Bethell, 2018, p. 216) and were further unveiled through the Lava Jato (Car Wash) investigation. Indeed, such was the avalanche of Car Wash-related developments – which culminated in the impeachment of president Dilma Rousseff on charges of violating federal budgetary laws in 2016 and in the imprisonment of several prominent politicians, among them former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva – in the years preceding the 2018 election that, for some analysts, ‘the histrionics over Brexit’ and ‘the conniptions over Trump in America are close to much ado about nothing’, as Perry Anderson (2019) emphatically suggested.

In the current ‘post-shame’ political era, in the formulation of Ruth Wodak (2019), several ‘anti’ factors – such as anti-establishment, anti-party politics, and anti-leftism – gain traction and shape the populist rhetorics of division that transform political adversaries into enemies to be annihilated. Hunter and Power (2019) suggested that Bolsonaro was the only presidential candidate to be ‘on the right side’ of both ‘major cleavages’ in the Brazilian electorate that determined the 2018 elections, namely the ‘anti-establishment’ and the ‘anti-PT’ (PT is the Workers’ Party) cleavages. While Lula might have been able to successfully appeal to his broad base and win the election had he been an eligible candidate, his party garnered passionate disapproval.

In André Singer’s now classic formulation of ‘*lulismo*’, a key element of its enduring appeal is the simultaneous diminution of inequality and maintenance of the established order (Singer, 2009, p. 84). While policies implemented by the PT governments improved living conditions for Brazil’s poorest, they did not significantly shake systemic structures and unequal power dynamics. This compromise, far from being a major factor in voters’ dissatisfaction, struck a balance between a desire to maintain ‘order’ on the one hand, and to address social and economic inequality on the other, appeasing fears that revolutionary politics generate and satisfying groups across the political spectrum.

The political disenchantment of many fed off the unfolding Car Wash investigations, issues of public safety and violence and the growing economic crisis. Identified with major corruption scandals and treated as the incumbent party even though it was no longer in power, the PT was largely blamed for all that was going wrong in the country and was therefore ‘punished’ in the 2018 election. As Hunter and Power (2019, p. 80) succinctly put it: ‘When

the electoral options were narrowed to Bolsonaro and a *petista* whose name was not Lula, Bolsonaro won by a landslide.'

It is worth noting that the profusion of post-fact explanations, aiming to make sense of the sudden rise and victory of the far-right candidate, followed a scanty academic interest in taking Bolsonaro's candidacy seriously: he was often dismissed with a laugh or taken as nonsense. Did analysts fail to perceive the transformations underway or were they unwilling to accept them? While it is of essence to probe into our own research bias and increase our ability to engage with 'multiple perspectives' in an open dialogue, even when we profoundly disagree with our interlocutors (Dullo, 2016), we must not fail to acknowledge the work of those researchers who were indeed listening to and taking seriously those people who showed indignation with the political status quo and demanded radical change. Some of those works, for example, pointed towards an increasingly heated anti-PT climate in the rallies of 2013, and especially in those from 2016 onwards (Solano, Ortellado and Moretto, 2017) while others emphasised the key role of social media in spreading disinformation on the two main candidates and the upcoming election (Malini, Ciarelli and Medeiros, 2017; Tardáguila, Benevenuto and Ortellado, 2018; Nemer, 2018). In the run-up to the presidential election, Isabela Oliveira Kalil (2018) sketched out a typology of Bolsonaro supporters, showing the diversity of his future electoral base – ranging from young gamers to LGBTQI+ people and from conservative churchgoers to university students. These early studies – most of them based on ethnographic research – not only acutely perceived and dissected what for many was the ugly face of common sense (Mazzarella, 2019) but also paved the way for future research and public debate on the fundamental social and political transformations that we have been witnessing since 2013 (see especially Zanotta Machado and Motta, 2019; Neiburg and Ribeiro Thomaz, 2020; and Hatzikidi, 2021).

Crucially, more than an electoral shift to a different candidate and political party, analysts have flagged that the rise to power of the former army captain may also present a threat to the country's democratic institutions (see e.g. Abranches et al., 2019). By electing a former member of the armed forces, who, despite having a political career spanning three decades managed to successfully present himself as a political outsider and 'anti-system' candidate, many Brazilians also manifested their willingness to make a break with politics as usual, broadly imagined as inherently corrupt. Authoritarian, far-right and 'postfascist' (Traverso, 2019) candidates around the world present themselves as the only viable alternative to ruined political traditions that existentially threaten the suffering 'silent majority'. As political scientist Zeynep Gambetti (2018) has illustrated, the idea of a break with existing practices and discourses is central to how far-right movements like to represent themselves. Bolsonaro's attempt to present himself as anti-system was further confirmed, in the eyes of his followers, when he entered into conflict with his own party and left

the Social Liberal Party (PSL) during his first year in office. Having failed to create his own political party, the president has governed most of his first term independently of party affiliation.

The president's frequent accusations levelled against the country's Supreme Court, the press and the Congress, coupled with his – and those of members of his government, as a video recording of a 22 April 2020 cabinet meeting graphically demonstrated – threats of military intervention, are seen by some as reassuring signs of the president's non-conformity to the political establishment and, by others, as worrying signs of an unmistakable attempt to dismantle democratic institutions and pluralism. Furthermore, the election of Jair Bolsonaro, and the rise of a previously insignificant far-right party (PSL), not only harmed the PT and weakened the political left more broadly, but also inflicted an important blow to the traditionally powerful centre-right parties, the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) and the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) (see also Garmany's discussion on post-PT Brazil in this volume).

Those who see in the increasing militarisation of the government (in early 2021, 92 people linked to the armed forces headed key state positions, while over six thousand military personnel occupied civil positions in the Brazilian public administration, a more than 100 per cent increase from 2016)¹ a warning about the weakening of democratic institutions are often equally concerned about the self-serving behaviour of part of the political establishment which, from early 2020 onwards, loosely joined the government's base of support in the Congress. Some of these parties were also strengthened by the results of the 2020 municipal elections and further consolidated their role as nationally important political players after the election for presidents of the Senate and the lower house in February 2021. In what follows, we will explore some of the challenges the current administration presents to the country's democracy and situate them within a broader historical perspective.

Democracy imperilled: the politics of transgression

Focusing on the way the Brazilian president and members of his government have addressed ethno-racial, religious and sexual minorities and their individual and group rights – such as women's, LGBTQI+ and indigenous rights – many (e.g. Lacerda, 2019; Rennó, 2019) have looked at Bolsonaro's ascendancy in terms of a broader – sometimes understood as global – far-right backlash against wins conquered by liberation movements since the 1960s which decidedly shook previously well-established dynamics of inequality. This international far-right wave is largely regarded as having provided fertile ground for the emergence

1 'Mais de 6 mil militares já exercem funções civis no governo federal, diz TCU', *Consultor Jurídico*, 17 July 2020, <<https://www.conjur.com.br/2020-jul-17/mil-militares-exercem-funcoes-civis-governo-federal>> (accessed 31 March 2021).

of such diverse figures as Donald Trump in the US, Viktor Orbán in Hungary after 2010 and Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, and of political parties such as Vox and Alternative for Germany in the European political scene.

While Bolsonaro might have been 'the identity politics candidate for white men', much like Trump was in the US (De la Torre, 2017, p. 5; see also Rocha and Medeiros, 2020), his electoral base was not exclusively composed of white men, nor of his enthusiastic core of *bolsominions*, but was strikingly diverse. It is well documented that Bolsonaro fared better among college graduates, was less popular in the Northeast than any other region in Brazil, and that he proportionally gained more votes from evangelical than from Catholic Christians (Hunter and Power, 2019, p. 77; Vital da Cunha and Evangelista, 2019; Lehmann, this volume). Overall, however, he attracted voters from all income groups, except from the poor and very poor to whom he appears to be appealing for the first time during the Covid-19 pandemic and mainly as a result of an emergency relief aid paid to unemployed and informal workers (Brum, 2020).

Almeida and Guarnieri (2020) interviewed voters who are for and against Bolsonaro, asking about their views on political regimes and democratic institutions, as well as on contentious moral issues. Their results indicated that 'Bolsonaro seems to have conquered a niche of conservative supporters regarding moral values, mobilizing people that identify themselves with the political right, support law and order policies, are critical of the PT but are not anti-systemic or specially disaffected towards democracy' (p. 155). Pointing to a shared respect for democracy and trust towards democratic institutions among the people interviewed, Almeida and Guarnieri tried to make sense of these voters' support for a candidate that 'routinely displays anti-democratic behaviour and rhetoric and jeopardizes fundamental rights' (2020, p. 155) by suggesting that 'under certain circumstances' (2020, p. 156), such as periods of perceived crises, relatively moderate voters may opt for radical candidates. What is at stake, at least since the 1990s, is a discursive dispute over the meaning of democracy, citizenship, civil society and participation (Dagnino, 2004). If we accept that divergent understandings and antagonistic projects, including authoritarian dispositions, are proper to the democratic endeavour, what Bolsonaro represents is not necessarily the destruction of democracy as a form of government – albeit the prolonged conflicts with the judiciary and legislative powers might lead to that – but rather the renewed return of a long-established authoritarian and conservative agenda. Following Dagnino (2004), we would argue that the re-democratisation project – which aimed at not only ensuring and expanding political, social and civil rights to all citizens but, more importantly, at enlarging the field of politics beyond the state and its institutions, and at transforming authoritarian practices rooted in Brazilian sociability into more equal social relations (Dagnino, 2004, p. 154)

– encountered a challenging obstacle in the dissemination of neoliberal values and rationalities by conservative and pro-authoritarian members of society.

Historian Enzo Traverso (2019) proposed the notion of ‘postfascism’ as a way to unite under a common denomination the different far-right movements that have emerged or resurfaced in recent years. Locating the term in a historical sequence while emphasising its chronological distinctiveness, Traverso suggests that postfascism is a phenomenon in transition. It ‘starts out from anti-feminism, anti-Black racism, anti-Semitism and homophobia’ (2019, p. 31); but unlike classical fascism, which proposed a ‘total alternative to what looked like a decadent liberal order’, postfascism does not wish to change the system completely but to transform its institutions from within. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt’s acclaimed book *How Democracies Die* (2018) grapples with the disturbing phenomenon many modern (liberal) democracies are witnessing, namely the sidestepping or co-option of their ‘guardrails’ by democratically elected political ‘outsiders’ who threaten to erode the very political system through which they emerged to power. Such outsiders, instead of being filtered out by democracy’s gatekeepers (such as political parties) are assisted by enablers who usually think they can benefit from, ‘tame’ and ultimately get rid of the would-be authoritarian. This, however, is rarely the case. Instead, Levitsky and Ziblatt argue, once in power, these ‘outsiders’ begin to ignore a series of ‘soft’ and ‘informal norms’ of democracy, which necessarily accompany laws and constitutions, inflicting potentially long-lasting blows to their countries’ democratic institutions.

The view that democratically elected governments transform democracies into authoritarian regimes by assailing democratic institutions from within is often accompanied by a critique of national and international economic elites, foreign corporations and international monetary institutions, which are often exclusively concerned about their financial interests at the expense of serious, and harmful, political, social and environmental ramifications (Carvalho, 2019; see also Sklair, this volume). The latter are either downplayed or miscalculated because electoral promises made by political ‘outsiders’ are often not taken at face value and are hence not expected to correspond to real policies after election. Frequently, however, would-be authoritarians make good their promises of radical change.

Asked about growing militarism and acts of censorship during Bolsonaro’s government in a recent interview, former president Dilma Rousseff said that ‘in the current neoliberal crisis in Brazil, a sort of contamination that erodes democracy from within is taking place, like parasitic fungi (*fungos parasitas*) invading a tree and eating it away’ (Lemos and Maciel, 2020). In a similar vein, the philosopher Marcos Nobre suggested that ‘the destruction of democracy’ is a conscious and methodically planned goal of Jair Bolsonaro, and that launching himself as an ‘anti-system’ or ‘anti-establishment’ candidate

was precisely a promise to confront and dismantle what he painted as corrupt (Nobre, 2019, 2020).

It is important to note that once an illiberal or anti-democratic government is in power, the distance between the gradual erosion of democratic institutions and the imposition of an authoritarian regime may be rather narrow. For example, after Jair Bolsonaro's endorsement of nationwide protests designed to cow the press, the judiciary and the legislative body in early 2020, his son and congressman, Eduardo Bolsonaro, spoke publicly of an imminent democratic 'rupture' which he saw as inevitable. Indeed, while many feared a Fujimori-style 'self-coup' was underway, the Brazilian president came close to actually ordering the shutting down of the national Congress and the Supreme Court in May 2020 (Gugliano, 2020).

While discontinuities and disruptions with liberal democratic practices need to be carefully considered, continuities also deserve our attention. Gambetti (2018, p. 2) suggests that if we construe the alt-right as 'a specific mode of repoliticization in an age of neoliberal depoliticization, but one that exacerbates the problems plaguing political systems instead of effectively overcoming them', then such reactionary political forces are not much of an alternative to liberal practices already in place. As an example, Gambetti discusses the sacrificing of 'small debtors for the sake of big ones on grounds that prosperity of the population depended on the wellbeing of corporations' (2018, p. 2). Many commentators have maintained that we cannot consider Bolsonaro's ascent to power without tying his rise to a victorious conservative movement that emerged from the 2013 street demonstrations and largely occupied the vacuum created by the political crisis, obtaining real gains from the fragmentation of the left and establishment parties (Goldstein, 2019, p. 250; see also Bethell, 2018). At the same time, however, the governments of Lula and Dilma were, at best, ambivalent in their relationship with neoliberal policies and rationality. As Singer (2012) pointed out, there was a continuity with Cardoso's neoliberal policies during the PT's first years in power. Indeed, Saad-Filho (2020) offers a reconceptualisation of the particular varieties of neoliberalism in the PT governments: 'inclusive' (2003–6) and 'developmental' (2006–13). Since Rousseff's removal from power in 2016, Saad-Filho (2020) has observed a turn to 'authoritarian neoliberalism'.

Temer's interim presidency revoked labour rights and disciplined unions, marking a clear break with the PT administrations (see Garmany, this volume). In this sense, it became 'the biggest threat to the national-state-based model' initiated in the Vargas periods and strengthened in the Lula administrations (Goldstein, 2019, p. 253). Yet the conservative pact (Singer, 2012) of *lulismo* could also be seen as part of the neoliberal depoliticisation, or rather, as a particular manner of conducting politics: coalition presidentialism. As Nobre (2013) has notably argued, the formation of coalitions and the need for wide support from parties across the political spectrum have been a defining

element of Brazilian democracy since the first years of re-democratisation. The constitution of the 'Centrão', a large self-serving cluster of right and centre-right parties known for negotiating its support of any incumbent government – independently of its political orientation – in exchange for strategic positions and financial gains, has been characterised by Nobre (2013) as a distinctive political strategy against strong polarisation. In this sense, the rising New Right with its anti-PT conviction presented itself, at the same time, as neoliberal and anti-systemic repoliticisation.

As we have witnessed during the first couple of years of Bolsonaro's administration, however, the proclaimed break with the corrupt '*velha política*' (lit. 'old politics') did not materialise. Not only is the Bolsonaro family currently being investigated in a money-laundering scheme but the government also has several more ministries and staff members than promised, and the president was quick to enter into agreement with members of the Centrão in an attempt to strengthen his political alliances in the parliament and shield himself from a potential impeachment process. Contradicting his electoral promises, the Bolsonaro administration is far from breaking with the 'old ways' of doing politics and rather affirms, at least as far as negotiations with the Centrão are concerned, the 'politics as usual' tradition.

When comparing Bolsonaro's heterogeneous base with the conservative voters of the 1980s researched by Pierucci (1999), a central difference one acknowledges today is the pervasiveness of a neoliberal rationality in Brazilian society. Those who, at the end of the military regime, voted for conservative candidates may have much in common with contemporary New Right voters, but have one key difference: they were advocates for state intervention in the economy. The advancement of neoliberalism in Brazil in the 1990s and its reformulation during the PT governments had unexpected effects that we are now witnessing: the authoritarian national tradition has now moved away from the state and into the arms of neoliberal movements and politicians. Pierucci (1999, p. 60) had made a distinction – which is often blurred today – between, on the one hand, the 'anti-communism' and 'neoliberalism' present in the discourse of politicians and, on the other, the voters and the 'voluntary activists' of the right who were committed to moral values (such as family and God – but not necessarily the Church) and mostly acting out of fear (which he ironically defines as their claim for self-defence). For the heterosexual, God-fearing, white lower middle-class family of the 1980s which Pierucci discusses, insecurity was centred around criminality and the threats posed by criminals to what was conceived as their 'property' – including their sense of self and social identities. In other words, it was not so much the red menace, or new economic agendas, that motivated these conservative voters but the preservation of 'traditional' family values against the promulgation of human rights through a strict law-and-order government.

This 'conservatism from below' of the 1980s was a moralist crusade conducted by radical anti-egalitarianists with authoritarian solutions. And yet, those all-fearing families presented no anti-communism in their speeches. For them, communism was not a threat – at least no longer. How then did Lula, the previously bearded communist, and the figure of 'the left' at large, become the target of a passionate anti-communist crusade nearly three decades later? And this despite Lula's manoeuvre to eradicate any perception of himself or the PT as communist.

The suggestion here is that the revival of this trope in Brazilian politics happened because anti-communism was fuelled as a threat to an already conservative population. It only turned against the PT when the revelations made by the Car Wash investigation painted the party and those associated with it as corrupted and therefore criminals. Thus, the striking continuity between conservative politics in the 1980s and today does not lie in the anti-communist crusade but in an authoritarian moralist one, demanding a high-handed imposition of law and order to protect society from criminals. Their view of human rights as 'criminal rights' was just another part of the story being played behind the curtains. In that sense, Lula was successfully depicted during street protests as 'Pixuleco': a huge inflatable doll dressed in prisoner's clothes. By becoming a criminal, Lula became the same old threat, and communism became, once more, a plague to be eradicated. By association, the PT's projects of social inclusion and diversity were also under scrutiny from a moral angle, to the point of promoting a renewed culture war. In short, anti-communism, as a recurring trope for external and internal political enemies (Patto Sá Motta, 2020), regained momentum in the mid-2010s, years which, unlike the transition to democracy in the 1980s, were marked by a generalised feeling of multiple crises and rampant corruption, for which the PT was seen as the main culprit. Linked to criminality, the 'communists' thus became the main menace to the conservative traditional family.

A generalised fear of criminality has been behind many increments of the 'law-and-order' agenda and of recent political investments, such as anti-corruption discourse, changes in gun ownership regulations, and in the use of lethal force by law enforcement officers. Since 2008 there have been attempts to make any police killing a heinous criminal act (Lacerda, 2019, pp. 114–18), while the number of deaths attributed, formally or informally, to the police is one of the highest in the world. At the same time, Brazil has the third largest incarcerated population, behind the United States and Russia. One central dimension of this problem is the persistence of the militarised nature of street cops, despite sustained demands (Almeida, 2020) – even from inside the force – to make them civil officers. Previous efforts to disarm the population are being reversed under the Bolsonaro government, since there is a gun rights movement in progress with the justification of granting the possibility of self-defence to the ordinary 'good citizen', who would stand his ground against

'criminals' and protect his family and properties (Lacerda, 2019, pp. 127–9; Casado and Londoño, 2020). Bolsonaro has long received strong support from the lower ranks of militarised officers, including street cops. The 'law-and-order' agenda both informs the government's initiatives and attends to the historically conservative population that is represented in segments of the New Right.

As several of the chapters in this volume indicate, the country was moving into conservative land well before recent events took centre stage. In other words, we are suggesting that conservative and authoritarian positions were present but largely silenced during the decades of Brazilian re-democratisation. Beyond the conjunctural combination of background conditions Hunter and Power suggest, this volume considers the authoritarian Brazilian tradition (Schwarcz, this volume) and structural inequality (Moraes Silva, this volume) as equally important in understanding the transformation of a fringe political figure, such as Bolsonaro, into a 'myth'. In other words, one needs to consider both the changes and the continuities that mark this historical moment, refusing to attribute the electoral result only to a circumscribed sector of the population or to provide any singular explanation for such a complex phenomenon. While Brazil was forcefully confronted with its conservative face in recent years, to believe that authoritarian and conservative values are only present among Bolsonaro's voters would be another attempt to look away from the social realities that (re)surfaced in the last years.

Politics as culture wars

Radical provocation in defying cultural and religious establishments informs the logic of politics as culture war. The idea of breaking with existing practices and traditions, common to such different fields of social life as born-again Christianity and populist political discourse, is also present in the ways far-right political forces present themselves. (See also Smith's 2019 analysis of contemporary Brazilian politics, where she makes the case for a specifically clergy-driven nature of culture wars.) From Pat Buchanan (the US paleoconservative) to Steve Bannon (former executive chairman of the far-right *Breitbart News* and White House chief strategist in 2017) to Jair Bolsonaro, a relevant part of politics has become a battle over ideas and their diffusion on the old and new media. The far right seems to have taken Gramsci's theory that political change *follows* cultural and social change quite seriously.

Indeed, Olavo de Carvalho, one of the most influential ideologues of the Brazilian New Right, has been accusing the 'leftists' of waging a Gramscian culture war against the country and its morals for decades (Carvalho, 1999, 2002, 2008) and has been calling for the creation of a 'New Right'. The constitution of this New Right has many sides and Rocha's chapter in this volume traces some of its trajectories, in particular the development of circles

of the neo- and ultra-liberal New Right. In Carvalho's view, the military regime's 'mistake' was to fail to acknowledge the relevance of culture wars and it was hence necessary to organise the political right to respond to this affront. Two main battlegrounds have been identified by the ideologue: the old media (chiefly newspapers and television) and the formal public education system (schools and universities). Arguing that there is no space for conservatives in those formative places, the first move was to promote their ideas elsewhere – hence the strong use of new media (online teaching, YouTube, social media) and private cultural centres. His bestselling books attest to his popularity growing exponentially over the last years, during which he has not only become an important player in national politics, but also saw many of his former and new students occupying government positions.

Congressman and former vice-leader of the government in the Chamber of Deputies (lower house) Carlos Jordy affirmed in a recent interview that 'Gramscism' is a major current threat to Brazil, as it has infiltrated people's minds and even 'people who think they aren't socialists . . . think like socialists' (Bevins, 2020). Declarations like this one are much in line with Olavo de Carvalho's teaching and are indicative of the general climate of transforming leftist theories and theorists into catchwords in the anti-liberal crusade undertaken by some of Bolsonaro's core followers. As Gambetti (2018, p. 4) put it, the far right 'has read Gramsci well enough to know how a hegemonic struggle is to be waged. And they correctly suppose that the left still retains the upper hand in the creation and maintenance of culture.' Viewing mainstream media as – at best – unfriendly to the New Right project, it is not surprising that Bolsonaro refused to attend debates on national television with other candidates and focused instead on directly reaching Brazilians via social media and especially via the direct messaging application WhatsApp (Cesarino, 2020).

Reacting to the news of Bolsonaro's election, Filipe Martins, foreign policy adviser to the president and disciple of Olavo de Carvalho, tweeted: 'The new crusade has been decreed. Deus Vult!' Using a far-right catchphrase,² Martins declared the inauguration of a new era in Brazil: one that projects into the country's future a mythical, uniformly white, patriarchal and Christian version of the Crusades and emphasises Brazil's European (via Portugal) heritage. Despite its reference to the Middle Ages, this rhetorical strategy does not

2 *Deus Vult* ('God wills [it]') is a Latin Catholic motto associated with the Crusades, more specifically with the First Crusade of 1096–9. It has been repurposed by the far right as a code word denoting anti-Muslim racism and Judeo-Christian pride without engaging in direct hate speech. Much of the motto's use on social media indicates a fashioning of far-right activists as 'modern Crusaders' fighting to protect 'Western Christian values'. In the Brazilian context, medieval historian Paulo Pachá has suggested that the use of this battle cry by far-right groups is tied to a 'reactionary revisionism' which presents Brazil as 'Portugal's highest achievement, emphasizing a historical continuity that casts white Brazilians as the true heirs to Europe'. See further <<https://psmag.com/ideas/why-the-brazilian-far-right-is-obsessed-with-the-crusades>> (accessed 5 April 2020).

attempt to recover a moment in the past – which, indeed, never existed – but to shape the future. It exhorts the conservative citizen to consider himself as noble and brave as the mythical crusader, hence as the force of good fighting evil. Using the far-right lexicon, or tapping into its codes and rhetoric, is not a strategy unique to Martins – who instigated a closer collaboration between Steve Bannon, his far-right populist organisation the Movement, and the Brazilian government – but is commonly shared among sectors of the Bolsonaro government.

As political struggles over cultural hegemony are shaping public debates, analysts have stressed the value of transgression in reactionary politics. Rocha (this volume) argues that Brazilian conservatives construe themselves as a kind of counterpublic (Warner, 2002) that stresses their discomfort by deliberately behaving in an impolite manner. Their aim is not only to shock and quash a conventional ‘politically correct’ behaviour but also (and perhaps mainly) to frustrate and extend the limits of what are considered appropriate and accepted ways of conducting oneself in the public sphere. In his study of the history of Western conservative politics, Corey Robin (2018, p. 25) shows that ‘the embrace of radicalism on the right’ is not antithetical to its tradition but, on the contrary, ‘it has to do with the reactionary imperative that lies at the core of conservative doctrine’. Conservatism, being an ideology of reaction, argues Robin, seeks to reconfigure the old and absorb the new it tries to change. In light of recent strategies employed by far-right movements and leaders across the world, especially with the use of digital media, it has been suggested that the far right ‘understands the value of transgression, edginess and counterculture often better than their left-wing opponents’ (Nagle, 2017, p. 61), advancing its political role by setting the tone for public discourse.

An issue that has troubled many analysts in the run-up to the 2018 presidential elections and afterwards has been the public manifestation of intolerance. Authoritarian populist politics appear to have recovered an old conception of difference as fixed and strictly segregative. Schwarcz (2019) has noted that the concept of ‘difference’ has been used to discredit rather than acknowledge the diversity of the human experience. While especially from the 1980s onward the claims for inclusive social policies amplified the perception of diversity in politics (see Arruti and Held, this volume), a strict egalitarianism at all levels could not be fully realised and inequality could be best dealt with by ‘respecting the diversity’ (Schwarcz, 2019). As Pierucci (1999) also shows, the old conservatism from before the 1980s was still pushing for an essentialised vision of ‘difference’, marked by regional, racial and gender prejudices. Over the last three to four decades those conservatives were told that speaking out was not acceptable and that a change of behaviour was needed for re-democratisation to succeed.

Yet the present historical moment makes clear that prejudice and intolerance were never satisfactorily abandoned but were rather silenced and dissimulated

in the public sphere under the surface of a more inclusive citizenship and a long-venerated 'tolerance ritual'. This was exemplified in the socio-political field through such concepts as 'cordiality' (Holanda, 2012 [1936]; see also de Souza Santos, 2019). Recent years have witnessed the return of those dispositions through open confrontation and expression of polarisation in a new fashion as attacks on political correctness and claims of freedom of speech. As Schwarcz (2019) suggested, unlike the past, today many Brazilians do not care to be defined as pacific but rather they prefer to parade their intolerance (2019, pp. 211–16). For Schwarcz, the decisive turning point for the transition from tolerance to intransigence was the 2016 impeachment: it lifted the lid 'of the cauldron of resentment, which spilled over into a deliberate politics of hate and polarisations' (Schwarcz, this volume).

Ruth Wodak and Pieter Bevelander (2019), in their introduction to a volume on populism and nationalism, discuss political scientist Ivan Krastev's reflections on growing xenophobia and fear of Islamisation in several Eastern European countries. According to Krastev, such phenomena are better understood as a popular reaction to these countries' brain drain. With people continuously leaving their homes, many of those left behind are 'afraid "their" culture, language and traditions might die out. This is why, Krastev argues, they close their borders to migrants and refugees coming from elsewhere, especially if the latter are Muslim' (Wodak and Bevelander, 2019, p. 9). Muslims, perceived as antithetical to 'their' Christian traditions, are seen as radically different in cultural terms, and become the main target of local hostility towards the 'other'. If we consider this fear of 'otherness', expressed in European right-populist rhetoric as predominantly the fear of the migrant Muslim other, as more broadly a fear towards difference, then, in the Brazilian case, this may include a fear towards the culturally different domestic other (cf. Arruti, 1997). In this case, then, instead of a 'crusade' to protect the 'true' Hungarian, Austrian or other European from 'Islamisation', the battle is waged for the safeguarding of the 'true' Brazilian (the real patriot), at the expense and exclusion of other versions of Brazilianness.

But why is it that people now feel the liberty to proudly express intolerance? What are the conditions of possibility of such public manifestations of intolerance? Part of the answer, or a path towards answering, lies, we suggest, in shifting perceptions of 'reality' towards an understanding of a world in moral decay and a conviction of the absolute firmness of the radical dualism between 'good' and 'evil'. A Manichean populist lexicon is shaping political cosmologies and reduces the complexities of this world to an eternal battle between the 'righteous citizens' (*cidadãos de bem*) and 'criminals' (*bandidos*) (see Dullo, 2021; Hatzikidi, 2020). Wanting to create a new future in which people would live a 'traditional' way of life in the face of growing visibility and rights acquired by minorities and underprivileged social groups – such as Black people and *quilombolas*, indigenous people, women and LGBTQI+ people –

conservative Brazilians wished to help ‘restore order’ in the country by voting for a Christian patriarch with vociferous misogynist, racist and anti-democratic views (see especially the chapters by Schwarcz and the afterword by Terena, Tikuna and Soares, this volume). Not unlike what Robin (2018) describes as typically conservative, Bolsonaro’s election simultaneously expressed a reaction to what many saw as culturally and politically threatening and a willingness to bring about major changes.

In their discussion of the relationship between evangelical (neo-Pentecostal) churches and the media, Birman and Lehmann (1999) explored the intersection of religious conflict and conflict over political power and the control of the popular imaginary. Analysing the famous ‘*chute na Santa*’ – the incident in 1995 where Pastor Sergio von Helder, then head of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (IURD) in São Paulo, kicked an effigy of Our Lady Aparecida, Brazil’s patron – Birman and Lehmann argued that ‘the war’ that broke out in its aftermath was not a merely commercial affair (between the rival networks Globo and TV Record), nor was it purely ideological (given the IURD’s political involvement), but it was rather about cultural hegemony (Birman and Lehmann, 1999, p. 150). The incident, they suggested, was not simply an attack on the possession cults and the Catholic Church, but – importantly – it also challenged or threatened ‘the cultural hegemony enjoyed by an intelligentsia and a political class educated and formed in a culture of Catholicism’ (Birman and Lehmann, 1999, p. 158). In light of the centrality of the attacks on the cultural, religious, political and intellectual Brazilian establishment in Bolsonaro’s electoral campaign and post-election period, Birman and Lehmann’s discussion of events more than two decades ago remains strikingly relevant. In fact, it points to the continuation of the culture war in another battleground: the soul of the citizen.

Evangelical Christianity in Brazil has been growing significantly in recent decades. Between 1991 and 2010, the number of Catholics roughly dropped by 1 per cent per year while that of evangelicals grew by 0.7 per cent. In recent years, both the Catholic decrease and the evangelical increase rate have accelerated. According to a survey published by the Datafolha polling institute in January 2020, evangelicals are now the majority among Christians between the ages of 16 and 44, a dramatic change for a country that still represents the largest Catholic community in the world.³

While there are several reasons for the expansion of evangelical churches in Brazil, one thing we know for sure is that their message is appealing and increasingly resonates with new converts (see also Lehmann, this volume). In them, followers find (among other things) affirmation of values and moral positions that are challenged elsewhere. Traditional hierarchies – such as

3 ‘Cara típica do evangélico brasileiro é feminina e negra, aponta Datafolha’, *Folha de São Paulo*, 13 January 2020, <<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/01/cara-tipica-do-evangelico-brasileiro-e-feminina-e-negra-aponta-datafolha.shtml>> (accessed 5 April 2020).

heteronormative gender types and the nuclear family structure (despite the existence of a minority of LGBTQI+ evangelical churches; see e.g. Silva, 2016) – are being morally validated in such spaces and hence gain new impetus with the growth of evangelical churches and with the increasing participation of pastors and church members in formal politics (Carvalho Junior and Oro, 2017). This, however, should not be understood as a simple equation of evangelical conversion with increasing conservatism in the country but rather as an indication of the growing relevance of such issues as morality in relation to social change over the past few decades.

Morality has indeed been at the centre of social and political transformations in recent years, and Bolsonaro's election was partly due to his campaign successfully portraying him as a saviour for a country in moral dissipation. He demonised his political opponents as inherently immoral and corrupt and promised to save the country from total ruin. He ran on a campaign that fostered an image of a decomposing world – in which the figure of the devil is central – fundamentally divided between good and evil; between 'patriots' and 'leftist psychos' (*esquerdopatas*). This called for an almost divine intervention of a Messiah – Bolsonaro's middle name – or a '*mito*' who would denounce the corrupt and failed establishment and bring about hope and radical change. Bolsonaro availed himself of a language that drew on widespread millenarianism among Brazilian Christians and fused together messianic and populist rhetorics to portray himself as the heroic leader and 'saviour' (Bonfim, 2020; Lebner, 2019).

Finally, what Bolsonaro's election also proved is that the fragmentation of public spheres of interest is better addressed by an equally fragmented discourse. While at first glance the president's discourse may appear incoherent or contradictory, it forms part of a carefully structured political communication strategy with which Bolsonaro is able to reach different social and economic groups at the same time (Kalil, 2018, p. 7). This communication strategy, known as micro-targeting, was successfully implemented by Donald Trump's 2016 presidential campaign, especially as it played out on Facebook (Marantz, 2020). Analysing a sample of widely distributed images on WhatsApp during the month immediately prior to the first round of the 2018 presidential elections, Rafael Evangelista and Fernanda Bruno (2019) suggested that 'messages were partially distributed using a centralised structure, built to manage and to stimulate members of discussion groups, which were treated as segmented audiences' (2019, p. 3). Their study of pro-Bolsonaro WhatsApp groups shows that in the Brazilian case too, political micro-targeting strategies operated together with disinformation campaigns (see also Davis and Straubhaar, 2020).

Building a perfect storm

We have already discussed the need to look at recent political transformations in Brazil as the result of deep-seated political legacies, such as authoritarianism,

and structural phenomena, such as socio-economic inequality, that came together at a critical moment of widespread discontent. Jair Bolsonaro left the political fringe and launched himself as an incorruptible Messiah with a mission to save the nation. But to succeed, he needed to convince voters that the nation's situation was indeed critical. People needed to see and feel the state of urgency the country was in and understand that the best (if not the only) way out of this crisis was the self-proclaimed political outsider. As anthropologist Jane Roitman (2013) pointed out, the diagnostic and narrative of crisis is a particular political device that enables a position of criticism with specific propositions and solutions. In other words, Bolsonaro did not simply avail himself of the existing climate of crises (economic, political, etc.) but contributed to its creation by performing crisis to build a perfect storm.

Sociologist Rogers Brubaker (2017, p. 377) has argued that 'the active, discursive bringing-together or tying-together' of different crises and physical insecurities and anxieties of the population that political actors and the media 'dramatise, televisualise, and emotionalise' contributes to the creation of a perfect storm. Such association, between political actors who perform, or actively engage with, crises and a population that experiences the ensuing anxieties, is often made about populist politics. Writing nearly twenty years ago, Paul Taggart (2004, pp. 275, 282–3) suggested that populism is a reaction to a *sense* of extreme crisis; of a feeling of living at a turning point in history and that politics as usual cannot deal with the unusual and urgent conditions of the moment. More recently, Nicole Curato (2016) argued that Duterte's 'penal populism' is best seen as a 'negotiated relationship' between the leader and his constituency which builds on two distinct, but mutually reinforcing, political logics: the politics of anxiety and the politics of hope. While Duterte built a narrative of crisis by politicising the public's 'latent anxieties', which thereafter became central, his penal populism – which, much like Bolsonaro's punitive public security discourse, drew a rigid dichotomy between the 'virtuous citizens' and the 'hardened criminals' beyond redemption that needed to be eliminated – carried with it the promise of justice, and hence a politics of hope among the Filipino population (2016, pp. 94, 102–6).

The apparent paradox which lies at the heart of penal populism perfectly captures the tensions inherent in crisis moments, where feelings of anxiety, fear and anger coexist with feelings of hope for change. Elchardus and Spruyt (2016, p. 125) have argued that political choices are moulded by perceptions of how society is doing, suggesting that populism 'appears primarily as a reaction to a societal diagnosis'. They emphasise the role of 'declinism', understood as a negative view of the state of society (2016, p. 117), in the support for populist candidates in Western Europe. Their understanding is that in this option lies a politics of hope; the promise of a return to 'the good society'. Paul Taggart's concept of the 'heartland' similarly proposes 'a territory of the imagination' (2004, p. 274), representing the good life as it supposedly once was, as a

core theme of populism. From this perspective, populism is 'felt rather than reasoned' and it is 'shrouded in imprecision' (2004, p. 274).

Undeniably, populism has passionate advocates and critics. For some, for example, populism is 'an illiberal democratic response to undemocratic liberalism' (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018, p. 1670), whereas for others it is a phenomenon 'integral to democratic processes since time immemorial' (Kapferer and Theodossopoulos, 2018, p. 1), yet one that proves to be 'highly vulnerable to forces that are potentially opposed to the system of democracy' (ibid., pp. 7–8). Populism is often understood as exclusionary – particularly in its far-right and authoritarian variants – but it is also associated with different forms of inclusion, as seen especially in leftist populist experiences, such as that of SYRIZA in Greece (see e.g. Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014). In Brazil, as Jorge Ferreira (2001, p. 12) reminds us, after Fernando Collor de Mello's election in 1990, populism was no longer associated with a particular historical period but was seen, by a part of the population and academia alike, as a 'real curse on domestic politics', associated with notions of mass manipulation. While the very usefulness of the concept continues to be challenged by many – with some opting for 'limiting', historically situated emic concepts which, they argue, can better describe local specificities (e.g. Gomes, 2014, p. 19) – populism theorists strongly defend its use as an analytic category, suggesting it can 'bring into focus important aspects of contemporary politics' (Brubaker, 2017, p. 367).

Most populism scholars today agree on a definition – one that emphasises an antagonistic division between 'the people' and a powerful group generally understood as 'the elite' or 'the establishment' – but there is still disagreement about the type of phenomenon that populism is (Moffitt, 2020, p. 11). While an exploration of the genealogy of the concept and the different attempts to describe it (notably, as a thin-centred ideology, a discourse, a political strategy and a performative way of doing politics) is beyond the scope of this introduction, we are here particularly interested in those studies that emphasise 'the performativity of crisis as an internal feature of populism' (Moffitt, 2015, p. 190). Based on the premise that crises are never 'neutral' events but are always mediated and performed by political actors, this approach invites us to see populism acting as a trigger for crisis, instead of seeing crisis only as a trigger or necessary precondition (Laclau, 1977, 2005) for populism. For scholars who follow this approach, the 'performative staging of a wrong' (Ostiguy, Panizza and Moffitt, 2021, p. 3), that is to say, the performative construction of crisis around a set of events, is what distinguishes populism as a political phenomenon.

As discussed already, in the years leading up to the 2018 presidential elections in Brazil, the PT was increasingly seen, by part of the population, as the main culprit behind large corruption scandals, the revelation of which profoundly shook the political establishment. The coming together of political and

economic crises, together with pivotal socio-cultural changes – the ‘progressivist shock’ Rocha discusses in her chapter – and religious transformations, created propitious conditions for the emergence of an impactful performative dimension of crisis, one that would accentuate the feeling of living at a critical moment which required an unorthodox response. Building a narrative of crisis around the fundamental corruption (understood in profoundly moral terms) of the entire political class, and of the former governing party (PT) in particular, Bolsonaro’s performativity of crisis tapped into pre-existing crisis narratives, fears and anxieties. Drawing on such narratives, he painted the entire society as contaminated (or in fear of contamination) by the deleterious acts and legacy of the PT administrations and promised to return the lost ‘heartland’ of conservative Christian values to the law-abiding citizens and patriots who had been wronged for too long.

A key element of populist performativity is what Pierre Ostiguy (2017, p. 3) has described as the ‘flaunting of the “low”’. According to this view, populist actors adopt a style – ranging from the way they dress and wear their hair to the way they speak and eat – that resonates with particular segments of the population. It is important to note that these ‘low’ cultural appeals that inform the political relationship between populist leaders and their voters are linked to an antagonistic understanding of socio-cultural differences: the populist actor embraces (and embodies) ‘what has been “disregarded” in the polity’ (Ostiguy, 2017, p. 85). We could think of Boris Johnson’s ‘messy’ hair or Jair Bolsonaro’s ‘passion’ for condensed milk and bread snacks, but also of the indecorous and ‘candid’ responses to the press or members of the opposition and of defending controversial issues in polemical speeches. As Brubaker (2017, p. 367) put it: ‘Since the body is a potent political operator and signifier, proximity to “the people” can be communicated and performed through gesture, tone, sexuality, dress, and food.’ The appeal of this ‘proximity’ draws on existing social cleavages which are politicised. The limits of what is considered ‘proper’ or ‘acceptable’ political behaviour are redefined, while the values of informality and transgression are once more asserted.

The performativity of crisis by populist actors hence shifts the horizon of the political and social field of meaning, redefining what is achievable and ‘the limit of what is representable within it’ (Laclau, 2005, p. 81). Such performativity may thus expand the horizon of emancipatory possibilities, providing conditions for broader political participation and democratisation. Political imagination can unfold beyond the existing ‘real’ to include utopian visions of a better collective future once the crisis moment is past. It may also, however, produce the reverse: a contraction of the socio-political space for debate, participation and dissent, leading instead to further discontent and resentment, or indeed to disengagement and a cynical understanding of politics. For as Margaret Canovan (1999, p. 13) famously argued, ‘unrealistic visions may be a condition of real achievements as well as being a recipe for

disappointment'. In what follows, we will look at some of the ways in which the performativity of crisis was manifested by Jair Bolsonaro and his campaign, and the implications of such narratives and acts for popular perceptions of reality and truth.

Conspiracy theories and disinformation campaigns

'A spectre is haunting the world – populism.' With this phrase, Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner opened the short introduction to the now classic volume *Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics*, first published in 1969, adding that at the time of writing the question of communism sounded 'a little out of date'. Yet as discussed already, mainstream political discourse in Brazil in recent years suggests otherwise. Indeed, the spectre of communism, in a revamped Cold War-era rhetorical mould (Solano, 2019, p. 311), and often interchanged with the menace posed by the so-called leftist cultural hegemony, was one of the key items that shaped populist discourse and stirred up public debates for and against Bolsonaro in the run-up to the 2018 presidential elections. Conspiracist rhetoric was an important component of such discourse, which reached millions of Brazilians through the unprecedented use of social media as a main channel for political campaigning and direct communication with 'the people'.

From 'cultural Marxist indoctrination' and 'gender ideology' strategies implemented at schools through such tools as the 'gay kit' to the 'sabotage' by Roberto Alvim's 'leftist aides' accused of having introduced Joseph Goebbels's phrases to the speech given by the then secretary of culture, conspiracy theories have spread into the mainstream through an avalanche of 'alternative news' that decidedly blurs Plato's distinction between *episteme* and *doxa*. For a long time ridiculed as paranoid and confined to the fringes of society, heterodox knowledge appears to have made a forceful comeback and, while still stigmatised, it exerts growing influence (Butter and Knight, 2018, 2020). In this process of 'mainstreaming the fringe' (Barkun, 2016, p. 4), social media and other online platforms play a key role in widely diffusing such information and increasing its visibility.

Disinformation campaigns, blending facts with deliberately misleading material, also present a threat to democracy in that they may serve specific authoritarian agendas that wish to attack democratic institutions and individuals by instigating fear and mistrust. The Covid-19 pandemic has spawned a new wave of false narratives around the world, and Brazil was one of the countries that was especially affected by them. Misinformation and disinformation can prove especially dangerous in tackling major health crises, as people may hesitate to follow the recommendations made by health experts, ignoring or underestimating the risks involved. President Bolsonaro first dismissed the virus's existence ('fantasy') and then seriously curtailed its importance ('little

flu' – '*gripezinha*' and '*resfriadinho*'), while accusing the press of hysteria and of seeking to overthrow him. His consistent attempts to downplay the importance of prevention – rejecting the use of masks and the need for social distancing – and his active encouragement of Brazilians to continue their lives as before the pandemic has been at least partly responsible for a great number of Brazilians refusing to follow public health guidance – such as that given by the World Health Organization – which contributed to one of the highest infection and death rates in the world.

In a 2019 interview, anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro suggested that Bolsonaro's government was undertaking a deliberate political plan of anti-liberal cultural regression which aimed to introduce confusion and denialism. In such a dystopian development, he argued, it is reality itself that has become hard to believe (Barros and Domenici, 2019). In light of our discussion, however, a prominent question arises: whose reality is believable? The term 'alternative news', attributed to Kellyanne Conway, counsellor to the former US President Donald Trump, is becoming widely used and it aims precisely at obfuscating the limits of what can generally be considered as 'real'. Can we establish consensus on what 'reality' is in the era of 'post-truth'?

For Schwarcz (2019), nothing is hard to believe when, in the 'us'-versus-'them' polarisation, the 'others' are stripped of any moral limits; they can hence be considered capable of anything and charged with every possible accusation. In the Brazilian case, Ashley Lebnner (2019) suggests that such Manichean views of reality resonate with a messianic Christian tradition of a decomposing world under attack by the forces of evil – so there is a much broader and deep-seated structure where populist and conspiracist rhetoric can be accommodated. In calling attention to the importance of considering Christianity when analysing the rhetoric of moral crisis, especially around 'the fundamental corruption of politics' in Brazil, however, Lebnner is also cautious to remind us that 'Christian rhetoric around evil doesn't always mobilise Christians, even if it resonates' (2019, p. 144).

It seems nonetheless, to have indeed been significant for a part of the population in 2018. Explaining her thesis of the 'bolsonarization of Brazil', Esther Solano (2019, p. 319) argued that a 'wish for a messianic justice against the enemy' was one of the elements that prevailed in the run-up to the 2018 presidential elections. And while millenarianism may well have a place in the public sphere – for, as Cornel West (2011, p. 132) has suggested, its very disruptions are calls to attention that make people see realities that make them uncomfortable – Bolsonaro's far-right populist discourse sees society as fundamentally divided between 'righteous citizens' and 'criminals'. This discourse, which is historically shared by many conservative Brazilians (Pierucci, 1999; Caldeira, 2001), brings to the fore the role of the 'enemy', central to most populist rhetorics across the political spectrum. Hence, if we consider Brazil's 'biblical culture' (Velho, 1995), its 'Catholic secularity' (Dullo,

2015), and the widespread influence of millenarianism (Pessar, 2004), the multiple faces of the 'enemy' ('leftists', 'communists', 'feminists', 'atheists' and so on) are transformed into a complex and multivalent 'political category of accusation' (Almeida, 2017, 2019) where a deep-rooted Christian polarisation of good versus evil finds a secular populist frame.

Others have also pointed to the adoption and amplification of the 'good' versus 'bad' division of society – which is of course not exclusive to the new-right but resonates across the political spectrum – by mainstream media. Martijn Oosterbaan (2017, p. 84), for example, argued that 'the Brazilian news media conspire to construct an image of society that is fundamentally divided between "the good" and "the bad"'. However, it is important to note that neither Bolsonaro nor the New Right were the ones who initiated this polarisation, which has been escalating since the June 2013 street demonstrations (Dullo, 2021), but rather they capitalised on and aggravated it. The fragmentation of the public sphere, already composed of distinct publics and their counterpublics, which instead of talking to each other were mostly talking to themselves, was intensified by digital echo chambers that reinforce confirmation bias (Kolbert, 2017) and affirm people's own 'truths' – both on the New Right and on the 'old left'. Bolsonaro established his 'internal antagonistic frontier' (Laclau, 2005) early on: the PT and all those who supported it, and even those who did not vehemently oppose it, were conniving against the will and power of 'the people' and Brazil itself. For order and progress to be restored, the corrupt leftists had not only to be defeated but also to receive an exemplary blow, a vote of punishment, which would force them to retreat. In this process of polarisation, identities were naturalised, and difference, as discussed earlier, was reconfigured as fixed and strictly segregative.

After evidence came to light in the lead-up to the first round of the 2018 elections – especially from a study that analysed posts in 347 WhatsApp chat groups, undertaken by the fact-checking platform Agência Lupa in collaboration with researchers from two public Brazilian universities (USP and UFMG) – that much of the content that was circulating through the messaging app relied on a network strategy in which 'fake news' was first sent to regional and local activists, who would then spread the messages widely to private and public groups, it became clear that social media had played an important role, unprecedented in a Brazilian presidential campaign. Social scientists and journalists studying digital disinformation observed the ubiquitous presence of metalinguistic patterns structuring the massive volume of content – memes, videos, audios, texts – firehosed on certain social media networks, such as WhatsApp groups, during and after the 2018 electoral campaign. They have argued that some kind of 'science of populism' must have oriented their design and implementation (Cesarino, 2020; see also Nemer, 2018 and Campos Mello, 2020).

Such phenomena did not end with the presidential election. Known for his prolific online activity, Bolsonaro is applying populist rhetoric to address his political base directly, bypassing traditional media where speech is often moderated. It is well known that social media creates the impression of direct and unmediated interaction (Urbinati, 2015) with people in positions of power. ‘Followers’ often see themselves as ‘actors’ in the political scene, being able to directly get in contact with a country’s leaders through online platforms. As Waisbord and Amado (2017) showed, however, presidential communication on social media remains essentially top-down. In other words, participation in what appears to be an open online dialogue veils an often strictly circumscribed space for engagement and interaction. While this is a complex and multilevel phenomenon, the analysis of which goes beyond the scope of this introduction, we agree with Garmany who, in this volume’s final chapter, suggests that new technologies may decisively change the way we think of and engage with politics.

Overview of the chapters

The eight chapters that comprise this volume have been split into two large temporal foci: before and after the 2018 presidential election. Although all the contributors are interested in exploring the shifting horizon of political possibilities that enabled Bolsonaro’s rise to power and analyse, from different perspectives, specific transformations that were underway over the previous years, some turn more explicitly towards present changes and future challenges. We have thus decided to group them under two key questions: ‘How did we get here?’ and ‘Where are we going?’

In the first chapter, Lilia Moritz Schwarcz charts continuities and discontinuities in Brazil’s history and suggests that many of its past ghosts continue to haunt its present. In line with this volume’s understanding of the 2018 presidential election, as we have sketched in this introduction, she places the current authoritarian turn within global shifts towards conservative regimes and authoritarian populist leaders. In doing so, however, she reveals the tensions between the broader and the specific, suggesting that the Brazilian case ‘is neither a circumstantial nor a solely global question’, and traces Brazil’s specificities in the country’s ‘authoritarian roots’. Schwarcz delves into the past and shows that a long experience of slavery, patrimonialism and fiefdoms, lack of equal access to education, and violence continue to inform naturalised structures of hierarchy which shape a deeply unequal society. Attentive to the paradoxes of a country that has been oscillating between a self-image of tolerance and openness to diversity and a public exaltation of intolerance, as we have witnessed especially in recent years, she reminds us that democracy has, since its inception, been an inconclusive process, one that always needs to be remade and broadened. This observation allows Schwarcz to place the current wave of authoritarianism – which appears at times to be the antonym of

democracy – within the democratisation process, and suggest that a viable way forward is to adhere to the ‘golden rule of citizenship’: learning from difference.

José M. Arruti and Thaisa Held similarly emphasise the interruptions and continuities of the process of democratisation, focusing on the challenges faced by *quilombolas* in accessing and protecting their constitutionally guaranteed rights. Their analysis sets off from the premise that since 2016 Brazil has been experiencing ‘post-democracy’, or a process of ‘de-democratisation’, characterised by the gradual dismantling of social achievements – such as labour casualisation, revocation of social rights, reduction of public services – and a growing dismissal of the importance of socio-cultural diversity that, taken together, are essentially undoing the process of democratisation that had been taking place since the early 1980s. Their discussion, split into two main parts, examines how the processes of democratisation and de-democratisation affect the process of constructing the *quilombola* population (communities originally created by formerly enslaved people and their descendants) as a political and legal actor. In the first part, Arruti and Held show that despite the protection of *quilombola* collective rights to land and culture in the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, the recognition of these rights has always been a hard-won conquest by the *quilombolas*, who faced important setbacks and were met with institutional resistance throughout the period of democratisation. In the second part, they outline some of the most visible and immediate effects of the de-democratisation process on *quilombola* communities. Their understanding is that while the processes of democratisation and de-democratisation are characterised by ambiguities and setbacks, Bolsonaro’s aim to consolidate his conservative political project, which prioritises the free movement of capital, is effectively leaving very little room for *quilombola* rights or indeed for socio-cultural and socio-environmental diversity.

In the third chapter, Camila Rocha explores the origins of the New Right in Brazil, highlighting the role of social media in providing alternative spaces for debate and the dissemination of ideas that did not always find space in traditional media, even from the early digital period in Brazil. Discussing the significance of two main pillars – radical free-market libertarianism and conservatism – for the development of the New Right, Rocha argues that they provided the ideological foundation for Bolsonaro’s campaign and, since 2018, government. In her analysis she places special attention to the role of Olavo de Carvalho in establishing a ‘shared political grammar’ among the New Right, in which the fights against globalism and leftist cultural hegemony were fundamental. Rocha shows that while these ideas have long circulated across the different counterpublics that met in online forums, it was only after the ‘progressivist shock’ of the early 2010s – with the establishment, for example, of racial quotas, and the extension of labour rights to domestic workers – that they began to attract new adherents and gain traction outside these online spaces.

David Lehmann, in the fourth chapter, delves into the evangelical ‘other’, at once familiar and unknown. Evangelicals have pushed forth a moral and intellectual transformation of the cultural background of Brazilian societies, attempting to bring their agendas on sexuality, gender, family and education into institutional politics, disrupting a historically established conception of *laicidade*. Due to this scenario, Lehmann asks us to take the evangelical presence in Brazilian society seriously in his effort to understand how their votes shaped the 2018 elections. Acknowledging the group’s vast internal diversity, Lehmann is exploring the ‘evangelical mindset’. He discusses the ways it may have influenced the political polarisation in the run-up to the previous presidential election, but also presents some of the challenges the progressive parties may face in the next. The attempt to circumscribe an evangelical mindset goes through pastors’ methods of mobilisation and the inspiration derived from textual sources into a ‘cult of the text’. Following their thread of hidden meanings, images, symbols and gaps in stories, Lehmann shows how this religious mindset put together a narrative of messianic unfolding. Inspired by a particular perception of Israel and the Jews, the messianic configuration connects the text, the ritual practices and support of Brazilian foreign policy in the Middle East.

In line with other chapters, Graziella Moraes Silva taps into the notion of processes that are open-ended and continuously negotiated in her analysis of racial formation in Brazil’s recent history. She takes a close look at the ways racial categories have been socially constructed and transformed in the past few decades. She does this by focusing on three intersecting levels of analysis: macro, meso, and micro. The macro-historical narratives are analysed through their interactions with global debates on race, observing Brazil’s transition from racial democracy to affirmative action. The institutional changes made to implement top-down policies that aimed at tackling structural racial inequalities provide the meso focus of Moraes Silva’s analysis. The previous two foci, and the changes they brought into effect, allow us to better understand the new tensions and disputes at the micro level, especially those around racial classification, and how state institutional practices may sometimes shape the latter. Her analysis of past categories offers a privileged vantage point from looking at the current administration and the colour-blind project which it embraces. While Bolsonaro’s racist comments are often dismissed as simply provocative, Moraes Silva importantly suggests that they do not operate in a vacuum but provide a frame for the implementation of policies that reproduce racial inequalities and privileges. At the same time, she also calls our attention to antithetical tendencies, such as bottom-up initiatives propelled by anti-racism – e.g. Black Lives Matter – and the growing visibility and empowerment of Black movements.

In chapter six, Andreza A. de Souza Santos looks away from state capitals, which often monopolise research attention, and focuses on the reality of 95

per cent of Brazilian cities, those with populations of less than one hundred thousand. Is the possibility of political engagement in a small city similar to those scholars have been portraying while researching in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo or Recife? At first, social media would appear as an equaliser, allowing many unheard voices to enter the public sphere. However, as de Souza Santos shows, there is no equal ability for people to express themselves and, in fact, political exposure can have harmful repercussions to someone living in precarity. The recent labour reform only worsened this situation, creating self-censorship and a current lack of protests. Through research carried out with a community association and looking at grassroots politics in a small city in the context of economic change, de Souza Santos asks how we can understand the silences in a country marked by protests, and what we can learn from the experience of those small cities. What can we make of silences, and how do they become strategic in a social context where the worker's political position may be antagonistic to that of their employer or when silence is the response to well-established neoliberal policies?

In chapter seven, Jessica Sklair gives a fascinating account of a little-known story: the Brazilian corporate and financial elite's political and social engagements, that is, of several employers who attempt to do good and make money at the same time. The divergences from better-known organisations of civil society are striking, even when one looks at this small and progressive strand of the economic elite. How do they understand and approach development? What are their aims and how do they connect with recent economic changes? By highlighting the notion of 'impact investing', Sklair shows that 'elite philanthropy has pursued an approach to development based on deeper incorporation of the entrepreneurial poor into the country's capitalist marketplace'; that is, the progressive elite aims at 'the fashioning of the entrepreneurial poor' in order to make them responsible for their own inclusion at the same time as looking for an increased consumption.

Suggesting that 2018 may be a pivotal moment for social movements, in the final chapter, Jeff Garmany raises crucial questions about the impact of Bolsonaro's election on the organisation and communication of political networks and of the relationship between state and civil society. Anti-PT sentiment has placed some doubts on the future of the left in Brazil, and Garmany wonders about a post-PT future. Considering the centrality of the party to recent democratic history, how will the left organise in a post-PT political landscape? If 'in Brazil, social movements rarely seek autonomy or anarcho-governance through mass mobilisation, but rather access to the state and its resources through vertically assembled leadership networks', this might be changing now, due to new technologies such as social media and increased access to cyberspace beyond geographical boundaries. Those changes are also transforming the position of intermediaries, which were 'central to political machinery in the past' and were used to control the engagement of the social

base of many movements. A more direct and autonomous form of collective action might appear, in which – as we are already beginning to see – alternative organisational networks can change the political landscape. However, as Garmany emphasises, the digital turn in Brazilian politics might also be far from a progressive change.

In the conclusion, the editors reflect on some of the issues raised in the book and consider the horizon(s) of political possibilities that may be emerging in Brazil ahead of the 2022 presidential election. The volume closes with an afterword written by three anthropologists, two of them indigenous Brazilians. In it, Taily Terena, João Tikuna and Gabriel Soares stress the continuities – as opposed to a rupture that Bolsonaro's election represented for many – between not only previous governments and the current one but also between the present authoritarian turn and the genocidal project against the indigenous peoples inhabiting Brazil since the colonial period. With a thought-provoking essay that dialogues with several of the volume's chapters, as well as with the volume's emphasis on continuities alongside disruptions, the authors affirm that while undoubtedly the threat of genocide is ever more present under Bolsonaro, the fear itself has never ceased to exist, becoming instead more of a norm than an exception for indigenous Brazilians.

The discussions in this volume bring to light some well-known and other little-explored aspects of contemporary Brazilian society, which, read together, help us better situate the political events that shook the country in recent years and continue to develop in different directions. Combining ethnographic insights with political science, history, sociology and anthropology, the interdisciplinary analyses included here offer a panorama of social and political changes in Brazil, spanning temporal and spatial dimensions. Their distinct foci, although not always in agreement, prove to be complementary, and together they provide a complex and fascinating account of politics and society in Brazil today. Taking as their point of departure the 2018 presidential election, the contributors discuss the country's recent – or more distant – past in relation to the present. Pointing to continuities and disruptions in the course of those years, the analyses offered are not only valuable guides to unpack and comprehend what has already happened, but also excellent pointers towards what may be coming next.

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Looking back: how did we get here?

1. The past of the present

Lilia Moritz Schwarcz

Many Brazilians reacted with shock in the face of growing manifestations of intolerance and the conservative lurch that Brazil has witnessed since 2014.¹ However, there is nothing recent or circumstantial in this social phenomenon. In truth, while it is possible to say that this direction is internationally in vogue, the Brazilian case appears to respond to a longer-running history, relating to the authoritarian roots of the country, which are grounded in the ‘past of the present’: the wide-ranging experience with slavery, the long coexistence with violence and public insecurity, the persistent fiefdoms and paternalisms and consistent low investment in education have made Brazil the ninth most unequal country and the fifth in rural income concentration.² These are, therefore, ghosts of the past that persist in haunting the present.

Time has moved quickly in these last years, but it has accelerated even more rapidly in Brazil, since the protests of 2013, when Brazilians took to the streets to ask for and demand their rights. What many did not see at that time is that there were two very different roads, separated and without bifurcations. Time also showed itself to be in a hurry due to the economic crisis: the recession and unemployment that accelerated in 2014 generated the figure of the ‘collectors’, those who judged and judge themselves to have ‘lost’ their achievements to ‘others’ who have now won them. The crisis also showed its claws on the occasion of President Dilma’s impeachment, on 31 August 2016, when Brazilian politicians offered a televised show of voting in the name of their children, parents, wives, friends, but never referring themselves to the issue at hand. Familial politics won, an old acquaintance of Brazilian politics.

It was in this same context that many governments lurched towards populist and conservative regimes, as was the case in the United States, Israel, Russia, Italy, Philippines, Hungary, Poland, Turkey and Venezuela, who believe that democracy is limited to winning elections. It is not so limited, however, as democracy is a regime that needs to be won every day: democracies are

1 This essay is based on Schwarcz, 2019.

2 The data are from the 2017 Farming Census and the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE, 2018).

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governed through coexistence with ‘difference’ and the different, and not just ‘preaching to the converted’.

Everything points towards Brazil passing through a similar experience, but it seems to have learnt nothing from what occurred previously with other nations. In truth, authoritarianism entered in full into the agendas of these new governments, which can be described as ‘democraship’ (see e.g. Vieira, 2018). These are regimes that, despite being elected, conduct all kinds of attacks against democracy: they enact censorship, are against new forms of gender, and attack institutions, journalists and academics.

The historian Timothy Snyder wrote a post that went viral on Facebook. In it, he affirms that we ‘are not better or wiser’ than the men who witnessed the rise ‘of Nazism, fascism or Stalinist communism’. We can only count on ‘our experience’. The problem is that we have not relied on it, and are living a kind of ‘global Weimar’, with the proliferation of a series of authoritarian governments that harm democratic rights.

My hypothesis regarding Brazil, however, is that it is neither a circumstantial nor a solely global question. Brazilians did not become authoritarian and intolerant from one day to the next. We have always been authoritarian but liked to represent ourselves as the opposite: as open, pacifist, harmonious.

I would like to explore, therefore, the ‘present of the past’. Brazil carries within it a heavy legacy stemming from slavery, the latifundium and patrimonialism that generated a very unequal society and a structure as hierarchal as it is naturalised. However, and as always, the country set about presenting historical narratives that stated the opposite: a ‘good slavery’ (as if a system that is based on the possession of a person by another could allow for such a definition); a ‘dictatorbland’ (Reis, 2014) and not a military dictatorship; an alleged democracy; even a belief that ‘God is Brazilian’.

I am certain these narratives are untrue, and intend to develop this essay by analysing long-running structures that, instead of changing, reiterated and reaffirmed themselves in our reality. History is change, but also repetition, and I would like to consider this here, with the objective of understanding aspects of the crisis we now witness.³

Reinventing the past

Brazil was the last country to abolish mercantile slavery. It received 4.8 million of the 10 million enslaved persons who left Africa and disseminated the system throughout the entirety of its territory. With this, hierarchal structures of power and command were established in a nation where few ordered and many

3 Due to the vastness of the topic, it will not be possible to develop the contents of each theme. The idea here is to include a series of factors that explain the conservative lurch experienced by contemporary Brazilians.

obeyed.⁴ A profoundly violent society was produced, with enslaved persons rebelling in multiple ways, and reacting to such an unjust and unequal system.

And if an obvious and determined continuity between past and present does not exist, the fact is that, after the abolition of May 1888, a long period that historians conventionally call ‘post-abolition’⁵ began, which has a starting but not an ending date. To this day Brazil practises structural and institutional⁶ racism – as we can see from the data on the discrimination against these populations. Indeed, it is Black persons that in Brazil have restricted access to education, are the most harmed by public health services and die the youngest.

On this matter, in fact, it’s possible to say that we are killing a generation of young Black men in the Brazilian periphery without much fanfare on the part of authorities or even the sector of the population that lives in middle-class or elite neighbourhoods. The intersectionality⁷ between social markers of difference, such as race, gender and generation, particularly accentuates the vulnerability of these groups, which is reaching epidemic levels.⁸

For example, if we look only at the year of 2012, when a little over fifty-six thousand persons were murdered in Brazil, of this total thirty thousand were young people between the ages of fifteen and twenty-nine, and of these, 77 per cent were Black. These numbers reveal very unequal conditions of access to the maintenance of rights and elevated violence with a clear target. Moreover, they indicate patterns of mortality that evoke short-, medium- and long-term historical questions.

To put these figures into proportion, we can note that this data is compatible with the homicide rates in various contemporary civil wars. In the Syrian conflict, which has embroiled the country since 2011, there are sixty thousand deaths per year; in the war in Yemen, which began in 2015, there are approximately twenty-five thousand yearly homicides; in Afghanistan, where conflicts began in 1978, the average is fifty thousand per year. These rates correspond to the scale of the Brazilian ‘war’, which permits us to speak of a Black youth ‘genocide’.

Brazil will not have a republic, in the true sense of the term, if it does not deal with the question of endemic racism prevailing in the country. But if slavery and racism represent the knot of Brazil’s contradiction, another long-running structure can be located in the rooting of ‘local fiefdoms’. For anyone who proclaimed that in 2018 a ‘new political era’ would be inaugurated, the

4 Brazilian historiography regarding slavery is today recognised both in the country and abroad. In 2018, I organised, together with Flávio Gomes, a collection that sums up the ‘state of the art’ (Schwarcz and Gomes, 2018).

5 For an overview of the topic, see, among others, Machado and Castilho, 2015.

6 On this, see Almeida, 2018; Ribeiro, 2018.

7 Concept derived from Crenshaw, 2002 and McClintock, 2010.

8 The WHO considers violence epidemic when ten homicides occur for every hundred thousand inhabitants.

results of the elections for president, senators and state representatives were very disappointing.

In any case, if in Brazil the prevalence of these true *paterfamilias* has been known since the colonial period, based on the generous distribution of lands (and authority) on the part of the metropole, and if we remember the figure of the *colonels*⁹ during the First Republic, what we see occurring now is a type of revival of these figures, still very enmeshed within the workings of Brazilian politics (Leal, 2012).

In a preliminary survey by the Intersyndical Department for Parliamentary Assistance (DIAP), conducted after the last elections, among the 567 new congressmen, 138 representatives and senators were identified as belonging to political clans – an increase of 22 per cent in relation to 2014. The number of members belonging to the ‘caucus of the relatives’, on the other hand, is surely much higher, since research is still ongoing and only first-degree relations were considered.

In 2018, there were even cases of ‘dynasties’ who campaigned based on an anti-systemic discourse, harnessing the wave of anti-traditional politics now in vogue. This was the case of Eduardo and Flávio Bolsonaro (both members of the Social Liberal Party, PSL), elected to the House and Senate, respectively, and who already had careers in state and national politics. In Pernambuco, João Campos (Brazilian Socialist Party, PSB), the congressman who won the highest number of votes, is son of former governor Eduardo Campos, who died in a plane crash in 2014, while campaigning for the country’s presidency (Gayer, 2020). The cousin of this politician, Marília Arraes (Workers’ Party, PT), who, in turn, is the cousin of a former federal representative and granddaughter of the former governor Miguel Arraes, won the second highest number of votes. In Bahia, the second most voted deputy for the House of Representatives is the son of senator Otto Alencar (Social Democratic Party, PSD). In Piauí, Iracema Portella (Progressives, PP), daughter of the former governor and of a former federal representative, achieved another term in the House while her husband, Ciro Nogueira (PP), was re-elected to the Senate. In Rio Grande do Norte, half of the seats for federal representatives were occupied by relatives – one of those elected is the son of the former governor.

In Ceará, according to the same article, one of the federal representatives with the most votes is the son of the current president of the state’s Legislative Assembly. In Pará, the Barbalho clan secured another re-election for its chief, Senator Jader Barbalho (Brazilian Democratic Movement, MDB), as well as two other members of the House – his former wife and a cousin. Kátia Abreu (Democratic Labour Party, PDT), for her part, now has in the Senate the company of her son, Irajá Abreu (PSD), currently a federal representative for the state of Tocantins and who won one of the two contested seats in the state.

9 *Colonel* and *colonelism* are Brazilian terms denoting local autocratic strongmen.

In Paraíba, the federal representative Veneziano Vital do Rêgo (MDB) won a seat in the Senate, where his brother already served a term and his mother acts as a substitute. The state's other seat belongs to Daniella Ribeiro (PP), sister of representative Aguinaldo Ribeiro (PP), who was re-elected. In other words, Paraíba's delegation in Congress is a visible sign of the persistent strength of political clans. Of twelve seats, ten are occupied by congressmen with familial ties to other persons who are already serving some electoral mandate.

And there is no coincidence, once it is ascertained that states which most possess families such as these are also those that generally present most wealth concentration and social gaps: fundamental elements to deepening the crisis, when resources are scarce and demand abounds.

The practices of local authoritarianism do not often arise alone. Frequently they are associated with a form of administering the state that, not by accident, implies managing public institutions as if they were private – intimate, even. There is a vast bibliography on the topic of patrimonialism (Holanda, 2002 [1936]; DaMatta, 1998; Cândido, 2004), which allows us to affirm that it is one of the greatest enemies of democracy (Schwarcz and Starling, 2014).

There are varied forms of exercising the old 'Brazilian way', when the majority of politicians understand the public office they occupy as a form of 'private property', their own or their family's, to the detriment of the interests of the collective that elected them. And if this is the standard meaning, the use of the term 'patrimonialism', so recurrent in Brazil, has already become, as André Botelho (2019) has shown, a type of 'accusatory category: a crime/sin in which the "other" indulges, not the subject of the enunciation'. Terms such as 'patrimonialism' or 'patrimonialist' have served, further, equally to stigmatise a political opponent or disqualify an adversary.

Finally, in these 30 years of the New Republic, Brazil has not only sought to consolidate democracy, but also to modernise social relations. It did not manage, however, to deter the practices of patrimonialism that are well rooted and help to explain part of the crisis we are experiencing today. It is for this and other reasons that patrimonialism maintains itself as one of the great enemies of the republic, having the power to undermine and weaken the institutions of the state. The health of a democracy is measured by the robustness of its institutions and, in our case, since colonial times there have been many instances where these were dominated by the interests of groups in power, who appropriate part of the state mechanism for private ends. The theory that Brazilians are more informal and 'averse to bureaucracy' acquires here a new face, when expedients such as these result in benefit to some and ill for many.

The contamination of public and private spaces is, therefore, a heavy legacy of our history, but also a record of the present. The concentration of wealth, the maintenance of old regional chiefs, as well as the emergence of the 'new colonels' and the strengthening of corporative politicians, show how it is still quite common in Brazil to fight, first and foremost, for private benefit. This

is an authoritarian and personalistic form of dealing with the state, as if it were a generous family guided by a great father who retains the control of the law and is kind to his allies, but severe with his opponents, who are understood as enemies.

The legacy of private powers survives within the very governmental machine. The DIAP presents very revealing data regarding the so-called ‘caucus of the relatives’, which continues growing in Congress. In the House, in 2014, 113 of those elected bore oligarchic last names, being relatives of established politicians. In 2018, the number of parliamentarians with family ties rose to 172.

And if patrimonialism is the first enemy of the republic, the second principal adversary goes by the name of corruption. It pertains to the practice which degrades the confidence that we have in one another and disaggregates public space, misappropriating resources and the rights of citizens. Not by coincidence, it is often associated with the mismanagement of public funds, occasioned by the lack of control of governmental policies.

Over the course of time, corruption has been called by different names, but they all represent, according to José Murilo de Carvalho, the act of ‘transgressing’, in the sense of ‘disrespecting, violating and infringing the most diverse areas of action’ (Carvalho, 2017). Etymologically, the word comes from the Latin *corruptio*, meaning ‘the act of breaking into pieces’; that is, of ‘degrading or decomposing something’. In the management of the state, corruption evokes the act of conceding and receiving undue advantages either by public agents or the private sector, with the goal of obtaining rewards. Corruption is widely diffused in Brazil, playing a fundamental part in the world of politics, but equally present in human and personal relations.

Many examples from Brazilian history show how the practice of corruption became a machine for the government of the country. Especially in times of crisis it tends to corrode the public edifice, extracting currency and resources from areas that really need them. I refer to healthcare, education and public transport, sectors immediately harmed by these practices.

Violence is also a very important element in explaining the current Brazilian crisis and the 2018 election result. Many people voted for whoever promised more security and an end to the robberies, thefts and murders.¹⁰ There is nothing wrong in taking these elements as determining arguments when selecting a candidate. After all, the number of daily homicides in Brazil equals the deaths from a crash of a fully loaded Boeing 737-800. This is one of the conclusions of the *Atlas of Violence 2018* (Cerqueira, 2018), produced by the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) and by the Brazilian Forum on Public Safety (FBSP).

¹⁰ Translator’s note: the author uses the term *latrocinio*, which is a murder that occurs during the act of robbery.

This situation places Brazil in a group of countries considered violent, with mortality indexes thirty times higher than those observed, for example, on the European continent. About 171 deaths are registered every day in the country and, taking into account the data from 2016, 62,500 annually. In just the past decade, there have 553,000 registered violent deaths. The same report attests that in Brazil, for the first time, the number of violent deaths surpassed sixty thousand per year. In fact, according to the *Atlas of Violence 2018*, the country reached the rate of thirty murders per hundred thousand inhabitants for the first time. This says much about the inequality that rules the country, but also regarding the deepening of social gaps, which are even more pronounced in moments of crisis.

Slave labour, land divided into latifundium, corruption and patrimonialism, all in large doses, explain the motives that made of the country an unequal reality. These historical factors do not explain, however, why, despite the process of modernisation and industrialisation that the country experienced in the twentieth century, we were unable to break totally with this vicious cycle of the past. On one side, research has shown that some alterations have occurred, for the better, in the data that measure inequality in Brazil. According to information collected by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE, 2018) through the National Household Sampling Survey (PNAD) – which analysed the living conditions of Brazilians in 2018 – the slice of national income appropriated by the richest 10 per cent fell in the last years from 46 per cent to 41 per cent, while the part of the poorest 50 per cent grew: from 14 per cent to 18 per cent.

But there are disagreements regarding these results. Marc Morgan Milá, an Irish economist and disciple of Thomas Piketty, indicated in a 2018 study that Brazilian governments, in practice, never opted to confront social inequality (Milá, 2018). In the researcher's opinion, inequality is worse than imagined, with an immense concentration of income at the top of the social pyramid: the group representing the richest 10 per cent of our population accumulates over half of the national income. Between 2001 and 2015, this sector of the population has seen their part of income grow from 54 per cent to 55 per cent. Meanwhile, according to Morgan Milá's calculations, the income of the 50 per cent poorest rose from 11 per cent to 12 per cent of the total. However, 40 per cent of the Brazilian population, the middle portion, had their share of national income shrink from 34 per cent to 32 per cent.

The same investigation reveals that the richest stratum of the population, which corresponds to only 1 per cent of the population, wolfs down 28 per cent of national income. Morgan Milá pointed out that, in the United States, the elites, the 1 per cent, possess 20 per cent of the national income, and in France, 11 per cent. Moreover, in France the annual income of the richest groups is under R\$925 thousand, whereas in Brazil the average annual income of this sector is approximately R\$1 million.

In 2018, a report prepared by Oxfam Brazil presented an equally pessimistic panorama. According to the institution, for the first time in 23 years Brazil saw its income distribution coming to a halt and poverty breaking out again. The convergence of income between men and women, as well as the levelling of income between whites and Blacks, were also diminished (Oxfam, 2018). These results are alarming, in the words of the authors, particularly since the majority of Brazil's population is composed, precisely, of women, Black and *pardo* (mixed-race) people.

The same document explains that in the last five years the proportion of the population living in poverty has grown, the level of income inequality in the workplace has increased, and infant mortality has expanded. The index that measures income inequality in the country, the Gini coefficient of per capita household income, which had been decreasing since 2002, stagnated between 2016 and 2017. According to Oxfam (2018), sustainable development 'walks backwards in broad strides'. For example, between 2016 and 2017, the poorest 40 per cent had an income variation worse than the national average. In this same context, women and the Black population present a level of income below that of men and the white population.

These results cannot, however, be read in isolation. In some way, they are a consequence of Brazil's ongoing economic, fiscal and political crisis that began in 2013 and ended up generating a clear retraction in the national income. They also express the recession experienced by the country, whose levels of unemployment practically doubled, going from 6.8 per cent in 2014 to 12.7 per cent in 2017.

In effect, despite the relative improvement that occurred from the end of the 1990s until 2012–13, a series of investigations has confirmed not only Brazil's elevated concentration of wealth but also the fact that the country remains one of the most unequal in the world. A study by IPEA, published in 2017 for the UN's International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, confirmed that the country is among the five most unequal on the planet, taking into account the concentration and distribution of income (Ferreira and Medeiros, 2017). What's more, research published on 5 December 2018 by IBGE indicated that poverty and extreme poverty increased in recent years. After Oxfam defined the scenario as 'stagnation', it was IBGE's turn to demonstrate how the crisis in the economy, the public sector and the labour market had a direct impact on workers' lives.

Other data reveals that the most affected are, in order of magnitude: Black and brown people, children up to the age of 14, single mothers, Black and brown single mothers, and people over the age of 60. Certainly, it is Black women, the backbone of their families, who have been most affected by the crisis. The number of white men considered poor increased by 7.8 per cent; the number of Black women also grew, but only by 2.68 per cent. However, in absolute terms, the number of Black and brown women in a situation of

poverty is 35 per cent, while that of white men is less than half that, at 16.6 per cent. The same picture repeats itself for the social situation characterised as 'extreme poverty'.

Disparity in income distribution between social classes defines inequality in Brazil. According to a 2017 Oxfam report, there is a real abyss in relation to fiscal data. The richest 10 per cent pay 21 per cent of their income in taxes, while the poorest 10 per cent pay 32 per cent. Indirect taxes eat up 28 per cent of the income of the poorest 10 per cent and only 10 per cent of the richest 10 per cent. Inheritance tax, for example, provides approximately 0.6 per cent of government revenue, a value based on low rates and, at times, not even charged (Oxfam, 2017).

In the area of healthcare, the data also reveals an unequivocal inequality between Brazilians of different regions. The majority of people who received no care possessed the following characteristics: women (3.5 per cent); individuals aged 25–49 (3.7 per cent); Black and brown people (4.3 per cent); persons with low- or mid-level educational attainment (3.3 per cent and 4.1 per cent, respectively); and those without a healthcare provider (4.2 per cent). There are also clear regional inequalities, with the largest numbers of untreated persons concentrated in the North and Northeast.

Regardless, the crisis that had been forming for a long time gained momentum in 2014. In such circumstances, the easiest route appears to be blaming the other as responsible for one's ills. The attacks on minorities and new social agents, therefore, are not aleatory. It is true that every society elaborates its own markers of difference.¹¹ In other words, it transforms physical differences into social stereotypes, generally of inferiority, and thus produces prejudice, discrimination and violence. If the concept of 'difference' implies recognising, as Michel de Montaigne (1533–92) explained, that 'Truly man is a marvellously vain, diverse and undulating object', in the sense of human experience being rich and plural, the term, in practice, has mostly been used to disqualify. In the contemporary world, it is also used to justify a type of behaviour that privileges the formation of isolated groups with their own digital media, separated by their interests and polarised in their identities; each becomes its own prisoner, captive within its own bubble.

On the other hand, the increase in the social perception of inequality, with the inclusion of new political subjects, often ends up generating dissatisfaction in sectors of society that tend to consider the 'other' as less legitimate and seek to deny them the right to full citizenship, conditioned by the 'difference' that they carry.

Social markers of difference are, therefore, 'classificatory categories comprehended as social, local, historical and cultural constructions, that belong to the order of social representations – as exemplified by fantasies, myths and

11 On this topic, see Machado and Schwarcz, 2018; Moore, 1987; Guimaraes, 2002; Botelho and Schwarcz, 2011.

the ideologies we create – as well as exercise a real influence on the world, through the production and reproduction of collective identities and social hierarchies’ (Schwarcz et al., 2018).

But these categories do not produce meaning only in isolation; they act, above all, by way of an intimate connection that they establish between each other – which is not to say that they can be reduced to each other. In the list of social markers, with the impact on the reality in which we live, are included categories such as race, generation, place of origin, gender and sex, and other elements that have the capacity to produce diverse forms of hierarchy and subordination.

In our society, the perverse use of these categories has generated different kinds of racism, resulted in femicide, produced much misogyny and homophobia, and justified and disseminated a culture of rape, whose numbers continue to be alarming, but are, at the same time, mostly silenced in the country. Women account for 89 per cent of the victims of sexual violence in Brazil. According to data from IPEA, between 2001 and 2011, fifty thousand women were murdered. Even so, the term ‘femicide’ was only formally recognised in Brazil in March 2015, typifying the existence of premeditated crimes committed against women.

The number of cases of femicide in Brazil – gender-motivated murder – is alarming according to data from *Relógios da Violência*¹² (Clocks of Violence), an entity linked to the Maria da Penha Institute. Every 7.2 seconds a woman is the victim of physical violence. The 2015 ‘Map of Violence’ (Waiselfisz, 2015) emphasises that, in 2013 alone, 13 women died every day, victims of femicide. About 30 per cent of these murders were committed by current or former partners. This number represents an increase of 21 per cent in relation to the previous decade, which indicates that the problem has grown, contrary to expectations.

The picture becomes even more dire if we examine the elevated rates of femicide based on the marker of race. According to the data from Waiselfisz (2015), the murder of Black women increased by 54 per cent in the years 2003–13, while for whites it fell by 9.8 per cent. Black women between the ages of 15 and 29 are 2.19 times more likely to be murdered in Brazil than whites of the same age group, according to the 2017 Index of Juvenile Vulnerability to Violence (Governo do Brasil and Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, 2017).

But there are other ‘feminine risks’ in Brazil. Every day, five women die during childbirth and four women die from complications caused by abortions. In one decade, the Unitary Healthcare System (SUS) spent R\$486 million on hospitalisations due to these complications, 75 per cent of which are intentional abortions as opposed to miscarriages.

12 *Relógios da Violência* blog, <https://relogiosdaviolencia.com.br> (accessed 11 May 2021).

The more Brazilian women have managed to impose their independence and autonomy, the greater has been the masculine reaction and the demonstrations of misogyny and authoritarianism. Meanwhile, the domination of men in public office is indisputable. One needs only look at the paucity of women in politics. With the end of the 2018 elections, we have only 55 women among 513 federal representatives.

Rape culture is also a reality bequeathed from the past with a contemporary presence. According to data from IPEA, 88 per cent of harassment victims are female, 70 per cent are children and adolescents, 46 per cent have not completed primary education and 51 per cent are Black or brown/*pardo*. What is more, 24 per cent of the victims point to the aggressors being either their father or stepfather, 32 per cent of cases are practised by friends or acquaintances of the victim, and many of these acts are committed by two or more persons: 10.5 per cent for child victims, 16.2 per cent for adolescents and 15.4 per cent for adults. The immediate consequence of our institutional fragility is that only 35 per cent of victims file a report with the relevant authorities, which leads us to remain imprisoned in scandalous under-reporting.

Despite this, according to the annual Brazilian report on public safety, in 2015 a rape was registered every eleven minutes in Brazil (Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, 2015). According to the Ministry of Health, every four minutes a woman enters into SUS as a victim of sexual violence (Carvalho, 2016). Estimates vary, but in general it is calculated that these cases correspond to only 10 per cent of the total. If we accumulate and project such data, we can arrive at the rate of nearly half a million rapes every year in Brazil.

The number of femicides also remains high – 4.8 for every hundred thousand women, according to data pertaining to 2013 but published in 2015 (Waiselfisz, 2015). This rate is the fifth highest in the world, according to the World Health Organization (2005). The number of murders of Black women, from 2003 to 2013, grew 54 per cent, going from 1,864 to 2,875 cases. In the same period, the annual quantity of homicides of white women fell 9.8 per cent: from 1,747 in 2003 to 1,576 in 2013. The last report by the WHO states that 4,473 cases of manslaughter occurred in 2017, of which 946 were femicides.

Such indexes reveal that, in Brazil, a woman is murdered every two hours and that the country experiences the shameful rate of 4.3 deaths, in 2017, per hundred thousand females.

There exist other populations in vulnerable conditions whose situation reveals that Brazil has never been, in fact, a republic and that the crisis in the country is not simply financial but also one of values. In 2015, 318 LGBTQ people were murdered in Brazil, according to the NGO Grupo Gay da Bahia (GGB), which maps homicides against this population; of these, 52 per cent were gay, 37 per cent trans, 16 per cent lesbian and 10 per cent bisexual (Michels and Mott, 2016).

Brazil is, however, a paradoxical country when this question is considered. While the biggest LGBTQ parade in the world occurs each year in São Paulo, 445 persons of this group were murdered in 2017. As the anthropologist Renan Quinalha (2019) shows, in the same manner that we like to present ourselves as open to diversity in a variety of sexual, affective and identitarian experiences, we permit widespread criminality against those who do not share the model of heteronormativity. On the other hand, if we celebrate the existence of one of the oldest LGBTQ movements in the world, which was formed 40 years ago and remained active under dictatorship, we have watched the election of leaders in the government who openly make a direct and unfettered association between politics and moral and sexual conduct.

To prove the existence and maintenance of so many paradoxes, it is enough to remember the increase in physical violence suffered by these populations. The GGB indicated that, in 2017, every 19 hours an LGBTQ person was killed (Michels and Mott, 2018). According to a study by the NGO Transgender Europe, between January 2008 and April 2013, Brazil saw 486 murders of transvestites and transsexuals; a number four times higher than in Mexico, the country with the second highest number of registered cases (*Exame*, 2014).

One way of assessing prejudice and the current process of exclusion is to note the lack of a public policy for verifying this form of crime. Not publishing and not measuring is a form of not knowing or not caring. There is little public data, or reliable sources, at both national and regional levels, regarding homophobic violence. There are only mapping efforts developed by NGOs linked to the topic, who base their work, in turn, on news reports.

This crisis has generated not only an increase in violence, but also much intolerance in the country. In fact, not long ago Brazilians liked to define themselves as harmonious, pacifistic and inclusive. Today the public image is totally different. Now they are defined and define themselves as intolerant. Politically, intolerance presents itself as conduct that seeks to erase, or which simply does not accept, different points of view than those of a given individual. Such behaviour often utilises prejudice and the dissemination of stereotypes to affirm itself. Racism, sexism, misogyny, antisemitism, homophobia, religious or political pragmatism and fear of foreigners are known forms of social intolerance.

Since a moment when Brazilians judged that democracy had consolidated as the best political system and as a fundamental value – since it had the objective of guaranteeing freedom, equality and a regular statute of rights, although it never fully achieved this – we have watched the growth of social intolerance, in the world and notably in Brazil. And intolerance, whichever form it may be – racial, religious, social, gender – attacks article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which affirms that ‘All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration

and against any incitement to such discrimination.’ It also attacks article 5 of Brazil’s 1988 Constitution, which guarantees: ‘All are equal before the law, without distinction of any kind, and Brazilians and foreigners residing in the country are ensured the inviolability of the right to life, liberty, equality, security and property.’

If it is possible to say that intolerance is not a sentiment or an existential posture that is born from one day to the next, and that is instead found in the roots of our past – in the short, medium and long term – despite our continued denial of the conflict, it is also necessary to recognise that we have stopped hiding such a sentiment, and now often exalt it publicly. And maybe this is the greatest novelty: what once were hidden manifestations have become occasions of pride and self-celebration.

This change in behaviour tends, firstly, to accelerate and become more visible in moments of open political polarisation. Secondly, despite the formally well-functioning institutions of Brazil’s republic, we still lack a truly democratic political culture that can sustain these kinds of tensions and transform them into public policies. Lastly, a prolonged crisis such as the one we are living through – featuring a recession, a decline in the levels of income and a rise in unemployment – underlines a little-explored political potential, that of aversion: aversion to corruption, which is treated as banal in newscasts; aversion to the insecurity present in the streets; aversion to the growth of organised crime; aversion to the disorganisation of the state, which has been taken over by private interests; aversion to political horse-trading; aversion to intellectuals and the press; aversion to new political actors; in sum, aversion to everything that is not ‘us’ or does not represent ‘us’.

The aversion by itself is not necessarily a bad sentiment; it would be good if we developed an aversion to racism, femicides and gender crimes, or to a military dictatorship that suppressed the rights of Brazilians. The issue will continue, however, knotted, if dissatisfaction can only provoke more dissatisfaction, channelled towards a supposed common enemy.

This was, moreover, the format of the 2013 protests; few people noticed, but already there existed, in that context, two sides of the street that never converged. If the streets represented a space dominated by the political left until then, suddenly the purview was broadened, while simultaneously reduced: broadened, since it hosted other types of demands; reduced, since it divided the public space in such a manner that two groups never shared the same place.

Democracy, since the ancient Greeks, has been defined as an inconclusive process, one that must always be remade and broadened. In our case, the prevalence of representative democracy in Brazil, during 30 uninterrupted years, did not equip us to deal with a divided society that is tired of living in recession and of watching on television how so many cases of corruption occur at the heart of the state. Brazilian society at large grew tired of the growth in scale and level of criminality in the peripheries and the deterioration of public

safety. This fatigue, for its part, gave way to the resentment and the direct manifestation of conservative values, in the sense of those who actually want to 'conserve', and who changed what seemed to be a shared utopia in the form of understanding, preserving and sharing rights. It also attacked the world of politics and the homogeneity of our politicians, who are generally male, middle-class, heterosexual and middle-aged.

A new dystopia gained form in the world and travelled to Brazil. That is to say, with the fabrication of this kind of generalised disbelief, one gains the impression that everything that existed was devoid of value, and that therefore it was now necessary to 'charge' for that which was 'taken' or 'subtracted' from Brazilian citizens. The demonstrators who took to the streets in 2013 had many sides and included diverse sectors representing a range of social complaints. Difference is not a problem (to the contrary, it is part of the game), but intolerance is. What is certain is that, since the impeachment of president Dilma Rousseff in 2016, the lid has been removed from the cauldron of resentment, which has resulted in a deliberate politics of hate and polarisations.

Since then, a movement has surfaced that lived on the margins, and started distributing intransigence, shamelessly declaring a lack of respect for any differences exposed in terms of belief, sexual orientation and public opinion. The other side also hardened: the left revealed equally their level of intolerance, adopting an ever more polarised discourse. And if there has ever been a time when we believed in the idea that Brazilians were a 'pacifistic and tolerant people', today few defend such a line. As we have seen, there is much evidence for the rise in violence against the LGBTQ community, the reactions to the inclusion of persons with disabilities in society, xenophobic demonstrations against immigrants and foreigners, cases of bullying in schools and workplaces generated by racial and gender differences or even political divergence, just as attacks against Candomblé places of worship have multiplied.¹³

According to an article in *Folha de São Paulo*, the registration of crimes related to intolerance reached a peak during the election of 2018. During the campaign – in August, September and October – there were dozens of cases every day, over treble the 4.7 registered per day during the previous three months (Estarque and Faria, 2019). The peak was in October, when voting for the first and second rounds occurred, with 568 filed reports, an average of a little over 18 cases a day. The total of this month represents 67 per cent of the first six months of that year, and is over treble what was registered in October 2017. Occurrences of religious intolerance grew by 171 per cent in relation to the three previous months, homophobia by 75 per cent and intolerance due to origin by 83 per cent. Those due to colour or race grew by 15 per cent.

The data from Disque 100 – the federal government's service for reporting human rights violations – indicate that the religions that were most attacked

13 Translator's note: Candomblé is one of Brazil's *religiões de matriz africana* (religions of African origin), with tens of thousands of practitioners.

were those of African origins, which were the target of almost 35 per cent of cases in the first half of 2018 (Ministério da Mulher, da Família e dos Direitos Humanos, 2019). The rise in violence revealed the scope of the intolerance. The Bureau for Human Rights of the Presidency of the Republic has shown how every three days a case of religious intolerance is registered. The report by the GGB informs us that in 2017 alone, the death of a victim was registered every 19 hours. And the number of cases of persons forced to hide LGBTQ flags also increased due to attacks, from insults to physical assault. Foreigners from Latin America, from Haiti or even Africa have also suffered a newly belligerent attitude from the Brazilian populace; in 2015, there was an increase by 63 per cent of cases of xenophobia, of which only 1 per cent resulted in litigation.

Intolerance has spread, in the same way, by way of social networks. According to the Internet Managing Committee of Brazil, in 2018 alone, between August and October, of every three minors with digital access, at least one had knowledge of someone who had suffered discrimination. Those interviewed referred to cases of prejudice due to skin colour or race (24 per cent), appearance (16 per cent) and homosexuality (13 per cent). Other research conducted in the same period, by SaferNet, an NGO that defends human rights on the Brazilian internet, showed thirty-nine thousand sites with racist content and exhortations to violence were reported for violating human rights.

Taken together, this data confirms how people who had felt restrained in demonstrating their intolerance now seem to feel emboldened, authorised. But it is difficult to explain such a lurch. When did we abandon the image of a country of cordiality to create a public representation of intransigence and an aversion to difference? Answers do not exist, because we have seen how this type of attitude was a political and cultural performance, and not an accurate portrayal of Brazilians' real, ambiguous views.

But a crucial element leads us to understand the growth of intolerance in our country: the deficiency in quality basic public education. Indexes of the Brazilian Forum on Public Safety (FBSP) and Datafolha for 2018 show that Brazilian society, on a scale of zero to ten, currently attains a rating of 8.1 in its tendency to endorse more authoritarian positions. According to Renato Sérgio de Lima, president of FBSP, a majority advocates for the use of violence as a form of governing and, paradoxically, judges that this would be the best manner to 'pacify society, in a sort of moral and political vendetta' (Gonçalves, 2017).

According to the same study, furthermore, the lower the level of educational attainment, the greater the tendency to risk authoritarian solutions which are not receptive to dialogue. After all, it is in school that students learn to live with difference and respect those who do not share the same familial experiences and forms of sociability.

The answer to the political, economic, social and cultural crisis in which Brazil finds itself will only come with a more inclusive and egalitarian project for the nation. Intolerance has increased the fragility of the rule of law of our

democratic state, which requires respect between ideas, experiences, practices, options and different customs. Democracies function better, write Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt (2018), and survive for much longer, when constitutions are reinforced by democratic norms and not writs.

Authoritarianism, now, represents the antonym of democracy. In any case, learning from differences continues to be the golden rule of citizenship and a key part of the strengthening of the democratic bases of Brazilian society. Betting on polarisation, incentivising intolerance based on the proliferation of hate discourse and reinforcing social binaries, on the other hand, signifies going against the common good and working for division, which will make us less, not more.

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2. Denied recognition: threats against the rights of *quilombola* communities

José M. Arruti and Thaisa Held

I went to a quilombo at Eldorado Paulista . . . Look, the thinner African descendant there weighed seven arrobas. They do nothing. I don't think they're even good for procreation anymore. Over a billion reais every year [is] wasted on them. They get a staple products quota [cesta básica] and some agricultural benefits . . . They don't give a damn about anything

– Jair Bolsonaro, 3 April 2017, Rio de Janeiro

In this chapter, we propose a synthesis of the complex construction process of – and the attempt to deconstruct – a new political and legal actor in Brazilian society, namely the *quilombolas*.¹ This timeframe largely coincides with the historical processes of re-democratisation and de-democratisation. We face this challenge by accepting two main limitations. First, this synthesis includes but does not expand on the initiatives of negotiation, resistance and invention of the *quilombola* social movement, its communities, actors or thinkers; we restrict our discussion to the limits of the state. Second, such a synthesis paints an inevitably incomplete picture, insofar as it speaks of an ongoing government that has been surprising Brazilian society on a nearly daily basis with attempts to dismantle victories won over the past three decades.

Taking this into account, we note that the construction of rights for *quilombolas* since 1988 has been marked by ambiguities. The creation of public policies based on those rights has been marked by the tendency to restrict to the administrative and fiscal levels what is guaranteed by law and official programmes. The *quilombola* struggle for the affirmation of rights, therefore, never experienced a particularly favourable moment – except, perhaps, at the very beginning of the first Lula administration. Seen in this light, all the advances made, as well as the growth of the national *quilombola* movement, have occurred under intense dispute. The political perspective of class conciliation resulted in the internalisation of contradictions by the governments formed

1 *Quilombo* corresponds, in Portuguese America, to Maroons or Palenques from the Caribbean or Spanish America. They are descendants of Africans who formed settlements away from slavery. ‘*Quilombola* communities’ is the expression that designates contemporary Black communities that, in Brazil, have recognition and legal protection as ‘traditional peoples’.

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between 2003 and 2016, which transformed them into arenas where different social projects competed for space, priority, budget and so forth. The 2016 institutional rupture and Bolsonaro's election in 2018 may thus be described as an attempt to put an end to such contradictions. Unfortunately, the easiest way to do this was the elimination – or drastic limitation – of the democratic practice itself.

The epigraph to this chapter is from a speech by the then federal deputy and potential presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro, in one of the most traditional associations in Rio de Janeiro, addressing a constituent of the Jewish community. He was referring to an alleged visit he paid to one of the 32 officially recognised *quilombo* communities in Vale do rio Ribeira, São Paulo. The region was historically stigmatised because of its low economic development, but later gained prominence for its high degree of socio-environmental preservation and diversity, becoming known, in the 1970s, as the 'Paulista Amazon' (*Amazônia Paulista*). There are at least 56 Black rural *quilombo* communities in the Ribeira Valley: besides the 32 communities recognised by the state, six have initiated the process of land regularisation and 20 are waiting to start or restart it. The Bolsonaro family has an economic interest in the region and Jair Bolsonaro's brother-in-law has a grievance for invading the territory of one of those *quilombo* communities. In the same address quoted above, the then deputy stated:

If I get there [the presidency] there will be no money for NGOs. These scoundrels will have to work. You can rest assured that if I get there, as far as I am concerned, everybody will have a firearm at home and there won't be a centimetre demarcated for indigenous or *quilombo* territory.

A few months later, Bolsonaro was prosecuted and sentenced in the state of Rio de Janeiro for his statements, which were characterised as hate speech (*crime de racismo*). In the following year, as a result of action by the National Coordination for the Articulation of Black Rural *Quilombo* Communities (CONAQ), among other entities and members of the parliament, the attorney general's office launched another action before the federal Supreme Court to increase the sentence imposed on Bolsonaro on the basis of the gravity of the remarks, including in the action the offences uttered in the same address against other groups, such as indigenous people, migrants and women.

In September 2018, however, when Bolsonaro was already regarded as a possible winner of the presidential elections the following month, the first conviction was reversed by the state justice and the federal prosecutor's request was archived, based on the guarantee of freedom of expression for parliamentarians in exercising their mandates. In the same month, the traditional agricultural system of the Ribeira Valley received the title of Brazilian Cultural Heritage 'for representing an essential aspect of identity for the native population of this region and for its relevance in promoting the Brazilian ethnic

and cultural diversity'.² This recognition marks an important achievement in the *quilombola* struggle for recognition, 30 years after the Brazilian Constitution and 15 years following specific legislation about the *quilombolas*. The overlapping of these two events in that month, however, heralded an aggressive and explicit reaction to such achievements, presented in a language of disrespect that had not been registered in the speech of political actors since, at least, the period of re-democratisation. In this way, Bolsonaro's address also heralded what recent political literature has called 'post-democracy' or 'de-democratisation'. Alongside labour precarisation, the revocation of social rights and the reduction of public services, de-democratisation also operates through the naturalisation of racism and the dismissal of (liberal) values associated with socio-cultural diversity, which marked the Brazilian democratisation process. It consists of a project that aims to annul the degree of unpredictability that democracy, even limited as it may be, imposes on the full sovereignty of the markets and on the reproduction of domination.

To describe how the de-democratisation process impacts *quilombola* communities, this chapter is divided into two parts. First, we present an overview of the process, full of obstacles, for the state recognition of collective rights for *quilombolas* in the context of the 1988 Constitution. We then attempt to outline the most visible and immediate effects the current process of de-democratisation has on recent *quilombola* conquests.

The development of a New Right

The writing of a new constitution, which began in 1986, was a fundamental moment in the Brazilian re-democratisation process. Together with its outcome, the Constitution of 1988, it was characterised by the recognition of fundamental social and ethnic rights. This was a watershed moment for Latin American constitutional revisions that underpinned the cycle of progressive governments on the continent. Alongside a series of advancements in the political and social fields, an important innovation of the 1988 Constitution was the creation of a specific chapter for indigenous rights. In addition, the terms of the new chapter on indigenous rights opened up hermeneutical possibilities for the recognition of other social groups, based on ethnic or cultural difference.

Nomination

In the chapter dedicated to culture, the Constitution imposes on the state the duty to guarantee 'to everyone the full exercise of cultural rights', thus supporting and incentivising 'the valorisation and diffusion of cultural expressions', protecting 'the popular, indigenous and Afro-Brazilian cultural

2 The traditional agricultural system of *quilombola* communities from the Ribeira Valley was inscribed in the Book of Knowledge in September 2018 by the National Institute of Historic and Artistic Heritage (IPHAN).

expressions, and those of other groups that contributed to the national process of civilization' (Art. 215, *caput* and §1). According to a prominent interpreter of the Constitution, this would have made the 'analogous application of the treatment given to the indigenous issue and to the other ethnic groups indispensable' (Duprat, n.d.), thus extending and strengthening the two sole mentions made, for the first time in a Brazilian Constitution, to *quilombos*. These are the article on Brazilian cultural heritage, which lists '[a]ll documents and sites that contain historical residues of the ancient *quilombos*' as heritage (Art. 216, §5 II) and Article 68 of the Temporary Constitutional Provisions Act (ADCT),³ which states that 'Final ownership shall be recognised for the *quilombo* remnant communities which are occupying their lands and the state shall grant them relevant land titles.'

It is worth mentioning that the recognition of the cultural value of Black people is part of the main constitutional text, while the recognition of the *quilombola* right of access to land is part of the Transitional Provisions of the Constitution. The distance between these two recognitions reveals, on the one hand, the elective affinity that Brazilian society establishes between Blacks and the cultural issue and, on the other, the reluctance of that same society to re-examine the right to land, and, more than that, to bring together in a single legal mechanism two central issues for the formation of national society, race and land (Arruti, 2006).

The constitutional text, however, only gained significant strength and extent when the Black peasant movement in the states of Maranhão and Pará appropriated it to translate the demand for the recognition and regularisation of the 'common use of lands' – a non-existing concept in the national agrarian regulation (Arruti, 2008). From then on, the constitutional expression 'remnants of *quilombo* communities' has been defined as 'groups that developed practices of resistance in maintaining and reproducing their traditional livelihoods in a given place', and takes on the form of 'ethnic groups' characterised by 'different forms of using and occupying space, based on kinship and neighbourly ties of solidarity and reciprocity' (ABA, 1994). This definition, based on anthropological rather than historical grounds, was fundamental in the legislative debates held between 1995 and 2000 for the formulation of a bill which would regulate Article 68 of the ADCT.⁴ While the regulatory proposal was debated, however, some local initiatives started

3 The Brazilian Constitution is composed of both definitive and temporary articles (ADCT). The latter's validity expires with time. In the case of Article 68 of the ADCT, it is valid until every *quilombo* receives its definitive land titles. This situation has a tendency to turn temporary into permanent articles. According to an estimate by the organisation Terra de Direitos, if the present pace is maintained, it will take about 1,170 years to title the 1,716 *quilombola* territories (Schramm, 2019).

4 The constitutional debate considers that, since Article 68 of the ADCT refers to a fundamental right, its applicability shall be immediate – in other words, it does not need a regulatory norm. However, since there is no explicit projection of to whom and how the public authorities

to put into practice this interpretation of the constitutional article. This was the case for the state land institutes of Maranhão, Pará and São Paulo, and of some National Institute for Colonisation and Agrarian Reform (INCRA) and Palmares Cultural Foundation (FCP) regional offices.⁵ Few communities accessed land titles as a result of those initiatives, but this was enough for similar collectives across the country to see in this legislation (and in the claim of 'quilombola community') a way to resolve the legal insecurity regarding their collective land possessions.

Controversy

When, in 2001, legislators were considering a bill to regulate Article 68 of the ADCT, then President Fernando Henrique Cardoso anticipated its approval by issuing a presidential decree (3912/2001) opposing the afore-mentioned bill on almost all points. The main items of that decree serve to highlight what the country's traditional elites perceived as the most dangerous changes in the new constitutional framework:

(a) It revoked INCRA's power to recognise and issue titles, transferring such role to the FCP, thereby restricting constitutional recognition to the field of culture, without proposing any new version of agrarian reform;

(b) It established the thesis, which would later become known as a 'temporal framework' (*marco temporal*), according to which the constitutional right would be restricted to communities that could prove effective possession of land since at least the abolition of slavery (1888) and until the proclamation of the new Constitution (5 October 1988).

(c) It insisted on individual land titling, in the conventional form of private property, in order to prevent the recognition of the 'common-use land tenure' (*terras de uso comum*) which constituted collective territories.

The 2001 decree declared any *quilombola* titling not in line with its interpretation ungrounded, resulting in the paralysis of all ongoing processes at federal or state level. *Quilombola* rights only resumed effective conditions in 2003. With the inauguration of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's government and the ratification of ILO's Covention 169 on indigenous and tribal rights, a new presidential decree (4887/2003) revoked the previous one and incorporated the controversial items outlined above.

Before that, however, it was necessary to overcome, at least partially, the reproduction of the same restrictive interpretation of 2001 at other normative

should grant title to these lands, nor a clear definition of the concept 'quilombo remnant communities', the article was regulated in order to be implemented.

5 The FCP, linked to the Ministry of Culture, did not possess either the structure or the personnel with practical knowledge of land regulation issues, but started the process of recognition of *quilombos* by requesting anthropological technical reports (*laudos*), which were to scientifically prove that a given community was a 'quilombo remnant', thus establishing the state obligation to title the lands of those communities.

levels. From 2003 onwards, the interpretative dispute migrated to the interior of the federal government, so that legal disputes gave way to disputes over technical procedures for the titling of collective territories within INCRA. After a new period of paralysis, marked by the internal publication of successive normative instructions on the same topic, INCRA arrived at the current definition of procedures only in 2009. The result of this long negotiation is a complex, time-consuming administrative process, which lasts, on average, ten years. It begins with the community's self-declaration with the FCP and its request to open an administrative process at INCRA. It then proceeds with the elaboration of a Technical Identification and Delimitation Report (RTID), which includes an anthropological study, and continues through several administrative steps open to contestation by any potentially interested party (public or private) in the same area, until it finally ends with the collective titling of those lands, in the name of the *quilombola* association (INCRA, Normative Instruction 57/2009). It is important to note that the title is valid subject to the maintenance of the common use of land: that is to say, the association cannot divide or sell the land, under penalty of returning it to the state.

On the other hand, the 2003 decree had secondary effects, by establishing *quilombo* communities as a public with special and specific policies. *Quilombo* communities started to figure as a population to be included in participatory initiatives that multiplied at that time, as in the form of state and municipal councils for education and health. There was a growing need to create a public record of the presence and demographics of these populations – which resulted in their inclusion in the educational census of the federal agency National Institute for Educational Studies and Research 'Anísio Teixeira' (INEP) and in the Single Registry (Cadastró Único) used for the basic income policy. The debate on how to include such populations in the national census was also initiated. The ensemble of such policies, of such instances of participation and of progressively qualified knowledge initiatives, contributed in the following years to the growth and spread of the *quilombola* movement across the national territory. As an increasing number of communities were becoming aware of the legislation and of the redefined official notion of the *quilombo*, the negative connotation the term still held in its colloquial rural use was gradually reversed. This enabled communities to move beyond the initial estimates of the early 1990s – pointing to the existence of some hundreds of communities concentrated in some states – to the current estimates by CONAQ of the existence of six thousand *quilombos* across the country.

Special public policies and their limits

While the federal Constitution recognised the cultural and land rights of *quilombo* communities, the latter were kept isolated in the Temporary Provisions, risking further precariousness. Similarly, while the federal

government published a presidential decree regulating the constitutional article according to the demands of the *quilombola* movement, it established internal rules for the government body responsible for the implementation of the decree that hindered the fulfilment of its stated objectives. As we will see below, such ambiguities also marked the construction of the field of public policy, transforming the latter into a new arena of disputes (Cefaï, 2002). In this arena, the interests of agribusiness and the chief government strategy, based on a new version of the old developmentalism, were confined to the margins, and had to justify themselves in the national and international public sphere in the face of the emergence of a new subject of collective rights.

As a way to organise and render its relevant actions visible, the federal government launched, in March 2004, the Brazil *Quilombola* Programme (PBQ), which would act on four axes: access to land; infrastructure and living standards; productive inclusion and local development; and rights and citizenship.⁶ The first of these axes was arguably the most important, since expected action in other axes depended on the regularisation of the territories in which they would be developed. The second and third axes, in practice, had little impact on specific policies, as they resulted from the local repercussion of general infrastructural policies already foreseen in the Growth Acceleration Plans.⁷ Finally, the fourth axis gained importance inasmuch as it involved the debate around the creation of a special *quilombola* education, which ended up being the second most important item in the movement's agenda. Below we will briefly present these two dimensions of specific public policies for *quilombos*, namely territorial and educational dimensions (Arruti, 2009).

Land

CONAQ estimates that there are around six thousand *quilombo* communities across Brazil. Although CONAQ's estimate is vague, it is based on a comprehensive network of sources not connected with the state. The Palmares Cultural Foundation (FCP) currently registers 3,386 certified communities, 192 certificates in progress, and 38 requests awaiting Palmares's technical visit

6 From 2007 on, such actions, that used to involve 11 ministries, began to be articulated by the so-called *Quilombola* Social Agenda (Decree 6261/2007), coordinated by the Special Secretary of Politics for the Promotion of Racial Equality (SEPPIR), directly under the jurisdiction of the President of the Republic.

7 Known as PAC, the Brazilian federal government's Growth Acceleration Program was launched in January 2007 and envisaged the articulation of a set of economic policies for the following four years, raising investments of over R\$500 billion. In 2010, PAC 2 was launched for the following four years, with total investments estimated at more than R\$1 trillion. In both cases, the program prioritised, on the one hand, the generation and distribution of energy (including oil) and, on the other, the expansion and improvement of infrastructure: sanitation, housing, transportation, energy and water resources, among others.

to petitioning communities.⁸ The figures available from the National Institute for Colonisation and Agrarian Reform (INCRA) are significantly smaller, as they reflect solely communities that have started or completed the long process of land regularisation. By the end of 2019, there were 1,747 *quilombo* communities awaiting the outcome of their application for land titling at INCRA. From those, only 278 Technical Identification and Delimitation Reports (RTID) had been considered. These reports are fundamental for the definition of the titling process. Just 124 *quilombos* in the entire country had received their collective land titles.

A simplified but fundamental indicator of the Workers' Party (PT) governments' performance on the *quilombola* issue is the number of titled territories. In the first Lula term (2003–6), the federal government titled five territories; in the second (2007–10) 11; and throughout the Dilma period (2011–14; 2015–16), 16 territories were certified. In other words, in 13 years of PT administrations, the federal government was responsible for 32 of the 120 titles of *quilombo* territories (all others were issued by state land institutes), corresponding to less than 2 per cent of the number (in itself insufficient) of INCRA's pending processes. Even so, it would be possible to see in the progression of the number of titles issued by the successive governments an expectation of gradual improvement of these indicators. However, a deeper look at the budget for *quilombola* policies raises important reservations in the interpretation of this first indicator.

While in 2010, the last year of Lula's administration, the authorised budget for indemnification of properties in areas delimited for *quilombo* territories was R\$54.2 million, in 2011, the first year of Dilma's administration, this item was reduced to less than half. In the following years, during the Dilma administration and following the coup that removed her from power, this budget continue to be reduced until it reached, in 2018, the figure of less than R\$1 million; that is to say, it was practically extinct (Schramm, 2018).

Although the political base of both Lula's and Dilma's governments was the less economically privileged segments of the population, their government programme, based on the proposition of 'class reconciliation', led to a close alliance with the conservative sectors. Regarding *quilombolas* (as well as peasants and indigenous peoples), this involved giving in to agribusiness – now the government's biggest financial backer – resulting in numerous obstacles to the land regularisation policy, which accentuated land concentration and denied access to rights.

8 The certification is a kind of state confirmation of the right to self-identification, provided for in International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 169 and ratified by the Brazilian government in 2003. The FCP is the government institution entrusted with this. These certificates are the first stage of the process that results in the land title deeds, the issuance of which is, since 2003, the responsibility of the National Institute for Colonisation and Agrarian Reform (INCRA).

We began to see the effects of this as early as 2005, during Lula's first term, when Dilma Rousseff was appointed chief of staff and commodity exports were consolidated. While federal funds continued to be allocated to the Brazil *Quilombola* Programme (PBQ), and funding even increased, honouring the government's commitment with its political base, funding began to be informally contingent through different administrative and legal mechanisms. From 2012 on, although the PBQ was not formally dissolved, it disappeared in practice. Spending on *quilombos* was no longer planned, and became the responsibility of the Programme Against Racism for the Promotion of Racial Equity (PERPIR). Despite having broader responsibilities, the programme allocated smaller budgets than those previously allocated to the PBQ.⁹

Therefore, it is only possible to comprehend the titling of 16 territories during the Dilma administration if we take into consideration that it was during this period that INCRA adopted the practice of titling territories only partially, leaving out areas which involved the payment of indemnities to third parties. Of the 16 territories recognised in that period, only one was fully titled. In the name of producing indicators, INCRA adopted the controversial practice of obtaining the communities' consent to recognise only part of their territories by promising that the disputed areas would be recognised in future, inasmuch as the institute found the resources to pay the necessary indemnities. Based on a promise that is difficult to keep, the practice of partial titling not only produced a false indicator, but it also consolidated, in the face of local power struggles, a reduction of the territories of those communities.

Education

One of the most notable novelties in the final document of the 2010 National Conference for Education was the elaboration of a specific chapter dedicated to '*quilombola* education' (CONAE, 2010).¹⁰ It specifically mentioned the rights to preserve cultural heritage, to the sustainability of traditional territories, to a diet and school structure that respect people's culture and relationship with the environment, as well as the differentiated training of school teachers. The latter was conceived as part of a potential *quilombola* undergraduate programme, which included specific pedagogical materials and administrative mechanisms that would allow the participation of *quilombola* representatives in staffing the relevant education boards. This document immediately reverberated around the

9 The progressive reduction of resources for racial issues was compounded by the abolition of SEPIR in 2015. It had been created in 2003 in response to the social mobilisation around Durban I (the World Conference against Racism) in 2001. In the ministerial reform of Dilma Rousseff's government, it was merged with the Secretariat of Human Rights and the Secretariat of Policies for Women, forming the Ministry of Women, Racial Equity and Human Rights.

10 CONAE was the result of a wide-ranging process of consultation that mobilised municipal and state conferences, representatives of the Ministry of Education, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, the National Education Council, municipal and federal leaders, and a wide range of entities that work directly or indirectly in the field of education.

National Education Council (CNE), which also organised the First National *Quilombola* Education Seminar in the same year, to discuss the elaboration of the National Curriculum Guidelines for *Quilombola* School Education, published two years later.¹¹ Although these texts had been preceded by similar policies developed by state and municipal governments, the approval of the new guidelines at the national level contributed to standardising the vocabulary, legal and institutional mechanisms and available resources, and to influencing the social and intergovernmental social debate on ‘diversity policies’.

The transition from concepts to numbers, however, needs to be done carefully. There is a fundamental difference between the normative definition of ‘*quilombola* education’ and the purely classificatory definition of ‘*quilombola* school’, as it appears in the INEP school census. In the second case, the figures simply refer to schools in *quilombola* territories or those outside such territories catering to this population. This means that the category includes existing schools, which, due to the recognition of the population they serve as *quilombola*, were also reclassified, regardless of any effective adaptation to the *quilombola* education concept. Thus, the exponential growth of *quilombola* schools since 2004 (see Figure 2.1) does not result from the creation of new schools, or even from the adaptation of old schools to the National *Quilombola* Education Guidelines, but from the progressive reclassification of schools located in *quilombola* territories.




Figure 2.1 Brazil and its major regions, 2004–14: evolution of the number of *quilombola* schools (basic education establishments). Source: Arruti, 2017.

11 The National Curriculum Guidelines for *Quilombola* School Education were built through official public consultation in some states (Maranhão, Bahia and Federal District), conducted by the National Council of Education of the Ministry of Education (CNE/MEC). In other states, public consultation was carried out by local and autonomous initiatives, as demanded by *quilombola* organisations and partner movements (Oliveira, 2013).

Still, observing such numbers is interesting in that the reclassification is not automatic, but depends upon a decision by the school administration, or even by the municipal or state secretariat to which it is linked. As school management or teaching positions are rarely in the hands of *quilombolas*, the distribution and pace of school reclassification as *quilombola* reflect conflicts surrounding the recognition of the communities themselves, as well as the resistance of public administrations to conform to the principle of diversity as proposed by the Guidelines.

On the other hand, these numbers also reveal progress in the consolidation of *quilombo* recognition by local authorities, regardless of the stage of their recognition at the federal level. This is important to the extent that such powers are frequently occupied by big landowners, agricultural developers and other economic interests opposed to the recognition of *quilombola* territories. Furthermore, the goal expressed in the Guidelines, that both the positions of teachers and the management of schools should be linked to *quilombola* consultation, makes such public apparatus a focus of great interest to the social movement – not least because it depends largely on the training and qualification of new activists.¹²

Quilombos in the context of de-democratisation

By assuming a kind of double commitment to both social policies and to the acceleration of neo-developmental policies, the PT governments, while they created the conditions for the advancement of *quilombola* rights, also generated mechanisms (mainly infra-legal, such as procedural rules and budgetary executions) intended to curb or, at least, regulate such advances. Throughout this period, the *quilombola* movement frequently complained about seeing the consolidation of rights being used as a bargaining chip in government negotiations in the Congress. This expression reveals the perception many *quilombolas* (and indigenous populations) had of the political negotiations between the government and the Congress regarding their rights. But it has the disadvantage of attributing to the ‘government’ a unified global rationality. It would be more correct to recognise that the state itself sets up an arena of disputes and negotiations, in which different internal fractions of the same government may be in complete contradiction.

These contradictory movements result from the creation of a field of debate in which academic arguments (mainly by anthropologists, lawyers, educators and historians), connections with similar movements in other countries (drawing especially on the experiences of the new Colombian and Ecuadorian constitutionalism) and a new conception of education and knowledge

12 For a broader analysis of these conceptual and demographic dimensions of *quilombola* education and schooling, including their comparison to the rural and indigenous school education category, see Arruti, 2017.

production were mobilised. In addition, there was also the formation of a body of technicians within public organisations that, by accumulating experience in *quilombos*, added administrative knowledge to the processes of elaborating and implementing public policy.

There is, therefore, a complex relationship between public policy for *quilombos* before and after the 2016 democratic rupture, triggered by the judicial-parliamentary-media coup against President Dilma. The actors involved, including those who were part of governmental alliances, appear to be the same, but thereafter the focus seems to shift from disputes within the political arena to a project of dissolving the arena itself, through the winding up of its institutional foundations and even the physical elimination of its opponents. The following reflections will further elaborate on these two issues.

Deinstitutionalisation

Answering to a question about indigenous peoples' claims for land demarcation, the then Minister of Justice, Osmar Serraglio, said that 'the land does not fill anyone's belly'.¹³ In the same vein, Antônio T. Costa, the evangelical pastor appointed FUNAI's new president, defended the presence of religious missions inside indigenous villages and affirmed that indigenous peoples should be included into the 'national production system' through the promotion of agricultural enterprises in their lands.

While the most conservative sectors in the National Congress¹⁴ – including the new occupiers of positions in the government – used the parliamentary rostrum to announce part of the political project associated with the coup, interim President Michel Temer started to restructure the government bodies responsible for agrarian policy. Provisional Measure 726 (May 2016) abolished the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA)¹⁵ and transferred the *quilombo* land regularisation authority to the new Ministry of Education and Culture. Eight days later, the government retracted this, maintaining INCRA's role, but linking the latter to the presidency through the chief of staff and the special secretary for family agriculture and agrarian development. These changes had an immediate impact on the implementation and continuity of public policies for related federal bodies (Mattei, 2018, p. 298).

13 The then minister, Osmar Serraglio, was rapporteur of the Proposed Constitutional Amendment 215 (PEC 215), which proposed to change the procedures for the demarcation of indigenous and *quilombola* lands. He had been elected a federal deputy in 2014, with 30 per cent of his campaign funds stemming from agribusiness companies. On his first day as a minister, he was visited by a group of fellow deputies from the Agricultural Parliamentary Caucus (FPA).

14 On conservative 'parliamentary fronts' and their anti-*quilombola* role, see Hatzikidi, 2019.

15 The MDA was created in 2000 with the aim of promoting agrarian reform and the sustainable development of family (small-scale) farming and of poor rural regions.

In addition, the chief of staff also decided to suspend all ongoing *quilombo* land titling processes. This decision was taken on the grounds of the Supreme Federal Court's (STF) uncertainty regarding the merits of the Direct Action of Unconstitutionality (ADI 3239) against Decree 4887/2003. The government's strategy was to transfer the responsibility for the interruption of more than 1,500 open cases to the justice system, betting on the perpetuation of the slowness in determining ADI 3239, which had already been postponed for 14 years. Nevertheless, the STF would make its final decision in February of the following year, declaring the action against the 2003 presidential decree groundless.

This decision was important as a formal guarantee of *quilombola* rights to land. In the discussions leading to the judgement, however, several restrictive arguments were presented, including the so-called *marco temporal* (temporal framework). First brought up in 2009, in the judgement of an action against the demarcation of the Raposa Serra do Sol indigenous reserve, the *marco temporal* thesis affirms that the constitutional right applies only to areas already occupied in 1988. In doing so, it fails to acknowledge forced displacements and expropriations, and restricts *quilombola* land struggles to a moment in time when the vast majority of current *quilombo* communities were unaware of the possibility of guaranteeing their rights.

In the ADI 3239 case, the evocation of the temporal framework thesis did not significantly impact the decision but highlighted that the highest level of the judiciary is open to its reconsideration. This is an important indicator for the legislature, which has been discussing several ways to implement this thesis, including the PEC 215/2000. Seizing this opportunity, only a few months after the STF's decision, the Attorney General's Office (AGU) published a normative opinion, approved by Michel Temer, binding all federal public administration actions to the temporal framework thesis. This document, conflicting with STF's own understanding that its decision on the Raposa Serra do Sol reserve did not extend to other cases, was questioned by the Public Prosecutor's Office and by indigenous peoples' organisations, but it was not revoked.

In the aftermath of the 2018 presidential elections, the most conservative group of deputies in Brazil's recent history would arrive in Congress, alongside Jair Bolsonaro. In this way, the measures taken by the previous government would not only continue but would be expanded. The aspiration to abolish the policies created or maintained by previous governments would go so far as to make the state's own operation unviable. Immediately upon taking office, Jair Bolsonaro issued a Provisional Measure (MP 870) that re- or de-structured the state, reducing the federal organisation from 29 to 16 ministries. He also dismissed all the technical positions created in previous administrations¹⁶ and

16 On the third day of his mandate, the number of employees dismissed from the federal administration under the pretext of 'de-PTisation' (*despetização* is a pun on *dedetização*, an expression that has its origin in the use of the pesticide DDT, and means pest control) or of

made changes that crippled control bodies,¹⁷ including technical ones, such as the National Institute for Space Research (INPE), responsible for monitoring Amazon fires.¹⁸ Finally, the president also tried to extinguish all mechanisms for popular participation in government decision-making and management, by dissolving more than 2,500 councils, commissions and other collegiate bodies composed of representatives of public administration and civil society.¹⁹

MP 780 transferred the authority to demarcate indigenous (FUNAI) and *quilombola* territories (INCRA), as well as the Brazilian Forest Service, to the Ministry of Agriculture, which is considered to be the political headquarters of the agribusiness sector. It also significantly weakened the institutional standing of INCRA. The abolition of the General Coordination of Rural Education and Citizenship (Decree 10252/2019) is an example of INCRA's debilitation. This agency was behind the National Programme for Education in areas of Agrarian Reform (PRONERA), created in 1998 in response to demands for access to all levels of education for the thousands of young land workers. It also created the Terra Sol project, which fostered agricultural training for newly settled local workers who benefited from the agrarian reform. Its extinction had an impact both on the autonomisation of these rural populations and on food sovereignty policy.

Strangulation

Another change imposed by the government of Michel Temer and continued by Jair Bolsonaro, with a direct impact on the poorest and, therefore, on the *quilombola* population, was the creation of a new tax regime, which prevents the growth of total and real government expenditures above inflation over the following 20 years. Constitutional Amendment 95/2016, better known

'fighting socialist and communist ideas', reached 3,400. At the end of the first year, a decree abolished 27,500 positions (mostly in the Ministry of Health) and prohibited public calls for tender for 68 university positions.

- 17 An article in *O Estado de S. Paulo/UOL* from August 2019 reports that 'In the past two months, president Jair Bolsonaro directly interfered in the three main anti-corruption agencies in the country, as they encroached on his family: the Federal Police, the Federal Revenue and the Financial Activities Control Council (Coaf)'. Bolsonaro, insisting that he is in charge, admitted that on certain occasions, he acted on behalf of his family. See <<https://noticias.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/agencia-estado/2019/08/17/bolsonaro-intervem-em-orgaos-de-controle.htm>> (accessed 31 March 2021).
- 18 INPE's director was dismissed after the erosion of international relations caused by the periodic disclosure of information on deforestation in Brazil. The intervention against the Institute served as an implicit permission for the advance in deforestation, resulting in the first registered action of large-scale fires. See the Human Rights Watch report 'Rainforest mafias: How violence and impunity fuel deforestation in Brazil's Amazon' (2019), <<https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/09/17/rainforest-mafias/how-violence-and-impunity-fuel-deforestation-brazils-amazon>> (accessed 31 March 2021).
- 19 The decree was judged as partially unconstitutional by the Supreme Federal Court in July 2019, which ordered the continuation of councils and other collegiate bodies created by law.

as the ‘public spending ceiling’, maintains the spending cap rules even in the face of demographic growth or strong economic performance. The ‘ceiling’ hinders investments in the preservation and expansion of public services, in the incorporation of technological innovations, in the increase of salaries, in the hiring of personnel and in career planning. All forecasts made by the new regime foresee the scrapping of social policies (especially in the areas of health and education), which points to a degradation in quality of life for the Brazilian population and implies disrespecting the spirit of the 1988 Constitution, which is oriented by welfare state principles. The ‘ceiling’s’ main goal is to save public money to guarantee the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by the federal government towards the creditors of public debt, one of the few items excluded from the prohibitions imposed by the measure.

The effects were already felt in the year following the Constitutional Amendment to health and education policies, where there was a budget reduction of 17 per cent and 19 per cent respectively. In other cases, the impact may lead to the closure of important social programmes, such as the Food Acquisition Program (PAA), a symbol of fighting hunger and extreme poverty in the country, responsible for the income generation of small rural producers, such as the *quilombolas*, and for access to food products by low-income sections of the population. According to a recent study, the PAA’s budget in 2017 was just 31 per cent of what it had been in 2014 (INESC, Oxfam Brazil and CESR, 2017, p. 4).

This strangulation of national finances led to successive cuts in the budget dedicated to the regularisation of *quilombo* territories between 2016 and 2019 – drastic even in comparison with the last year of the Dilma administration, which, as we have seen, was already imposing cuts in this area (see Figure 2.2). With the 2019 Budget Law, little more than R\$3 million remained for land regularisation in the regional superintendencies across the country, an amount that was supposed to cover more than 1,700 ongoing processes at INCRA.




Figure 2.2 INCRA’s budget for quilombola land regularisation. Source: INCRA, 2019.

To illustrate this dire situation, in 2017, the regional superintendence of INCRA in the state of Mato Grosso had a cash flow of less than R\$10,000 for handling more than 70 ongoing processes, while the state of Alagoas had less than R\$4,000 for 17. The unviability of INCRA's task is highlighted by the fact that the regional superintendence of São Paulo state has an average cost of R\$60,000 per RTID (CPISP, 2017).

Devaluation

Even though the 'rigging' of state organs was one of Bolsonaro's main criticisms of previous governments, the logic of corporate and partisan interests prevailed in the appointments made by his administration. All technical criteria (such as educational attainment or familiarity with the topic) were abandoned, in order to distribute positions to people lacking technical qualification or recognition in their respective fields. In some cases, even unknown characters were appointed, with careers and views contrary to the directives of the office to which they were assigned. With regard to *quilombos*, managerial positions related to land, environmental and Black culture issues were especially affected.

'This is your government!' was the phrase Bolsonaro spoke to the deputies and senators who make up the Agricultural Parliamentary Front (FPA) in a breakfast held for them at the Planalto Palace. Members of this group occupy the positions that impact directly the future of *quilombo* communities. The Ministry of Agriculture is headed by Tereza Cristina Dias, leader of the ruralist caucus (as the FPA is commonly known), dubbed 'poison muse' (*musa do veneno*) for defending a bill that lifts restrictions on the use of pesticides, despite the reluctance or disagreement of regulatory bodies. The Special Secretariat for Land Affairs is chaired by Luiz Antônio Nabhan Garcia, President of the Democratic Association of Ruralists (UDR),²⁰ who is under investigation by the joint Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into Land for acting in the formation of armed militias in the countryside, with the aim of 'repressing' social movements in the 1990s.

The connection between Dias and Garcia led to the dismissal of INCRA's president, General João Carlos Jesus Corrêa, as he did not comply with the ruralists' recommendation to title 600 areas in the name of beneficiaries of the national programme of agrarian reform through Operation Light at the End of the Tunnel. This operation aimed to greatly expand the amount of land available to the market. The ruralists' influence can also be seen in changes in INCRA's behaviour in relation to apparently minor, internal and technical

20 The UDR brings together large rural landowners with the stated objective to 'preserve property rights and maintain order'. It has a conservative political role, acting as a lobbying group in defence of rural landholders, both in the National Congress, against agrarian reform initiatives, and in the countryside, directing judicial and executive powers in situations of labour conflict.

actions, such as the decision not to recognise the technical reports of land identification at the moment of regulating *quilombo* territories.²¹

This stance fleshed out that what Bolsonaro has been promising from the beginning of his campaign: to legalise mining and other economic activities in indigenous lands and environmental reserves; to end the ‘charade’ of fines for environmental crimes; to abolish the Ministry of the Environment (MMA); and, like Donald Trump in the United States, to take Brazil out of the Paris Agreement against climate change. Indeed, as soon as he took office, he withdrew Brazil’s candidacy for hosting the UN 2020 Climate Change Conference, COP25, but backed down about the Paris Agreement and the MMA. Given the negative repercussions within and outside the country, especially in the agribusiness sector, and aware of the environmental clauses that regulate international trade agreements, Bolsonaro decided to keep MMA but chose someone with a solid record of opposition to environmental policies. As the new minister, Ricardo Salles, declared in a press interview, he was the first head of this ministry who had not been an ‘activist’ in the field: ‘The Ministry of the Environment was, historically, managed by environmentalists who had no commitment to economic development,’²² he declared.

Unable to modify indigenous and environmental legislation, which, from his point of view, hampers national development, Salles has been working to dismantle federal environmental policy from within, intimidating even his subordinates.²³ He thus abolished the Secretariat of Climate Change and Forests, considering global warming as ‘secondary’. He reduced the participation of organised civil society and state and municipal governments in the composition and functioning of the National Environment Council. He began to discuss the reduction of environmental conservation units and loosened the inspection of these areas, with budget cuts and the reduction of regional posts. He distanced himself from environmental organisations – about which he began to raise generic suspicions without evidence – in addition to ending agreements and partnerships with them regarding the management of the Amazon Fund resources, originally designed to promote the preservation of the forest. The inversion of values in the MMA practices resulted, almost immediately, in a wave of invasions by miners, loggers and land grabbers

21 This was the case, for example, of Resolution no. 12/2018 of INCRA, which reduced the area of Quilombo Mesquita, Goiás state, by 80 per cent. The reduction was subsequently revoked by an action of the Public Prosecutor’s Office (MPF) and CONAQ.

22 Available at: <https://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/republica/balanco-meio-ambiente-ricardo-salles/> (accessed 25 May 2021).

23 The MMA has been punishing its employees for the regular exercise of their functions. The Ibama inspector who, in 2012, fined the then-deputy Bolsonaro for illegal fishing in an environmentally protected area was exonerated and the fine was cancelled. Furthermore, employees of the Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation who did not attend a meeting that Salles held with parliamentarians linked to agribusiness were arbitrarily dismissed.

in protected areas, as well as in an unprecedented increase in deforestation of several biomes, including the Amazon, which has the greatest worldwide repercussion.

Finally, after values were reversed in the conduct of land and environmental policies, it is worth making a brief note about changes in cultural policies. First, it is necessary to understand that the creation of the Ministry of Culture in 1985 was one of the innovations by post-dictatorial governments, in order to provide autonomy to cultural initiatives, which previously fell under the Ministry of Education and Culture (1953–85). Arts, historical, archaeological and intangible heritage, and folk cultural expressions were clearly encouraged and diversified. Special attention was given to ‘Afro-Brazilian culture’, for which the Palmares Cultural Foundation (FCP) was created, with the stated aim to fight against racism and promote and preserve Black socio-economic and cultural values.

With the abolition of this ministry in 2019, its tasks were allocated to the Special Secretariat for Culture and incorporated into the Ministry of Tourism, suggesting the standpoint that would guide relevant initiatives. As if this were not enough, the first secretary appointed to this office was dismissed after public outcry over a speech in which he echoed statements made by Joseph Goebbels.²⁴

Something similar happened with the nomination of the journalist Sérgio Camargo to the presidency of FCP. From November 2019 to March 2020, his appointment was discussed in the judiciary due to some public statements in which he denied the existence of racism in Brazil, defended the end of Black Consciousness Day (which, according to him, ‘causes incalculable losses to the national economy’), attacked the Black movement, and called the historic *quilombola* leader Zumbi dos Palmares a ‘false hero’ (Falcão and Vivas, 2020).

From 2003 onwards, the FCP began to have a special role in the process of *quilombo* recognition, by acquiring the power to issue the certificate which initiates the process of land regularisation at INCRA. Upon taking office, Camargo abolished seven public bodies at once, concentrating power in the presidency. They included entities indispensable to public policy, such as the management committee of the Quilombo dos Palmares Memorial Park, the Open Data Committee and the Information Security Committee (Decree 45/2020).

Violence

Ultimately, such actions of dismantling the state and reversing its values come hand in hand with a rhetoric of war, anti-intellectualism and intolerance,

24 See ‘Roberto Alvim é demitido da Secretaria Especial da Cultura’, *O Globo*, 17 January 2020, <<https://oglobo.globo.com/cultura/roberto-alvim-demitido-da-secretaria-especial-da-cultura-24196589>> (accessed 31 March 2021).

cultivated daily by the president himself, through his public pronouncements and social media activity. This stance has an effect of its own on the growth of violence, which cannot be attributed exclusively to any of the above-mentioned factors. Since the electoral period, the press has registered aggressions against social activists (indigenous people, *quilombolas* and people associated with the Landless Workers' Movement, as well as gay, transgender and Black people), both by individuals inspired by Bolsonaro's hate speech and by political groups with special economic interests. Situations defined as 'political violence' grew as Bolsonaro rose in the electoral polls.²⁵ With his victory, authorisation for the use of violence has become more than symbolic: it has been guaranteed by the manipulation of inspection bodies, by the Minister of Justice's silence on crimes of international repercussion, and by the active encouragement by the government of the use of firearms, especially by the landowning rural elite, while legitimising and legally guaranteeing unrestrained police violence.

As a result, violence against the poorest, against Black people and against the rural population increased, as the report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) from November 2018 indicates. Motivated by a set of denunciations of human rights violations, the IACHR report is concerned with impunity for rural violence, with social and environmental setbacks, and with the weakening of democratic institutions for human rights (CIDH, 2018, p. 6). The NGO Human Rights Watch released the 'Rainforest mafias' report (Human Rights Watch, 2019), which links the fires in the Brazilian Amazon with the impunity of landowners and criminal groups who finance machinery, chainsaws and a workforce for land grabbing. The report highlights that civil servants fear that environmental fines will be annulled and the inspectors who issued them will suffer penalties. It also calls attention to the increase of rural violence, especially against environmental activists, indigenous people, *quilombolas* and other traditional communities. In November 2019, the Arns Commission and the Human Rights Advocacy Collective denounced Bolsonaro to the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity and for inciting the genocide of indigenous peoples. In sum, in little more than a year of Bolsonaro's government, the country was constantly mentioned in the UN for human rights violations, the numbers of which are approaching the darkest period in our recent history: the military dictatorship. In 2019, more than 35 complaints against Brazil were filed at the Human Rights Council, involving violence against indigenous peoples, human rights activists and religious intolerance.

25 During the electoral process, the then candidate Bolsonaro was mentioned in 11 cases of violence, including attacks on the Brazilian Landless Workers' Movement and indigenous territories in six states. See 'Morte, incêndios, ameaças e agressões no campo marcam ascensão eleitoral de Bolsonaro', *Pública: Agência de Jornalismo Investigativo*, 30 November 2018, <<https://apublica.org/2018/11/morte-incendios-ameacas-e-agresoes-no-campo-marcam-ascensao-eleitoral-de-bolsonaro/>> (accessed 31 March 2021).

The report *Rural Conflicts: Brazil 2018*, by the Pastoral Land Commission (CPT, 2018), deserves special mention. This report, a product of the extensive and diffused network of social agents, pointed to an increase in conflicts over water and labour involving mining, in addition to the increase in the number of families expelled from their land holdings in 2018. Conversely, it also registered a progressive decrease in 'gun crimes' (*crimes de pistolagem*), between 2015 and 2018. This type of crime is committed by illegal security agents in the service of landowners and land grabbers (frequently police officers working outside office hours), and is symptomatic of the low standard of public security and of the abandonment of the most vulnerable populations by the justice system. Thus, such a reduction probably points to a progressive change of the institutional framework. Bolsonaro responded to this 'good news' at the end of 2019 with what different commentators have called the 'nationalisation of hired gunmen'.²⁶ The president sent a bill to the Congress to exempt from punishment security agents who committed crimes and abuses of power during operations called Guarantees of Law and Order (GLO). According to the Federal Constitution, the GLOs would be reserved for cases of exhaustion of the instruments provided for in public security bodies (Article 142, regulated by Complementary Law 97/1999 and Decree 3897/2001). In this case, however, it specifically aimed at repossession actions.²⁷ If the proposal had been approved, police and military officers could be exempt from punishment.

Finally, focusing on the specific situation of *quilombo* communities in the period between 2008 and 2017, a report titled 'Racism and violence against *quilombos* in Brazil' was published (Terra de Direitos and CONAQ, 2018). The report identifies 2017 as the most violent year, registering threats, injuries and deaths. In 2017 alone, 14 people were murdered in different types of conflict: an increase of 350 per cent compared to the previous year.

The sampling used to collect this data does not reflect the exact number of violations suffered by *quilombolas*, but it offers a glimpse of the vulnerability such communities experience. In 2017, 29 threats and persecutions were registered; five arbitrary arrests; six cases of contamination by pesticides and/or water pollution, in which *quilombolas* were deprived of the use of natural resources; 15 civil, criminal or administrative proceedings were opened against *quilombo* communities or *quilombolas* in order to criminalise them in legal disputes, in addition to the opening of administrative proceedings for alleged environmental crimes; there were five incidents of destruction of houses or

26 'Projetos de Bolsonaro propõem estatizar a pistolagem no campo', Blog do Sakamoto, 25 November 2019, <<https://blogdosakamoto.blogosfera.uol.com.br/2019/11/25/projetos-de-bolsonaro-propoem-estatizar-a-pistolagem-no-campo/>> (accessed 31 March 2021).

27 In addition, upon accepting the role at the Ministry of Justice, Sérgio Moro (known for his role in the Car Wash Operation) presented a proposal to reform criminal legislation that would absolve police officers who committed crimes during official operations. The proposal was rejected by the National Congress.

crops; and 22 records of expropriation of communities in their territories, involving evictions and illegal subdivisions.

There were also reports of killings in the Iúna *quilombo*, in Lençóis, Bahia state, and in Lagoa do Algodão Quilombo, in Carneiros, Alagoas state. However, investigations do not link these deaths with land disputes, which calls for reflecting upon the ways institutional racism and the invisibility of *quilombo* communities interfere with the production of available data. As the CONAQ report highlights, in 29 of the 38 cases – that is, in about 76 per cent of cases – the killer is unknown, leading police investigations to conclude that the motivations for those deaths are of a personal nature. Police strategies to dissolve land conflicts into other kinds of conflicts are enhanced by on-the-ground factors, namely the fear of denouncing the responsible actors, due to the low or ineffective protection for witnesses and human rights activists. In 2017 alone, several cases related to real estate speculation (11.8 per cent), large estates (24.8 per cent), megaprojects (20.8 per cent), rural militia (2.4 per cent) and institutional racism (32.8 per cent) were registered (Terra de Direitos and CONAQ, 2018, pp. 63, 83).

The report also draws attention to gender-based violence in the context of violence against *quilombos*. Although women are on the front line in the struggle for land rights, political invisibility places them in official statistics as victims of domestic or common violence. The survey carried out by CONAQ demonstrated that six women were murdered between 2008 and 2017. The study also identified that all murdered women had held positions of leadership and/or were actively participating in the quest for collective rights (Terra de Direitos and CONAQ, 2018, pp. 54, 108–9).

Concluding remarks

‘Left-wing governments found other ways to hinder Brazil, with *quilombo* communities. With all due respect to those who came to Brazil and were enslaved – we abhor slavery, thank God it no longer exists in Brazil – these demarcations cannot happen. We are one people, one race’ (*Notícia Preta*, 2020).

Jair Bolsonaro’s statement in March 2020, quoted above, was given at the exact moment in which we were writing this conclusion. It perfectly conveys his rejection of the Constitution and his willingness to violate it with respect to *quilombola* rights. In the course of this chapter we have also gathered evidence of three additional post-democratic characteristics of this government: its concerted work to disqualify and even criminalise alternative political, social and environmental conceptions, always alleging the protection of national development; its public security initiatives and its dismantling of state bodies of fiscalisation, effectively contributing towards tolerating if not stimulating violence; its reaction to any form of control or monitoring by the civil society – whether through the abolition of bodies that, in various instances,

guaranteed the participation of civil society in public decisions, or through ending transparency in the production of official data and threats to punish its critics. Jair Bolsonaro's statements and actions are not, however, just traces of an authoritarian personality (alluding to the image of the demagogue analysed by Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018). They characterise a conservative political project, based on an accounting mindset for which socio-cultural and socio-environmental diversity only represent an increase in costs and unpredictability of the movement of capital.

Quilombola rights were constituted in Brazil under the sign of ambiguity. Rights holders have had to wrestle with a reductive interpretation of the categories of recognition used in the text of the law; the manipulation of the rules that must regulate those same laws; and budget cuts that prevent their consolidation. This ambiguity was aggravated from 2010, when, as a result of the 2008 financial crisis and the international appreciation of commodities, the government's commitment to the popular classes, especially the rural populations (peasants, landless workers, indigenous people and *quilombolas*) has lost more and more ground to commitments to agribusiness and extractive capital.

The 2013 protests in Brazil expressed, in part, this breach of commitment, but they also expressed its opposite. Representatives of a middle class who were not satisfied with the social advances of the immediately preceding period also took to the streets. The reduction of poverty, the entry of the less economically privileged segment of the population into public universities, the regulation of domestic work, which in Brazil maintains a direct link with colonial forms of work (a mixture of overwork, family, affection, racial hierarchy and asymmetric exchanges), represented a threat to the hierarchical structure of Brazilian society. The crisis around the impeachment of President Dilma took the necessary time for the ambiguity of the streets to be captured by one of these parties. This paved the way for the process that would result in the 2018 elections.

Since then, *quilombola* rights have ceased to be subjected to the ambiguities of the policy of class conciliation and are under direct attack, without the ideological cover of racial democracy. The presidential speeches are relevant not only because of the prominence that our presidential arrangement ends up attributing to them. They are important also because they exemplify a regression in the public discourse of our elites in dealing with the racial issue. It is no longer a question of denying racism, but of affirming the need to eliminate unwanted populations. In this context, the (ambiguous) advances achieved by *quilombola* communities since re-democratisation, in terms of rights and public policies, ended up placing them in a prominent position, alongside the indigenous populations, in the face of the current federal project for the destruction of the legacy of the 1988 Constitution.

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3. From Orkut to Brasília: the origins of the New Brazilian Right

Camila Rocha

Years before the ascension of Jair Bolsonaro to power, New Right activism had occupied the Brazilian streets and social networks, taking by surprise political analysts accustomed to associating social movements and street protests with leftist groups. This process involved the emergence of new leaders and new forms of expression and organisation, as well as new ideas that recently started to circulate with greater strength in the Brazilian public sphere: libertarianism and the denunciation of a ‘leftist cultural hegemony’ in the country.¹

In the first section of this chapter, I describe right-wing activities in Brazil in the previous decades, considering their links to the actions of the New Right that emerged years later. In the second section, I indicate how, amid the political transformations that occurred in the country, a new constellation of actors and ideas had been formed which then greatly contributed to Brazil’s political shift to the right.

The traditional right: Hayek and the fight against communism

In Brazil, the promotion of neoliberalism began between the 1940s and the 1950s through a strong campaign against the left that united conservative Catholics and anti-communist businesspeople, who committed themselves to the preservation of private property. In 1946, the Austrian economist F.A. Hayek’s *The Road of Serfdom*, originally published in 1944, was translated into Portuguese with the support of the businessman Adolpho Lindenberg. Lindenberg’s intention when contacting Hayek and sponsoring the translation and publication of his book was, in Lindenberg’s own words, to ‘scientifically’

1 Libertarianism stands for the radical defence of the free market without any restrictions, and is also associated with the defence of the moral and political liberty of human beings who are not coerced one by another (Doherty, 2007). Libertarians usually do not like to be labelled as either left or right, but empirically they tend to connect with right-wing leaders and parties. In Brazil they mostly lean to the right. Although there is a small political group that refers to themselves as left-libertarians, they are gathered under a right-wing party called the New Party (Partido Novo).

make a case for private property and bar the advance of the Catholic left and its main agenda, land reform in the countryside:

Here in Brazil, before the revolution [the 1964 military coup], in the 1950s, there was a leftist, Catholic movement, an important one, which wanted to form communist societies called *comunidades de base*, [composed of] blue-collar workers, priests, feminists, all of them grouped in these communities . . . And there was another movement, in which I participated, which was called Tradição, Família e Propriedade (TFP), directed by Plínio Corrêa de Oliveira, a conservative, traditionalist, Catholic movement. From the beginning, we opposed the left-wing movement. Plínio Corrêa de Oliveira wrote a book called *Reforma Agrária, questão de consciência* because land reform was a motto of the Catholic left. They thought it was possible to divide big properties, make only small properties destroying the Brazilian agrarian structure . . . At that time, I wrote in a newspaper named *O Catolicismo*, which had an extraordinary diffusion in the Catholic milieu, showing how the liberal economy is the true one, the one based on natural law and the right to property, and that Catholics have an obligation to fight the left . . . When I saw the Catholic left advancing too much, I searched for a movement that could beat the left, and I met Hayek, so I got one of his books, got excited, and said: 'I am going to publish this to give weight to it, something to be respected.' I wrote a letter to Hayek, and he authorised me to publish the book, and it was good, you see, because Hayek provides a scientific basis to what we defended. Then [Ludwig von] Mises appeared too, and an American, [Milton] Friedman, these three are the main ones (Interview with Adolpho Lindenberg, March 2017).²

Lindenberg, along with Plínio Corrêa de Oliveira (who happened to be Lindenberg's cousin), was one of the main founders of Tradition, Family, Property (TFP) in 1960, which was intimately related to members of the Brazilian royal family and operated across Latin America.³ At the time, there were many groups and organisations committed to the fight against communism (Motta, 2002). The appeal of such anti-communist discourse may be observed in the massive adherence to the 'March of the Family with God for Freedom', a protest organised by conservative Catholic women, which was attended by around three hundred thousand people in the city of São Paulo in 1964 (Cordeiro, 2009).

However, if Catholic conservatism captivated a significant share of society at the time, neoliberalism was confined mainly to the elites who, like Lindenberg, were also concerned with what they viewed as substantial advances of the left.

2 I conducted all the interviews mentioned in this chapter for my doctoral thesis about the origins of the Brazilian New Right. For further details on the interviewees see Rocha, 2019. The excerpts used here were slightly edited for brevity and fluency.

3 Lindenberg is the acting president of the Instituto Plínio Corrêa de Oliveira (IPCO), founded in December 2006. For more information, see <<https://ipco.org.br/quem-somos/#.W-27UnpKhmA>> (accessed 19 February 2021).

Among them were Eugenio Gudín, the economist who participated in the ninth meeting promoted by the Mont Pèlerin Society in Princeton, New Jersey, in 1958 (Boianovsky, 2018),⁴ and the businessman Paulo Ayres Filho, whose work with the Foundation for Economic Education began in 1959, and who would later join the Mont Pèlerin Society (Spohr, 2012).⁵

Ayres Filho was a leading figure in the civil-military coup against President João Goulart in 1964, also backed by Gudín. In 1961, he founded the Instituto de Pesquisa e Estudos Sociais (IPES) in São Paulo, which brought together businesspeople, politicians, the military and intellectuals to resist the advance of the left.⁶ Among them were Catholics and conservative intellectuals linked to the Instituto Brasileiro de Filosofia (IBF) and the Sociedade de Convívio.⁷

During the transition to democracy, however, conservative discourses, characterised by aggressive anti-communist rhetoric, lost their appeal due to dwindling public and private support. The fight against communism was not a priority any longer. In fact, the idea of being a rightist was out of fashion at the time since it linked right-wing people and organisations to the military regime. For similar reasons, political scientist Timothy Power (2010) coined the epithet ‘the ashamed right’ to characterise the Brazilian right after the end of the dictatorship.

The unfavourable scenario prompted conservatives, who were saddled with a frayed discourse and could not rely on great funding for their organisations, to defend free markets more organically and less pragmatically than in the 1950s and 1960s. In the words of Ricardo Vélez Rodríguez, a former member of

4 The Mont Pèlerin Society was founded in 1947 by Hayek with the intention of stimulating the exchange of ideas between intellectuals familiar with the theses outlined in *The Road to Serfdom* such as Ludwig von Mises, Milton Friedman, Karl Popper, Wilhelm Röpke, Lionel Robbins, Walter Eucken, Walter Lippmann, Michael Polanyi, Salvador de Madariaga and others (Cockett, 1995; Stedman Jones, 2014).

5 The Foundation for Economic Education (FEE) founded in March 1946 in the city of Irvington-on-Hudson, New York, was idealised by the businessman Leonard Read and was supported for many years by a fund with a multi-million-dollar balance, the Volker Fund, created by the magnate William Volker and managed by a free-market enthusiast. Thus, the institution had relative autonomy in face of immediate political interests and aspired to educate American people for the advantages of free-market capitalism (Doherty, 2007).

6 Later, between the 1960s and the 1970s, IPES managed to have branches in other Brazilian capitals. For more information, see Dreifuss, 1987 and Ramírez, 2007.

7 The IBF was founded in 1949 in São Paulo and was initially headed by the Brazilian jurist and philosopher Miguel Reale. The institution counted among its members Luis Washington Vita, Vicente Ferreira da Silva, Renato Cirell Czerna, Heraldo Barbuy, Vilém Flusser, Leônidas Hegenberg, Roque Spencer Maciel de Barros, Ubiratan Borges de Macedo, Antonio Paim and Ricardo Vélez Rodríguez. Between the 1960s and the 1980s, IBF operated with the Catholics of the Sociedade de Convívio, created in 1961 in São Paulo by Father Adolpho Crippa, from the Order of Salvatorians, with the active participation of Paulo Mercadante, Creusa Capalbo, Antonio Paim, Nelson Saldanha, Ricardo Vélez Rodríguez and Ubiratan Borges de Macedo (Gonçalves, 2017).

the Conviviality Society and former Minister of Education in Jair Bolsonaro's government:

In 1979, when I moved to Brazil for my doctoral studies, [Father Adolpho] Crippa offered me a research position in the Convívio publishing house. I accepted it, but I said: 'Crippa, this is *démodé*.' I think that communists must be fought against and criticised, but to dedicate oneself only to this is too little. We need to come up with a proposal . . . He was a staunch anti-communist, but he wanted to change. Why? Because he received financial support from businesspeople from São Paulo, who no longer financed this anti-communist discourse, this discourse became worn out, and they no longer helped that much. I told Crippa: 'Surely the businesspeople are seeing that things are changing, that anti-communist discourse is not enough, that we need to think about Brazil from a more radical perspective and how to dismantle patrimonialism, so Brazil can really develop' (Interview with Ricardo Vélez Rodríguez, 2017).

Vélez Rodríguez and other conservative intellectuals started to attend the circuits formed by the Instituto Liberal⁸ – founded in 1983 in Rio de Janeiro by the Canadian-Brazilian businessman Donald Stewart Jr and José Stelle, Hayek's translator and chief editor at Henry Maksoud's magazine *Visão* – and by the Institute of Business Studies, created in 1984 by the businessmen Winston Ling and Willian Ling. The Instituto Liberal had eight branch offices scattered across Brazil by the beginning of the 1990s, and in 1993 hosted the Mont Pèlerin Society's annual meeting in Rio de Janeiro. About the same time, other pro-market think tanks were created, such as the Instituto Atlântico, founded by old members of the Chamber of Economic and Social Studies and Debates⁹ and headed by the economist Paulo Rabello de Castro, who had graduated from the Chicago School of Economics.

Most of the organisations founded at the time had an important connection with the Partido da Frente Liberal (PFL), now renamed Democratas (DEM), which housed politicians that used to be linked to the military regime's party, the Aliança Renovadora Nacional (ARENA). Roberto Bornhausen, whose brother, Jorge Bornhausen, was a politician affiliated to the PFL, presided over the São Paulo chapter of the Instituto Liberal and the Instituto Atlântico, which was

8 'Liberal' in Brazil stands mainly for pro-market currents, being less associated with the defence of progressivist values than liberal groups in an Anglo-Saxon context.

9 CEDES was formed by a group of academics, most of whom were alumni of the University of São Paulo, especially from the Fundação Instituto de Pesquisas Econômicas (FIPE). The group had great liberty to elaborate public policy proposals, despite being sheltered in what Rabello de Castro referred to as 'the national temple of conservatism', the Sociedade Rural Brasileira, an entity that was, in his view, profoundly anti-neoliberal. At the time, however, the Sociedade Rural was presided over by Renato Ticoulart Filho and other directors who, according to Castro, were more intellectual and open to innovations. The group also relied on bankers, such as then president of Unibanco Roberto Bornhausen, and the Andrade Vieira family, owner of Bamerindus, a bank strongly linked to the state of Paraná's rural elites. (Dreifuss, 1989, pp. 52–3).

responsible for elaborating the party's political programme. Intellectuals linked to the former Sociedade de Convívio, such as Antonio Paim and Ricardo Vélez Rodríguez, also circulated in those think tanks and actively sought to influence it ideologically, administering many formation courses to their members.

However, after the sociologist Fernando Henrique Cardoso, affiliated to the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB), was elected President of Brazil in 1994 and after the end of hyperinflation, the institutes started to face increasing difficulties in keeping their sponsors. Many businesspeople believed it was no longer necessary to finance the dissemination of pro-market ideas since the federal government had already implemented these ideas in practice. According to Winston Ling:

After the Plano Real no Institute could levy any more funds because the sponsors would say: 'We were already successful, we reached our goal, we are already in liberalism, we no longer need the Institute, inflation is zero, and now the thing is to work and make money, we don't need that any more' (Interview with Winston Ling, April 2017).

The New Right: Mises and the fight against globalism

In 2003, amid the withering of Brazil's pro-market organisations, former union leader Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva's first presidential term started. Despite his leftist origins, the PT's leader adopted a more orthodox economic orientation than that of President Cardoso, with the objective of not upsetting the country's economic elites, especially those related to the financial markets.¹⁰ However, the outbreak of a corruption scandal known as *mensalão* in 2005 altered this perspective.

The scandal was named after the monthly instalments paid to deputies in exchange for their votes in favour of projects which were of interest to the executive branch, and it became one of the best-known corruption episodes in Brazil.¹¹ It received wider media coverage than previous corruption scandals (Miguel and Coutinho, 2007), and it involved high-ranking government officials. In June 2005, Lula's chief of staff, José Dirceu, resigned from his office and, months later, had his parliamentary mandate revoked. In March 2006, Antonio Palocci, then Minister of Finance, also resigned from his post, despite having become the main actor for the maintenance of the orthodox economic policy of the government, and his successor, Guido Mantega, soon adopted a more heterodox approach.

10 This argument is developed in Lima, 2016.

11 In an opinion poll conducted in 2006 by Fundação Perseu Abramo, the PT's think tank, 76 per cent of the population affirmed that the *mensalão* had occurred, which indicated low adherence to the party's official version of the scandal, according to which the financial transactions that were the original focus of the scandal were campaign money that was not accounted for by the PT's former treasurer, senator Delúbio Soares (Venturi, 2006).

In addition to the changes that occurred in government, the *mensalão* scandal also negatively affected the image of the PT, which had historically championed ethics in politics, and contributed to an increase in distrust in the political system as a whole (Venturi, 2006; Carreirão, 2007; Paiva, Socorro Braga and Pimentel, 2007). Amid such a negative impact, the first movement linked to the New Right, the Rightward Brazil Movement (MEB), was founded in 2006 in São Paulo by young lawyers led by Ricardo Salles (currently President Bolsonaro's Minister of Environment).¹² The group intended to promote a campaign for Lula's impeachment. Nevertheless, the idea did not gain enough support due to the country's economic bonanza at the time, according to one of MEB's members, the historian Rodrigo Neves:

The MEB emerged in 2006 as a right-wing lawyers club . . . It was formed by Ricardo Salles and some of his friends from São Francisco, PUC, Mackenzie [prominent law schools in São Paulo] who had recently graduated, who were against the PT and shocked by the *mensalão* scandal . . . Their idea was: let us mobilise people to achieve Lula's impeachment. But, at the time, this did not gain support because it was 2006. Brazil was in the hype of an economic bubble that the PT created. Everybody saw an artificial increase in salaries, the economy grew in a frenetic bubble, so it did not gain support. Everybody knew that Lula had committed a crime and everybody knew Lula was corrupt and that the PT had bought votes, and nobody cared (Interview with Rodrigo Neves, April 2018).

Like the members of the Rightward Brazil Movement, most of the political analysts who appeared in major media outlets, as well as opposition political actors, affirmed that, after *mensalão*, Lula would no longer have any support. However, not only did the ex-unionist get re-elected due to the economic improvement and the support of the poorest people in the country, but also he finished his first term of office with 80 per cent popular approval. Therefore, during his second term (2006–10) there was a wide political consensus around his government, and disgruntled voices, on both left and right, were scarce. The existing right-wing parties (such as Bolsonaro's party at the time, the Progressive Party [PP], ARENA's political heir), were part of the government's legislative alliance, and other opposition leaders, from PFL/DEM or PSDB, did not seem to have great differences with the government's agenda.

In civil society, dissonant voices also had little support. Opposition to the government in the public sphere was limited to the activity of a few journalists in newspapers, magazines and books criticising Lula and the PT (Chaloub and Perlatto, 2015), and people who decided to express their frustration and resentment in online forums. At the time, the internet became a refuge for anti-PT right-wingers or those who did not see their demands reflected in Lula's policies. Feeling cornered in mainstream publics, these individuals turned to the digital space to explore and sympathise with strangers through forum

12 *Endireita* means literally to straighten something, and figuratively a right turn in politics.

interactions, blogs, websites and digital communities, encouraging the creation of discursive spaces that existed outside the dominant pro-government currents.

Thus, in addition to the subaltern counterpublics that were active at the time, such as those formed by feminist activists (Medeiros, 2017), LGBT+ and queer people, for example, there were also non-subaltern counterpublics formed by traditionalists, anti-globalists and supporters of the military regime, among others, who influenced the formation of the Brazilian New Right (Rocha and Medeiros, 2020).

The emergence of the online social network Orkut was crucial in the emergence of right-wing counterpublics. In 2004, the network became one of the main spaces for forming the Brazilian New Right. The first step in this direction was taken in the 1990s by the philosopher Olavo de Carvalho, who, by the early 2000s, stopped writing for mainstream media outlets and focused only on his online activities. In 2002 he created a collaborative website called *Mídia sem Máscara*. In 2004 there were already two Orkut forums dedicated to the discussion of Carvalho's ideas. Two years later, he started broadcasting a podcast, and in 2009, he began offering online philosophy lessons for a fee.

Significantly influenced by a marginal, esoteric and anti-modern current of thought called traditionalism, also shared by Steve Bannon and Aleksandr Dugin (Teitelbaum, 2020), Carvalho argued that the left had established a cultural hegemony in Brazil through the more or less conscious adoption of a political strategy developed by the Italian communist intellectual Antonio Gramsci. Such a process supposedly began during the re-democratisation era in the mid-1980s. It involved the activity of mainstream media outlets, NGOs, publishers, universities, organisations that operated in the arts and humanities field, and international entities that defended progressive agendas such as feminism, LGBT+ rights and human rights in general. All those organisations were, according to Carvalho, part of an ongoing worldwide revolutionary process called 'globalism'. For globalists, only the intervention of a global authority, invested in an unprecedented power concentration, could solve the main contemporary issues, hence Carvalho's call for liberals and conservatives to unite in the fight against the leftist cultural hegemony and the upsurge of a 'universal Leviathan' (Carvalho, 2009).

Today, references to globalism and leftist cultural hegemony can be found in most discourses associated with contemporary right-wing leaders and groups, especially in the United States. In Brazil, these references were incorporated by readers of foreign authors and users of American internet forums, then adapted to the national context, and eventually shared with a larger audience through the translation of texts into Portuguese and dissemination in national digital forums. In this sense, Olavo de Carvalho's activity was fundamental for the emergence of the New Right in Brazil. Around 2010, when Facebook became a popular social network in Brazil, Carvalho's ideas had been circulating on the internet for some years, and it was possible to find four communities that

bore his name. According to Marcus Boeira, a philosophy professor at the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, who was also a reader of Carvalho's work and a user of these Orkut communities at the time:

Back then, it seems to me that there was a stronger Gramscian hegemony than there is today . . . It was harder back then, we were no more than 20 persons working in these media, and the rest was practically 99 per cent of the people saying the same things . . . He [Carvalho] said what we all wanted to say to journalists, university professors, people that worked in the media, people in the third sector, etc. He was saying everything that many people would like to say but had no voice. So he, in a certain way, channelled all those voices (Interview with Marcus Boeira, June 2018).

Initially designed for the American public, Orkut rapidly became popular in Brazil. It is estimated that in January 2006, 75 per cent of all its users were from Brazil (Fragoso, 2006), which indicated an early engagement of Brazilians in this type of social network in comparison to people in other countries. Between 2005 and 2007, the peak of Orkut's popularity in Brazil, internet access was limited largely to groups of educated young people and adults, mostly from the middle and upper classes, and located primarily in the southern and southeastern regions of the country (Comitê Gestor da Internet no Brasil, 2007). Using Orkut, one could create communities about the most varied subjects, in which internet users could interact with each other through conversation topics. However, the use of fake profiles was quite common, and it contributed to the chaotic and sometimes violent development of debates (Fragoso, 2006).

The environment provided by Orkut ended up fostering the constitution of right-wing counterpublics – debate arenas characterised by disruptive and indecorous language to the detriment of rational-critical arguments, which are the basis of dominant publics' legitimacy (Warner, 2002). Olavo de Carvalho used this kind of language consciously, to attract attention through shock and indecorous behaviour and to counteract the rational-critical argumentation used by dominant publics through the defence of the use of swear words:

THE USES OF SWEARING:

I swear because it is NECESSARY.

It is necessary in the Brazilian context for demolishing polite language, which is

a straitjacket that traps people, making them respect what does not deserve respect.

So, sometimes, when you disagree with someone but disagree respectfully, you are giving them more strength than if you agreed with them.

Because you are going against his idea, but you are reinforcing his authority.

Authority is respectability.

The problem of those people, those crooks I am talking about, is not their ideas. It is precisely the fact that they are scoundrels.

They are scoundrels, they are crooks, they are thieves.

G-O- F-U-C-K-Y-O-U-R-S-E-L-V-E-S! (Carvalho, 2015).

Not only was the language disruptive, but the very ideas that circulated in such forums were also so contrary to the dominant perspective that, if they were uttered without qualifications in dominant publics, they were very likely to cause hostile reactions. Among the most recurrent ones was Carvalho's idea that Brazil was dominated by a 'Communist Gay dictatorship', that the Brazilian military dictatorship and its fight against so-called 'terrorists' should be praised, and the idea expressed by young libertarians that 'taxation is theft'.

Although there were glaring differences and acute tensions between groups that met in those forums, they shared the fight against globalism and 'left-wing cultural hegemony' in Brazil to a lesser or greater degree. Thus, although the defence of traditionalist and anti-modern ideas was restricted to a small group, the traditionalist counterpublic led by Olavo de Carvalho created a shared political language and constituted a broader discursive field (Alvarez, 1990) that could unify different groups that had strong tensions among themselves. According to the then libertarian economist Joel Pinheiro da Fonseca:

[Olavo de Carvalho] influenced many people. Many free-marketeers today have much more of a 'right-wing bent' than a progressivist one, and he has played a significant role in that, I'm pretty sure of it. The thing about left hegemony, of forming this combative instrument, I think there is a lot there. Maybe he wasn't the only one, but I think he helped foster that. Without that kind of belief, perhaps we wouldn't have had that desire to fight and make things happen. Maybe, on a more practical level, he had a vital role in giving form to the vision that 'we're in a lean, half-educated minority, without representation, we have to fight' (Interview with Joel Pinheiro da Fonseca, May 2017).

Libertarianism, which promotes free-market capitalism more radically than neoliberals linked to the Chicago School such as Ludwig von Mises and Murray Rothbard, was almost non-existent in Brazil until then. However, it was through Orkut that university students such as Filipe Celeti, and independent professionals like the economist Rodrigo Constantino, were able to contact each other to share ideas and to translate and share texts:

In my last college year, I started to discover this new universe that, in a certain way, was all but non-existent in Brazil. The majority of texts were in English, so it was hard to have access to information. During that period [2005–6] many free translation projects arose due to public interest. Many people created blogs to translate small texts and articles. So the need to disseminate those ideas was bubbling, and this brought people together:

'Look, let's share these ideas, we need this.' At Orkut, you typed the name of an author, and you had communities with 20, 30 people, and most were not people from Brazil, [but] the Brazilians started to take over these spaces. So Orkut, with its communities, enabled people's meeting, the exchange of information, and promoted great debates on ideas (Interview with Filipe Celeti, April 2016).

I started working in the financial market and had a boss who was a known liberal in Brazil, Paulo Guedes [currently Brazil's Minister of Finance], who held a PhD from Chicago. And he started giving me tips, 'read this thing here, you will like it,' and that thing was the Austrian School. So I discovered authors like Mises and Hayek very early on, and started, in parallel, working in the financial market, which is a propitious environment to fight against socialists, . . . to broaden my horizon of readings. Around my twenties, I was already, let's say, a libertarian. I always liked a good controversy too . . . When I discovered Orkut and these communities where everybody spent the day debating, it was convenient, and we had endless debates there. Those were wonderful times. I loved the quarrelling and polemics. Orkut was a life lesson, I loved debating, defending the ideas that I believed in, and I started to find an echo. I began to find people that were willing to discuss with me as well (Interview with Rodrigo Constantino, December 2016).

Highly active on the internet, the militants started to promote their ideas on YouTube channels, forums, blogs and social networks. This strategy, combined with the creation of study groups and participation in student movements and organisations throughout Brazil, ended up aggregating a growing number of like-minded people:

I met some friends who told me about Olavo de Carvalho and Rodrigo Constantino. I began reading some of their texts, and we discussed them between ourselves, not only the texts they recommended but also some that we chose on our own. I think I started to get in touch with this around 2009 and 2010, which coincided with when I began to have a political activity at college . . . Many debates started after we began to use Facebook; before that, we were on Orkut. You can see that some people disagree with some types of thinking, ideologies or political practices. [But they are] completely alienated from decision-making processes. [We ran for the students' committee elections] and we had many supporters (Interview with Fernando Fernandes, March 2017).

Simultaneously, militants also circulated in older forums and organisations, such as the Fórum da Liberdade, promoted annually by the Institute for Entrepreneurial Studies (IEE). Here it is possible to highlight the roles of Bernardo Santoro, Rodrigo Constantino and Fábio Ostermann. While Ostermann had a fundamental role in structuring new key organisations dedicated to pro-market militancy, such as the Free Order and Students For Liberty (Brazil) (EPL), Santoro and Constantino were responsible for the restructuring of the former Instituto Liberal in Rio de Janeiro. The contact

between different generations provided access to already established pro-market contact networks inside and outside the country and new sources of funding, and helped to forge new community bonds (Polletta and Jasper, 2001):

When I attended EPL's national conference in 2013 in Belo Horizonte, the sense of family within the movement became very clear to me. Because of a group of crazy people who started doing this on Orkut, you get a ride in a crowded car, and people treat you well, there's a lot of chatting: 'How do you do it in your state?', and so on. Suddenly, I had this sense of belonging, and it was great (Interview with Gabriel Menegale, January 2017).

Pro-market and libertarian ideas dominated the then-emerging New Right. According to Rodrigo Neves from Endireita Brasil, conservatives had less success mobilising civil society than attracting young free-market defenders. This continued the trend where conservatives circulated in think tanks and pro-market organisations:

I arrived at the Fórum da Liberdade with the reputation of being a conservative, a person from the Endireita Brasil movement, a person that had started a conservative movement at the University of São Paulo. People came to talk to me about conservatism. So, on the first day of the Fórum I was already Mr Conservative. The warm-up to the Forum was at the First Conference on the Austrian School. I received the invitation for free from Helio Beltrão, because of our [operation on the] Tax Freedom Day. [There were] anarcho-capitalists, libertarians, me, a staunch conservative, and Marcel Van Hattem, who was also a conservative. Marcel says he is a free-marketeter, but he always had some conservative ideas, because he is very religious with a strong conservative bias. [Question: At the time, who else would you call a conservative that attended these spaces?] Me and Ricardo Salles. Both of us were swimming against the tide, because this new right-wing movement was formed mainly by libertarians and free-market defenders. Ricardo used to call himself a right-wing free-market defender, or he could not sell his product. But I declared myself: I am a conservative. I was one of the people who started to change this setting. Marcel, he used to hold back because he was more focused on bringing the debate to free-market economics, even if he had some conservative values. Ricardo did the same (Interview with Rodrigo Neves, April 2018).

However, by the end of Lula's second term, the 'pro-market and libertarian hegemony' of the New Right gave way to the conservatives.

Breaking with the system: Bolsonaro's rise to power

After 30 years as a legislator, former army captain Jair Bolsonaro appeared on the political scene as a palatable leader for the emergent New Right in 2014, when he received a record 464,000 votes in Rio de Janeiro's legislative elections, four times the amount he obtained in the previous election. In the same year, one of his sons, Eduardo Bolsonaro, was elected as a Rio de Janeiro

federal representative for the first time, with eighty-two thousand votes. The vast difference in the number of votes comes from two main factors: the early engagement in social networking¹³ and an emphasis on consistently defending conservative values, especially from 2011 onwards.¹⁴

Bolsonaro historically has always sought to meet the demands for better wages from the low-rank military, his electoral base, and position himself frontally against human rights, not afraid of asserting himself as an anti-communist, right-wing politician. In the 1990s, he asserted that Congress should be closed down and that President Fernando Henrique Cardoso should be shot dead. However, in 2002, when he lobbied to nominate the communist Aldo Rabello to the Ministry of Defence, he claimed that he had voted for Lula. In an interview, he ironically stated that communists nowadays drink whisky and live well (*Folha de São Paulo*, 2002). At the time, Bolsonaro's party was part of the PT's coalition, and political pragmatism spoke louder than ideologies.

But things changed in Lula's successor Dilma Rousseff's first term. In only four years, Brazilian society went through a 'progressivist shock'. In 2011, the National Truth Commission (CNV) was created to investigate the state's crimes during the military dictatorship. The same year, the Supreme Federal Court (STF) recognised the right to same-sex marriage. The following year, the STF also recognised the right to abortion in foetal anencephaly cases and confirmed the validity of the racial quota system in public universities. A project for a constitutional amendment to widen labour rights to domestic workers, known as PEC das Domésticas, and a law prohibiting physical punishments and cruel and degrading treatment to children and adolescents, known as Lei da Palmada, were promulgated in 2013 and 2014, respectively. Simultaneously, Brazilian versions of the Canadian Slut Walks popped up throughout the country between 2011 and 2012, popularising feminism among young women and fostering new feminist activism on the streets and social networks (Medeiros and Fanti, 2019).

Facing such a scenario, Bolsonaro did not hesitate to lead the reaction to the so-called progressivist shock. Flanked by other conservative legislators, he managed to bar the printing of leaflets of the programme Escola sem Homofobia, formulated as early as 2004 and derogatorily called gay kit (Soares, 2015). However, he was unsuccessful in his attempt to bar the installation of the Comissão Nacional da Verdade and the approval of the same-sex marriage bill. And there was still the possibility that Dilma Rousseff, if re-elected, would dedicate herself to the legalisation of abortion, once she had claimed in 2007 that the practice should be decriminalised (Pires, 2010).

13 Jair Bolsonaro created a Twitter account in 2010 and a Facebook fan page in 2013.

14 As pointed out by research conducted by BBC News Brasil based on more than 1,500 speeches given by the then-representative at the Deputies' Chamber plenary during 27 years (Shalders, 2017).

Due to Bolsonaro's activity during this period, which was extensively publicised in his social media accounts, many conservatives, previously more dispersed in forums and free-market organisations, started to flirt with the former army captain. At the same time, Orkut libertarians, such as Bernardo Santoro and Rodrigo Constantino, began labelling themselves liberal-conservatives, pointing to a historical tendency of free-market defenders who adhered ideologically or pragmatically to conservatism (Constantino, 2018).¹⁵ Such positioning caused discomfort among conservative groups for some time, as the label liberal-conservative seemed like an oxymoron, and, eventually, caused tensions in various groups, especially relating to matters such as abortion rights. According to the lawyer José Carlos Sepúlveda, member of the Plínio Corrêa de Oliveira Institute, the organisation that succeeded the old TFP:

The leaders of pro-market movements defended liberal ideals. Still, many people – and I noticed a lot of this in northeastern Brazil – who found shelter there were not exactly liberal. I see this as a border, a wide border of the conservative-liberal movement . . . The pro-market movement ended up gathering many conservative people. Some ended up breaking with the movement. Others stayed, but with ideas that tended more towards conservatism . . . One thing that Plínio [Corrêa de Oliveira] always defended in his books is that if we take an ordinary, uneducated woman, she has her inner world. If we speak to her, she probably holds conservative ideas. Still, she is unfamiliar with both the conservative and liberal movements, or anything at all, but her mentality is conservative. Also, PT's Fundação Perseu Abramo recently published research showing that even people from the outskirts of big cities are conservative. Well, they are figuring out what was obvious, right? And it seems to be the following: contrary to other countries, things here are more fluid. Sometimes I see that people want to put a straitjacket on the talk about Brazilian reality, as if we were in America, for example (Interview with José Carlos Sepúlveda, April 2017).

In 2014 Bolsonaro had established himself as one of the leaders of the conservative reaction that had taken over the country. In the following years, his political prominence reached new heights, peaking during the protests for the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff. During the presidential elections of 2014, the militants of the emerging New Right pragmatically campaigned for PSDB candidate Aécio Neves, and they all supported him in the run-off. At the time, Rousseff's defeat was taken for granted by the opposition due to the report of a corruption scandal related to the most prominent state company in the country, the oil giant Petrobrás (Singer, 2018). Thus, the shattering of expectations with the announcement of her re-election was such that soon it

15 As with the support of American libertarians for the conservative Senator Barry Goldwater in the 1960s (Doherty, 2007), and the support of Hayek for the British Conservative leader Margaret Thatcher (Cockett, 1995): in each of these cases, support was mixed with important ideological and identity tensions.

was suggested that the election was rigged. Opponents of the PT began to express outrage, which provided a welcoming environment for anyone who wanted to protest against the situation.

The first pro-impeachment protest was called only six months after the re-election of Dilma Rousseff. The call for the protest was made on the Facebook page of Paulo Batista, a state legislator candidate from São Paulo also known as Raio Privatizador. His campaign was coordinated by libertarian militants and members of the Movimento Brasil Livre (MBL), the main pro-market movement in the country.¹⁶ In humorous videos shared on YouTube, Batista was shown firing 'privatising rays' on supposedly communist cities. Although Batista was not elected, around 2,500 people attended the protest, which was supported by Olavo de Carvalho. For the first time, it gathered all the representatives of New Right groups in the streets of São Paulo, including legislator Eduardo Bolsonaro. The protests continued being called by different movements, until 15 March 2015, when, according to Datafolha Institute polls, more than 250,000 people, bearing the national flag's colours, filled the streets of São Paulo to demand Rousseff's impeachment, encouraging the organisers to call new protests later in the year.

According to opinion research conducted by Esther Solano, Márcio Moretto Ribeiro and Pablo Ortellado during the protests in São Paulo in August 2015, 96 per cent of the protesters were dissatisfied with the political system. Seventy-three per cent said they did not trust political parties, and 70 per cent claimed that they did not trust politicians (Rossi, 2015). Thus, beyond sharing the rejection of the PT and its leaders (Telles, 2016), rejection of the political system as a whole was widespread among protesters, probably due to the generalised perception that the political system was corrupt.

After the 2005 *mensalão* scandal, which affected the PT's leadership, only 5 per cent of the population considered corruption the country's main problem. However, in October 2015, these numbers had increased to 34 per cent (Singer, 2018). This increase resulted from a series of protests against corruption that took place between 2011 and 2012, after the *mensalão* scandal trial, and especially after the massive street protests of June 2013. The 2013 uprisings, started by the Movimento Passe Livre (MPL), demanded reduced public transportation fares and were violently repressed by the police. They gathered millions of people throughout Brazil in dozens of protests that turned against the political system as a whole, perceived as impermeable to the population's appeals (Nobre, 2013).

16 Founded initially by a group of friends led by Fábio Ostermann as a Facebook page to coordinate the pro-market militancy during June 2013, MBL was re-created by the activist Renan Santos on 15 November 2014. Since then, it has served as the main pro-market movement in the country, and one of the groups that led the campaign to impeach Dilma Rousseff.

The outrage against the political system increased the following year due to the beginning of a huge anti-corruption operation, responsible for the imprisonment and condemnation of several politicians and businesspeople. Initiated in March 2014 with a money-laundering report at Petrobrás, and inspired by the Italian *Mani Pulite* investigations of the 1990s, Operation Car Wash soon gained wide mainstream media coverage and rapidly made one of its architects, judge Sérgio Moro, the most prominent symbol of the fight against corruption in the country.

Thus, amid a crisis in public trust aggravated by the worsening economic situation, it is understandable that 56 per cent of the protesters agreed with the statement 'Someone outside the political system would solve the crisis.' For 64 per cent of the interviewees, this person could be an 'honest judge', and for 88 per cent an 'honest politician'. When asked who inspired more trust, 19.4 per cent affirmed that they strongly trusted Jair Bolsonaro, who headed the list. Only 11 per cent said they trusted PSDB, the party most of them had voted for in 2014, and only 1 per cent said they trusted the Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB), the party of the then Vice-President Michel Temer, who would occupy the presidency if the impeachment demanded by protesters was successful.

Bolsonaro was one of the few politicians who could participate in the anti-impeachment demonstrations and be applauded by the crowds, unlike other opposition leaders. Thus, at the end of 2015, the former military captain, considered by part of the population as one of the few honest politicians in the country, became a natural presidential candidate by defending law and order, advocating anti-system rhetoric, and attacking the PT and the left in general. His military background and consistent support for the death penalty, the reduction of the age of criminal responsibility for minors, and the injunction of forced labour among prisoners were seen as some positive attributes among his supporters. He was regarded as the only one capable of reducing violence through repressive measures and disciplining society in the face of moral degradation in a country where the rights of leftists, gays and Black people were supposedly better protected than those of the 'ordinary citizen'.

The former army captain, who married an evangelical woman in a ceremony presided over by the conservative televangelist pastor Silas Malafaia in 2013, gained prominence for opposing 'gender ideology' and supporting discipline in schools. His appeal to the conservative Christian public increased when, in March 2016, Bolsonaro formally joined the Partido Social Cristão (PSC), which incorporated a significant number of conservative Christian leaders in Brazil, and was baptised in the River Jordan by Pastor Everaldo, the party's candidate in the 2014 presidential elections.

However, Everaldo's presidential campaign became less known for its exaltation of Christian values than for the exhaustive repetition of the motto 'let's privatise everything'. The motto was a brainchild of Bernardo Santoro, director

of the Instituto Liberal at the time, who was Liber's ex-president and an active participant in Orkut counterpublics in the mid-2000s. Santoro joined PSC in 2014 and became a self-styled 'liberal-conservative'. He focused on actively influencing Jair Bolsonaro and his sons to embrace free-market radicalism. In his own words, Santoro intended to diffuse free-market radicalism to broader sections of the population, such as members of the impoverished middle class and 'Uberised' labourers.¹⁷

Santoro's mission was a tough one. At the time, free-market defenders saw Bolsonaro as an adept of national developmentalism, a set of state-centred economic policies advocated by the military dictatorship in the 1970s. Santoro did not give up, and his efforts soon started to pay off. In March of that year, Jair's son Eduardo Bolsonaro enrolled in a course on Austrian economics offered by the Instituto Mises Brasil, established by Hélio Beltrão Jr, the creator of the Orkut community 'True Liberalism'. His brother, who served as a municipal councillor in Rio de Janeiro, decided to run for mayor in the elections of that year with a message strictly aligned with the agenda of Santoro.

Bolsonaro seemed less inclined to market radicalism than his sons, although he decided to participate in events promoted by the market circuit as a presidential pre-candidate. In 2017, he was introduced to Paulo Guedes by Winston Ling, founder of the IEE. Guedes, a Chicago School graduate and a well-known figure of the financial market circuits, founded the Instituto Millennium in 2006, a pro-market think tank based in Rio de Janeiro, with Rodrigo Constantino and Hélio Beltrão Jr.

But the pro-market milieu was initially suspicious of Bolsonaro and tensions grew among his new party's political leaders, whose extreme political pragmatism often sacrificed the right-wing public agenda. The last straw was PSC's alliance with the Brazilian Communist Party (PC do B) in the 2016 gubernatorial elections in Maranhão, forcing Bolsonaro and his sons, staunch anti-communists, to search for a new party.¹⁸ In August 2017, the Bolsonaros announced their affiliation with the Ecology Party (PEN). To house the former captain's presidential aspirations, the party changed its name to the Patriot Party. As general secretary of the party, Bernardo Santoro introduced

17 According to the sociologist Ludmila Costhek Abílio, 'Uberisation consolidates the passage from a worker statute to one of nano-businessperson, permanently available for work, removing minimum working guarantees while maintaining workplace hierarchies; yet it appropriates, administratively and productively, a loss of publicly established working forms. However, this appropriation and subordination may operate on new logic. We can understand Uberisation as a possible future for companies in general, which become responsible for providing infrastructure for their "partners" to execute the work; it is not difficult to imagine hospitals, universities and companies in a wide range of fields adopting this model and using the work of their "just-in-time collaborators" according to their needs' (Abílio, 2017).

18 When Bolsonaro left the PSC, Paulo Rabello Castro, founder of the Atlantic Institute in 1992, became the party's candidate in the 2018 election. However, in the same year, he withdrew his candidacy and started to figure as candidate for vice-president on presidential candidate Álvaro Dias' Podemos' ticket.

Bolsonaro to a young economist called Adolfo Sachsida, who has a PhD from the University of Brasília and worked as an analyst at the federal government's Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA). Sachsida, at Santoro's request, formed a group of 11 economists that met weekly with Bolsonaro.

The opposition of free-market defenders to Bolsonaro seemed to decline gradually. In December 2017, Rodrigo Constantino publicly suggested that Paulo Guedes should be Minister of the Economy in a future Bolsonaro government. However, in early 2018, the pre-candidate decided to leave the Partido Patriota and affiliate to the Social Liberal Party (PSL). The sudden change in affiliation to a new party quickly caused discomfort among the libertarian militants of PSL that had gathered since 2016 at the group LIVRES. Staunch *antibolsonaristas*, LIVRES militants left the party shortly after Bolsonaro joined it, adhering to the Partido Novo.

The pre-candidate eventually caused another shock when he shunned participation in the presidential debate organised by the Fórum da Liberdade, an annual gathering of right-wing leaders and ideologues. In order to end lingering suspicions due to his erratic political movements, Bolsonaro decided to seal his alliance with the pro-market defenders by announcing in the first half of 2018 that Paulo Guedes would be his Minister of the Economy. Despite all sorts of suspicions, tensions and resentments, most market fundamentalists actively supported Bolsonaro's presidential campaign, bringing together the New Brazilian Right around a libertarian-conservative amalgam.

After the first round of the elections ended in October 2018, Bolsonaro had won more than half of the valid votes in 12 states and the Federal District, which surprised many political analysts. Bolsonaro was disappointed by the results, as he felt he could win the elections in the first round. On the other hand, the counterpublic militants were impressed by the votes he had received and leaders of the pro-impeachment protests, such as law professor Janaína Paschoal, journalist Joice Hasselmann and then federal legislator Eduardo Bolsonaro, all PSL candidates, received more than a million votes each. The party became the second-largest in Congress, with 52 members, a six-fold increase.

Conclusion

Bolsonaro's victory, as well as that of many New Right activists, was a result of a long political and social process that can be traced back to the *mensalão* corruption scandal in 2005 and culminated with a firm electoral rejection of the PT and Lula's arrest in 2018. Even though many factors explain Bolsonaro's victory – economic and social crisis, rampant violence and crime, Lula's imprisonment, and the disappointment with the PT and the political system as a whole, including intense sharing of political content on social networks

(Brito Cruz, 2019)¹⁹ – it is of paramount importance to consider the formation of emerging New Right militancy networks which diffused new ideas during a series of critical moments between 2011 and 2016: the progressivist shock (2011–14), the protests against corruption (2011–12), the *mensalão* scandal trial (2012), the uprisings of June 2013, Operation Car Wash (2014), Dilma Rousseff's re-election (2014), and pro-impeachment protests (2014–16).

Bolsonaro came to symbolise the burgeoning outrage against the PT and the political system, and the desire for law, order and discipline in Brazilian society. His closeness to evangelical leaders, Olavo de Carvalho's followers and radical pro-marketeters delivered him a wide-ranging mixture of personnel ready to serve in government, apart from those recruited into the army that also exalted the military dictatorship. The disruptive and indecorous language characteristic of counterpublic discourse became frequent in official communications, as in Donald Trump's administration (Thimsen, 2017), contrary to Michael Warner's hypothesis that counterpublics would normalise if their members became part of dominant publics.

However, there are significant tensions between the new right-wing groups. In this sense, the first two years of Bolsonaro's government were a game-changer for the New Right, which subsequently has begun to show signs of division between unconditional Bolsonaro supporters who still employ disruptive and indecorous language in social networks, critical supporters, and a few opponents, who consider him a threat to Brazilian democracy.

Considering the horizon of (im)possibilities that this book addresses, it is possible to say that while the emergence of counterpublics facilitated by digital media (Downey and Fenton, 2003) points to increased representation of certain groups in the public sphere, to the extent that it allows more people to participate and influence the public debate, it can also have harmful effects. The increased fragmentation of the public (Sunstein, 2017) and the formation of the so-called 'bubble effect', a process of feedback of ideas and information by internet users through filters and algorithms (Pariser, 2011), may lead to the intensification of political radicalisation (Downey and Fenton, 2003), and counterpublicity may facilitate the popularisation of authoritarian ideas incompatible with the democratic regime.

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4. Ritual, text and politics: the evangelical mindset and political polarisation

David Lehmann

In a pre-election poll published shortly before the 2018 election, 69 per cent of evangelicals questioned said they would vote for Bolsonaro, compared with 51 per cent of Catholics and 56 per cent overall.¹ That is an astonishingly high degree of consistency for a group representing 30–40 million voters. Evangelicals may be broadly conservative, but in previous elections their vote had not been anything like so concentrated. In the pages that follow I will provide two sorts of background interpretation of this high degree of convergence: one is a broad picture of the growing involvement and rising profile in recent years of evangelical leaders and churches in Brazilian national politics, and the other is an account of a small messianic congregation who offered a microcosm of what looked to me like a collective panic that gripped the country in 2018.

The management of the evangelical vote

Pentecostalism at first inspired distrust and puzzlement in the political class, but soon they realised the political gold mine represented by pastors who enjoyed such strong influence among their faithful. Membership of the Congressional evangelical *bancada* (caucus) has risen from 13 in 1982 to 32 in 1986 and then 51 in 1998 and 73 in 2014 (Rodrigues-Silveira and Urizzi Cervi, 2019, p. 562), and in 2020 to 195 Deputies and 8 Senators.² The evangelical voice in the National Congress became audible during the debates of the Constituent Assembly in the 1980s on issues of importance to them – notably the death penalty, to which they were opposed, as well as same-sex marriage and abortion. But their more ideological voice only became prominent some ten years into the new century when vociferous pastor-politicians began to make provocative

1 Datafolha poll published in *Folha de São Paulo*, 25 October 2018, three days before the run-off vote.

2 Note that not all members of the *bancada* described themselves as evangelical Christians. Report from the project 'Religião e Poder' of the Instituto Superior de Estudos da Religião (ISER), <<http://religioepolitica.com.br/eleitos-nomes-religiosos-14-2020/>> (accessed 23 October 2020).

pronouncements against permissiveness and tolerance in the fields of sexuality, education, the repression of crime and occasionally race relations. They denounced the *estado laico* (exclusion of religion from the sphere of the state) as a mechanism to silence religion and they contributed to the climate of opinion in which the Federal Deputy for Rio de Janeiro, Jair Bolsonaro, created his own noisy lone-ranger profile around similar themes. Some pastors stood for their own Social Christian Party (PSC) but others stood for other parties – in any case affiliation in such small parties is largely a matter of convenience. Individual candidates to national, state and local legislative bodies are obliged to have a party affiliation, but their standing in the hierarchy of the elected depends on the number of surplus votes they generate, which can be passed to other candidates further ‘down’ their party’s list.³ Rather than money, they extract concessions of a different kind. The growing salience of issues of morality and state regulation has encouraged local church leaders to coordinate their efforts politically, leading one article to liken their *modus operandi* to a closed-list system in which it is the churches, rather than the parties, which take over the coordination and prioritisation of candidacies. In the municipal elections of 2020, the Institute of Studies on Religion (ISER) found that almost 13,000 candidates for municipal councillor were registered with a religious title (e.g. ‘pastor’) – 24 per cent more than in the previous elections. However, only 679, or 14 per cent, were successful, while only 30 mayors using religious titles were elected in the whole country. Note that pastors are not necessarily outsiders or even newcomers to the political stage: a survey of legislators showed that 39 per cent of evangelicals among them have family members who have previously held elected office – this is lower than Catholic legislators but higher than others (Rodrigues-Silveira and Urizzi Cervi, 2019, p. 565). The figure reminds us of the extent to which politics, like the pastoral profession itself, is a family affair in Brazil. The time may have come to ask whether people with political ambitions do not sometimes choose a pastoral vocation primarily as a stepping stone on the way to achieving those ambitions.

***Laïcité* lite: porous lines between religion and state**

Evangelical politicians protect their fiscal exemptions and successfully resist the implementation of rules governing the separation of religion from the state (*laicidade*, or *laïcité*). For example, under French *laïcité* it would be unheard of for religious professionals to take partisan political positions, and even in the United States to do so would in principle endanger the tax-free status of their churches – a frequently violated principle, it must be said (Lehmann, 2013; Hamilton, 2014). Evangelicals have fought hard to receive the same exemptions and privileges as the Catholic Church on grounds of equality

3 If 100,000 people vote in a constituency that has 10 deputies, a candidate needs 10,000 votes to get elected: votes in excess of 10,000 generate a surplus to pass on to the next highest voted.

of treatment. Their church status exempts their media operations, their publications, their real-estate dealings and their cash income from tithes and donations from taxation.

Churches have also extended their freedom of action into spheres from which strict *laïcité* would exclude them. Thus in 2014 Magno Malta (a Baptist pastor and former senator) successfully stopped a measure that would have prevented churches from proselytising in publicly funded drug-treatment programmes (Smith, 2019, p. 18).

In any case, judges' interpretation of what is 'necessary' for the conduct of religious services has been generous. For example, in June 2014 the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus, henceforth IURD) won a case against the imposition of customs duties on 39,000 square metres of stone cladding for its flagship Temple of Solomon (seating for ten thousand) in São Paulo. It is surprisingly easy to set up a church with the corresponding legal qualifications: in February 2011 two reporters from the *Folha de São Paulo* registered a new church in a space of five working days at a cost of US\$250 – the procedure was far cheaper and simpler than opening a bar (*Folha de São Paulo*, c. 16 February 2011).

There are rumours that churches offer drug traffickers a convenient channel for money laundering disguised as cash donations (Abumanssur, 2015). Detailed ethnography in a low-income Rio neighbourhood describes less collusion than coexistence: people, mostly young men, profess a respect for pastors but have trouble giving up a life which, however sinful, enables them to earn five times the minimum wage (Vital da Cunha, 2015). The pastors are running small neighbourhood churches, and, unlike Catholic priests, cannot afford to refuse their donations.

Surveys of evangelical opinion

Evangelicals tend to take a hard line on divisive moral issues such as abortion and gay marriage, but they are not far removed from the Brazilian public as a whole. In 2014 the Brazilian Electoral Panel Studies (BEPS) found that even among those professing no religious affiliation at all, only 14 per cent favoured liberalising abortion laws and 26 per cent favoured tightening them, to the point of making abortion completely illegal (Smith, 2019, p. 104). (Existing legislation is so restrictive that abortion is almost entirely illegal.) A 2013 survey by Datafolha confirmed the sometimes highly repressive responses of the Brazilian public to questions about personal morality but also revealed surprising differences between the evangelical public and evangelical politicians. Thus approval of criminalisation of abortion (including imprisonment) was above 60 per cent for all religions except spiritists, above 70 per cent for evangelicals and above 50 per cent among the religiously unaffiliated, whereas evangelical members of Congress were less enthusiastic. In a similar

pattern, evangelical Congress members were only half as likely as the evangelical public as a whole to support reduction in the age of criminal responsibility for violent crimes, which had an approval in public opinion of over 70 per cent (Prandi and dos Santos, 2017).

In a study combining survey material from Rio and from an evangelical conference in Fortaleza with quantitative and qualitative data collected in Juiz de Fora (Minas Gerais), Amy Erica Smith also concluded that evangelicals went beyond the overall conservatism of Brazilian opinion, growing increasingly homogeneous and separated from other citizens and developing ‘the most active repertoires of political engagement’ (Smith, 2019, p. 129). Although their views on economics, poverty and anti-racism were compatible with a social democratic or liberal democratic outlook, what Smith calls their ‘below average willingness to extend civil liberties to groups they dislike’ (Smith, 2019, p. 145) pointed in another direction. To this should be added the group pressure that comes from church attendance: according to the 2014 LAPOP Barometer surveys of Latin American opinion, a crucial explanatory factor for intolerance (in this case towards gay people) in Brazil is frequency of church attendance, principally at an evangelical church (Smith, 2019, p. 141).

These elements, taken together, bring us to the state of near-hysteria that descended on Brazilian political life after the re-election of Dilma Rousseff in 2014 – described by Smith (2019) euphemistically as ‘affective polarisation’. The atmosphere was darkened by the gathering Lava Jato storm from 2014. The ensuing fiscal crisis led the government to adopt austerity measures and brought about the worst recession since the 1930s. The weight of revelations fuelled *antipetismo* and above all *antilulismo* more than hostility to other politicians convicted of corruption – like the speaker of the Chamber, Eduardo Cunha, who orchestrated the impeachment of Dilma only himself to end up in jail after being removed from office by the Supreme Court. This imbalance in public indignation was turbo-charged by a no doubt well-funded torrent of fake news and scare stories spreading fears of an undermining of the foundations of family life and distasteful, innuendo-filled campaigns against Dilma, against the PT and against Lula. (Some will remember the scatological misogynistic booing to which she was subjected by a prosperous upper middle-class crowd at the 2014 World Cup.)

Already in 2010–11, a scare had been propagated that the Ministry of Education was to prescribe a sex education booklet, popularly labelled a *kit gay* (a supposed children’s guide to becoming gay), to shape children’s sexuality and encourage them to become homosexual (Carranza and Vital da Cunha, 2018, pp. 490–2). The spectre of ‘gender ideology’, first brandished by Pope Benedict, became a repeated theme of attack. The topic, and the *kit gay* trope, were still very much alive in the 2018 election. The infatuation of Brazilian evangelicals with Israel – though not precisely with Jews – provided the opportunity for further demonisation of the PT, which was said to be engaged in a worldwide

anti-Israel alliance, while Lula was accused of channelling funds to Hamas in the triple-frontier area where Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay meet.⁴ The theme was not entirely new – Israeli flags have been a standard item of Brazilian church furniture for many years – but the confluence with Bolsonaro’s campaign and its emphasis on primordial themes of sex, gender and family sharpened its toxicity, accentuated by WhatsApp campaigns. For the first time since the military regime, Brazilian politics was drawn into the phantasm of a cold war which aligned the PT with Venezuela, Cuba and UNASUR (the ephemeral South American association of states inspired by Hugo Chávez) against Israel, God and the family.

Neo-Pentecostalism upends the religious field and the rules of the political game

Before the 1990s Brazil saw a steady growth of small-scale chapels in the ‘classic’ model associated with – though not controlled by – the worldwide confederation of federations, the Assemblies of God. Having developed steadily since the early twentieth century, at first in rural areas and small towns, Pentecostal churches had by the 1990s spread deep into major urban centres. Chapels were usually founded and led by independent pastors who, having found their vocation in other churches, then struck out on their own. Other brand names were the Four-Square Church (Igreja Quadrangular) and the Renewed Baptists (Igreja Batista Renovada), but their practice of worship varied little. Today evangelicals and Pentecostals number above 20 per cent and, according to some, 30 per cent of the Brazilian population, though because of the fleeting nature of affiliation in many cases and the ease of joining and leaving, these numbers need careful dissection. (The Datafolha poll estimated them at 31 per cent of the electorate.)

Neo-Pentecostal churches, which developed from the 1970s and gained prominence in the 1990s, are far larger than the classic chapels, build organisations directly controlling numerous local churches, and adopt a different pattern of praise and worship. They devote more time and energy to asking for donations: in addition to the regular ‘tithes’ (10 per cent of income) common across Pentecostalism, they imply or even proclaim that those who give will be rewarded by finding prosperity, and they warn people and their families fearfully against invisible forces of evil emanating principally from the *candomblé* and *umbanda* possession cults. Those themes are not unfamiliar in classic Pentecostal church life, but they are proclaimed with greater force in Neo-Pentecostal churches, and the balance between financial and

4 The presence of a large Lebanese merchant community in the area gave rise a long time ago to stories about a terrorist presence there, which gained prominence in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. The area has also been cited as a support base for those who carried out the bombing of the AMIA Jewish Community institution in 1994 in Buenos Aires, killing 85 people.

other contributions, and between this-worldly and other-worldly blessings, is changed.

Neo-Pentecostal churches have established centralised global apparatuses for training church officials and *obreiros* (uniformed volunteers who take care of good order during services), to raise and manage resources, and to project their brand, their message and their claim to legitimacy in the religious field. They have also built imposing structures across the world and a strong media presence in many languages. The big names in this at first were the IURD and Deus é Amor (God is Love). In 1991 the IURD founder and leader Edir Macedo bought a bankrupt TV network, TV Record, which is now the second biggest free-to-air network in the country after TV Globo. TV Record is more than 'just' an evangelical broadcaster: during daytime it broadcasts mainstream programmes, but at night it is devoted to religious topics foregrounding the church, and its website foregrounds much IURD news and propaganda. Ownership lies with Macedo and his family and not with the church itself. There are rumours that the church pays generous fees for advertising on TV Record as a way of channelling funds from its followers to the company, but these are only rumours. The IURD's three million or more followers are a minority among evangelicals, but the TV station plus its imposing buildings located in central locations of major urban centres have given it a high profile, to the point where everyday parlance among the secular and Catholic middle classes uses the words *evangélico* and *universal* almost interchangeably.

The Universal Church must be the biggest single evangelical or indeed religious organisation in Brazil in terms of people employed and liquid assets. It has extended and institutionalised its reach into fields untouched even by other Neo-Pentecostal churches like the Igreja Mundial do Poder de Deus (the Worldwide Church of God's Power) and the Igreja Internacional da Graça de Deus (the International Church of God's Grace), both founded by former Macedo associates. The Catholic Church is weighed down with invaluable but illiquid real estate in its churches and schools and cannot rely on such a large army of volunteers. The Assemblies of God have far more followers but they are not a centralised body, rather a confederation in which autonomous state-level Conventions are more important than the nationwide body in terms of resources, and in which local churches are independent, relying on their subscriptions to the Assemblies for access to certification, branding, advice, training and materials like bibles and prayer books, but limited financial support. Occasionally ambitious pastors from the Assemblies have broken away and built their own Neo-Pentecostal operations like the 'Assembleia de Deus – Ministério Madureira'. Aside from those affiliated to the Assemblies, there are thousands of independent churches and chapels. Unlike Catholic or Anglican priests, pastors do not depend on any institution to confer that title: if you lead a church, however small, you call yourself a pastor. The ritual of baptism by full immersion is a spiritual or performative rite of passage and also

signals a purging of previous diabolical associations with the *cultos Afro*, but membership depends on attendance and tithing. Membership is also tiered, distinguishing between those who attend occasionally (*que frequentam*), or regularly, and setting apart *obreiros*, who are very numerous.

The IURD has built a more elaborate and formalised organisation even than other Neo-Pentecostal churches, creating a hierarchy of *obreiros*, *pastores* and *bispos*, while preserving Edir Macedo's apparently firm grip on the organisation. Perhaps to secure that control, it shifts people around frequently and at short notice. In 2015 I interviewed a bishop at their church in Tel Aviv, and a few weeks later their pastor in Haifa (who came to Israel from Brazil as a footballer and then became his team's talent scout) told me he had been recalled to Brazil. In London one of their people told me that the church's personnel have no possessions, no house or car, and are ready to move at a moment's notice. In the range of its activities and the concomitant scale of its ambition the IURD seems to aspire to take the place of the Catholic Church, creating a separate religious public space by building monumental constructions called cathedrals, as well as the Temple of Solomon (Gomes, 2011; Oro and Tadvald, 2015) and a dense network of satellite organisations. These include youth groups engaged in community service or campaigning against drug use, and a social welfare army of '257,000' volunteers nationwide providing services to members of the police, the military and the fire protection service, truck drivers and prostitutes, including manicures, haircuts and legal advice – always ending with a prayer.⁵ They claim to offer similar provision in 92 countries. In addition to building itself up this public-service provision, which is said by some to include subcontracting arrangements with local and state government social services, TV Record transmits blockbuster TV miniseries recounting biblical episodes shown across Latin America and (in English) worldwide with great success (e.g. 'Moses and the Ten Commandments', 'The Rich Man and Lazarus'). The church's weekly newspaper, *Folha Universal*, is a professional production with a focus on people's personal lives as well as on national stories.

The IURD has taken care to institutionalise its political interventions, taking an approach driven less by ideology or proselytism and more by an aspiration to power: its elected federal deputies seem to keep their distance from the more controversial politician-pastors and also from the evangelical caucus. It has also kept a low profile on questions of personal morality (Oro and Tadvald, 2015). Its first candidate to a federal position was elected in 1986. At that time the church would provide candidates for different parties (Machado, 2006), but in 2005 it created its own Partido Republicano Brasileiro (now known as Republicanos). It supported Cardoso against Lula in the 1990s and

5 'Igreja Universal expande ações sociais e ocupa espaços ignorados pelo poder público', *Folha de São Paulo*, 10 August 2019, <<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2019/08/igreja-universal-expande-acoes-sociais-e-ocupa-espacos-ignorados-pelo-poder-publico.shtml>> (accessed 23 October 2020).

then Lula and Dilma Rousseff twice each. As impeachment loomed, though, Macedo deserted Dilma, joined her replacement Temer, and, somewhat late in the presidential campaign, offered his support to Bolsonaro. These moves were accompanied by ministerial appointments for Macedo's nominees. Macedo anointed the current president with oil at the Temple of Solomon in September 2019, with the following words: 'I use all my authority to bless this man and give him wisdom . . . that the country be transformed and that he enjoy determination, good health and vigour' (Schmitt, 2019).

The institutionalisation has extended its reach into the field of social movements, and the IURD has created its own women's movement. Macedo's son and daughter-in-law appear in person online with matrimonial advice, and have developed a system of doctrine and support directed entirely at women for the building of a lasting 'iron-clad' marriage – *matrimonio blindado*. Starting with closed discussion groups known as a 'sisterhood' (the English word is used) under the leadership of 'big sister' Cristiane Cardoso (the daughter-in-law) in which membership was subjected to a careful vetting process, Godllywood, the church's women's brand, has now evolved to the point where they call it a movement, easily reachable on Facebook. It even has a 'signature' greeting for adepts, holding the back of their hands against their cheeks. Godllywood offshoots include 'Love School' and 'Love Walk' (Teixeira, 2012, pp. 90–120; Teixeira, 2014).

In another example of the leader's readiness to break with conventional evangelical practice, Macedo has encouraged families to limit their size and has in the past given discreet support to abortion in the name of a rational approach to marriage and child-rearing. For presumably political reasons he later downplayed the subject, but the strong emphasis on rational rather than romantic and emotional motivations in choosing a partner and in planning family life continues to figure prominently (Teixeira, 2018, p. 103).

Text, origins and authenticity: a case study

In the pages that follow I complement the above 'big picture' with evidence from a very small messianic congregation that I attended every Shabbat, in a major Brazilian city, during September–November 2018. The word 'messianic' is used here loosely to refer to congregations of diverse origin which combine adherence both to Jesus as Messiah and to the Jewish Old Testament. Messianics follow the laws as given by God to Moses in the Sinai desert and see the coming of Jesus as the fulfilment of that cycle. They denounce the separation of followers of Jesus from Judaism and the later establishment of a state church in the Roman Empire in the fourth century, and they have no interest in rabbinic Judaism – that is, in Judaism as it evolved after Jesus, which they also reject precisely because it was a rejection of Jesus as Messiah (Carpenedo, 2018, 2021). Their adoption of some paraphernalia of contemporary Judaism, even

ultra-Orthodox Judaism, should not mislead us in this respect. The core of messianic Judaism is this direct line to the children of Israel crossing the desert, as opposed to an approximation to contemporary Judaism. This explains why, although this congregation accepted me as an observer, they were uninterested in, and even puzzled, by me as a Jew.

The name 'messianic' does not only refer to Jesus' first coming: it also looks forward to the second coming, and the establishment of the state of Israel is seen as a stage in the fulfilment of prophecies in the biblical books of Daniel and Revelation, among others. For this reason messianics should be seen as an offshoot of evangelical Christianity and not as Jews. Their occasional curiosity about the idea that they might be descended from the forced converts or secret Jews (*anussim* and *marranos*) who had taken part in the colonisation of Brazil is just that – curiosity.

Their fervent support for Israel and its government was one of several factors drawing them to support Bolsonaro, who had been baptised in the River Jordan in 2016,⁶ who promised to transfer the Brazilian embassy to Jerusalem, and whose campaign events were routinely swamped with people waving the Israeli flag.

The ideas that circulated among them were similar to those circulating in evangelical churches and on evangelical media, although unlike most messianic congregations in Brazil, they were not 'emigrants' or 'refugees' from evangelical or Pentecostal churches. They all had different stories and were finding their own way through texts studied together and online.

They offered prayers in Portuguese and Hebrew, they chanted melodies drawn from the Jewish tradition and modern Israel, and they read the weekly portion (following the Jewish calendar) from a reproduction Torah scroll. They had a loose structure – their leader, known as 'Rosh', the Hebrew for 'head', was not in the style of the evangelical pastors who rule over all aspects of their congregations, but rather a first among equals. They were mostly middle-class and lower middle-class, but included two visibly very poor women, one of whom took on some housekeeping duties. Women and men were on an equal footing in their rituals.

Although prayers were quite discreet on political themes, not mentioning their favourite presidential candidate by name and praying for peace and the good of the country, the opinions expressed by the most vocal members repeated widely circulated rumours and conspiracy theories which seem to have been promoted through 'bots' on WhatsApp in support of Bolsonaro's campaign. The spectre of a PT victory leading to government-sponsored or even government-

6 The baptism was performed by Deputy Everaldo Dias Pereira, who was also leader of the evangelical caucus, and who was arraigned in 2020 on corruption charges in the state of Rio de Janeiro and sent to prison while awaiting trial (*Correio Braziliense*, 28 August 2020). The ex-mayor of Rio, Eduardo Crivella, also a bishop of the Universal Church, was also charged with corruption later that year, as was the incumbent governor, Wilson Witzel.

controlled sex change or gender reassignment was contemplated with horror; nostalgia for the military government which had ruled Brazil between 1964 and 1984 went together with hostility to the ‘inhuman rights’ that leave criminals unpunished while respectable citizens (*cidadãos de bem*) hide in their houses. A WhatsApp message circulated depicting young schoolgirls provocatively performing in tutus with their bottoms turned towards the audience, contrasted with a picture from bygone days when schoolgirls wore modest uniforms. The country was ruled by a political class and legal profession whose disagreements were a mere smokescreen enabling them to preserve their privileges and sustain a corrupt system. In another picture that circulated, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula were campaigning together against the military regime in the late 1970s, and this was taken as proof that they were still today allies leading Brazil to communism. These were representative of memes that fuelled the hysteria which gripped the country during the campaign and echoed far beyond religious fundamentalists or evangelicals.

What might these kinds of ideas, and the mindset in which they are grounded, have to do with the cult of the text which is observed in messianic congregations, far more than among evangelicals generally? The cult of the text is expressed in a search for hidden meanings, signs and correspondences across a multifarious consecrated compilation (the Old Testament). The search emphasises images, symbols and words that crop up in different parts of the text, and how they can be fitted into a chosen narrative – in this case, the messianic unfolding. Thus the Jewish New Year (Rosh Hashanah) was renamed as the day of the Messiah, and the words of God in Deuteronomy 13 are seen as foreshadowing the end of days.⁷ Life is thought to be full of coincidences because, in a widely quoted evangelical saying, ‘nothing happens by chance’: coincidences are signs, and anything can count as a coincidence. The attempt on Bolsonaro’s life during his campaign was a glaring example, implying that it helped his cause but miraculously did not kill him.⁸ The cult of the unadulterated and consecrated material biblical text opens the way towards accepting conspiracy theories, a disposition with a well-established history in Latin America (Senkman and Roniger, 2019).

In contrast to the ‘bolt of lightning’ and other supernatural experiences which characterise standard Pentecostal conversion narratives, members of messianic congregations speak of a gradual awakening: they often use the

7 The passage repeats a formula that appears throughout the Pentateuch from Sinai onwards: ‘that the Lord may turn from the fierceness of his anger, and show you mercy, and have compassion on you, and multiply you, as he swore to your fathers, if you obey the voice of the Lord your God, keeping all his commandments which I command you this day, and doing what is right in the sight of the Lord your God’ (Deuteronomy 13:17–18).

8 A ‘left’ version has circulated according to which the Mossad arranged or simulated the attack to help Bolsonaro’s campaign – the ‘proof’ being that he was treated in a São Paulo hospital named after Albert Einstein, which was founded by a Jewish charitable body, and serves the public as a whole.

Portuguese word *pesquisa* (research) to describe an inexhaustible search for origins. Thus a laboratory pharmacist told me that each person is entitled to their own interpretation, and when I asked how she could know which is the correct one her reply, repeated for emphasis, was that she ‘always says’ *vai para a origen* (‘go to the origins’). ‘The Tanach [Old Testament] tells us the functions of the Messiah, the purpose of his coming and what are the things he did not fulfil . . . so one has to study so that God will open our eyes.’ She reads Hebrew and says her prayers from the Jewish liturgy daily.

In her words *text* and *origins* are core elements contributing to *authenticity*, three key words in the messianic interpretation of texts. This is important for people who, dissatisfied or disillusioned with the demands and impossible promises of Pentecostal and especially Neo-Pentecostal churches (Carpenedo, 2018, 2021), have found another way of recognising Jesus as Messiah. This involves adoption of his Aramaic name Yeshua, in accordance with standard practice in messianic congregations worldwide which do not recognise the name used in Christian churches, heirs to the rejection of Jesus’ status as a Jew. One significant reason for the shift in adherence is that followers were checking what pastors were saying about the Bible against the biblical text itself and finding that they were ignoring or even denigrating the laws given through Moses.

Thus the search for a true original religious faith and practice associates the foundational elements with the authentic; messianics say the truth was hidden or distorted by the Emperor Constantine and the Church founded for political purposes. Yeshua is not just the Messiah, but also a prominent rabbi whose disciples were marginalised in the creation of a pagan Church. The very idea of a Christian Church is described as a betrayal of Jesus himself. Those origins are pushed further back to link in to a genealogy, for example, of Jewish rebels like Bar Kochba.⁹

The text is composed less of signifiers than of signs: Kabbalists are drawn to the significance of Hebrew letters which, as in Latin but much more extensively, are also numbers (Hebrew *gematria*), and the multiple associations available through the roots of Hebrew words. Messianics are drawn to correspondences across the entire scriptural corpus. Treating the Bible as a single undifferentiated source is a way of saying it is a text written by divine hand, so the idea of origin is not historical. The words ‘authentic’ or ‘untouched’ open the way to those who claim special or privileged insight, like preachers who persuade others that they control or liberate demonic forces possessing them, and their esoteric claims point to what is *behind* the text, what is *hidden*; in particular, hidden prophecies. Thus in a *derasha* (exposition) on *Shabbat Bereshit* – when the cycle of weekly Torah portions recommences at Genesis shortly after Rosh Hashanah

9 Figures like Bar Kochba, who led a rebellion against the Romans in the second century CE which was ruthlessly repressed, are regarded with some ambivalence in Judaism because, despite their heroic status, they provoked terrible repression.

and Sukkot (the Feast of Tabernacles marking the harvest) – the meaning of nakedness is discussed in the context of Adam and Eve’s disobedience: God ‘made garments of skin for the man and for his wife’ (Genesis 3:21) – ‘maybe’, the speaker remarks, ‘it was body hair rather than a garment or tunic . . . There are disagreements.’ Later he refers to the ‘giants’ (*nephillim*, unusually formed beings in some understandings, Genesis 6:4) – were they the deformed offspring of Cain or maybe the fruit of angels reproducing with humans? In these discussions (amid interjections from the group) there was less affirmation of decrees or commands than curiosity and something like wonderment: what are the texts hiding? Of course they are authoritative, of course they are immutable, but their meaning is not at all clear. Circumcision is another subject of constant fascination for messianics.¹⁰ Quoting Exodus 12, he explains that in Moses’ time if a gentile male wanted to take part in the Seder – the Passover service and accompanying meal held in the home, telling the story of the exodus from Egypt – he would have to be circumcised, and although in the modern world he could attend, he could only partake of the lamb, not the *matzah* (unleavened bread).¹¹

The correctness of such interpretations is not at issue – rather, our interest is the mindset, digging deep into Bible stories to uncover their hidden meaning or the stories that lie behind them. For if the biblical text is, in the standard English phrase, ‘holy writ’ (‘set in stone’) it is also, unlike a conventional work of literature, but like myths and fairy stories, full of non sequiturs and omitted connections, leaving later generations for ever to fill in the gaps – as in another discussion about whether the children of Israel (as they were then) kept the Sabbath before they had received the Law, and with it the instructions to observe the Sabbath day, at Sinai. This sort of inquiring urge has much in common with the conduct of Talmudic discussion: there are always more questions to be asked.

When the congregation gathered to celebrate Sukkot, they read passages featuring the feast including Leviticus 23 (which lists the main occasions in the prescribed annual sequence of festivals, each marking a stage in the agricultural cycle), Revelation 7 (cataclysmic explosion heralded by seven trumpets) and Zechariah 14 (alternating prophecies of destruction, untold suffering for those

10 In the far more institutionalised CINA (Congregação Israelita da Nova Aliança, studied by Manoela Carpenedo) a category of ‘elders’ is set aside: they sit separately, they are all men, they are the only ones who can receive honours such as being ‘called up’ to the reading of the Torah, and they have to be circumcised. Among Brazilian messianics there are people who undertake circumcision and say that they have been trained by a certain ‘Rabbi Gottlieb’ from London . . .

11 Cf. the Paschal Lamb which is represented by a lamb’s bone on the Seder table. This was broadly correct: the text states that ‘when a stranger shall sojourn with thee, and will keep the Passover to the Lord, let all his males be circumcised, and then let him come near and keep it; and he shall be as one that is born in the land: for no uncircumcised person shall eat thereof’ (Exodus 12:48).

who will not accept the reign of the Lord in and over Jerusalem). (For some evangelicals Sukkot is the time when Jesus comes to dwell – *tabernacular* – among men, and Pentecostals do indeed converge on Jerusalem from all over the world to mark it with prayers and processions.)

The readings were then linked to the campaign for foreign embassies in Israel to move to Jerusalem. The speaker said that so far only nine nations had moved their embassies, but predicted that all the others would repent as in Zechariah's prophecies and that 'all nations will obey the reign of God Almighty', as those who denied Yeshua would also repent. There was also a reference to warning signs in Israel before the attempted assassination of Bolsonaro.

In this congregation, the one point of certainty was that the foundation of the state of Israel was a step towards the Second Coming and the subsequent establishment of messianic dominion over the world. This infatuation with the state of Israel sits side by side with a puzzling and perhaps puzzled disposition towards Jews themselves as a collectivity. (They accepted me as a Jew, and welcomed me to their services and celebrations, but were naturally puzzled by my admission, on questioning, that although I was respectful of tradition I could not say that I believed in the existence of God.) On the one occasion when I broached the subject of the Holocaust, the leader of the congregation told me with a straight face, and without any hint of defensiveness, that it was explained by Deuteronomy 28 (where the punishments for not fulfilling God's commandments are listed in gruesome and prolonged detail). He was saying that the Holocaust was a punishment for the Jews' disobedience (an explanation not unknown in rabbinic pronouncements over the years). 'And in any case,' he went on to say, 'it opened the way for the creation of the state.'

One of the more learned congregants, who delivered expositions at the Shabbat service and has been teaching himself Hebrew and the Bible for several years via the internet, told me of his personal voyage of discovery. He had gone 'back to the beginning', and had rid himself of all his preconceived ideas in pursuit of a personal contact with original texts. He said he was not even looking for a single absolute truth, for there are various truths and his was not the only valid one. His questioning extended to questioning the very purpose of rituals: he knew that there is no biblical basis for the Jewish practice of covering one's head with a skullcap (*kippa*) but he happened to like it ('achei legal'). For him the formalities of ritual did not count so long as the underlying purpose was fulfilled. In support of these doubts he cited the example of Zipporah the wife of the prophet Moses who 'took a flint and cut off her son's foreskin' (Exodus 4:25). What counts, he said, is the substance, not the ritual forms. Women are not allowed to conduct circumcisions, and yet the circumcision of Moses' son was performed summarily by a woman without any ritual or ceremonials. On this basis, among others, my interlocutor argued that ritual is not important. Yet he had chosen an example involving circumcision – itself a

ritual of no practical consequence yet of central importance to Jews (as well as many other peoples across Africa and the Middle East).¹²

This person also told me how at crucial junctures in his religious life and in his career he had heard mysterious voices or experienced strange coincidences which determined the path he then chose. He seemed sceptical about ritual, yet lent credit to supernatural experiences and was also alert to mysterious coincidences.

This congregation is on a journey. They develop new rituals and perform selected established ones: they celebrate the conclusion of the Sabbath in their own manner, giving leading parts to women and children; they blow the shofar on Rosh Hashanah; they follow certain procedures, pronounce blessings and sing many tunes from the Jewish prayer book; they dance the Israeli *borah*. They add the name of Yeshua to the Jewish blessings – saying ‘in the name of the Lord and of Yeshua’. Unlike Pentecostals they do not invoke the supernatural to solve this-worldly problems, but rather take their place in the unfolding of a millennial destiny.

Nevertheless, texts are not their whole story: their lives are surrounded and foretold by supernatural signs: the man just quoted is one example. Another came from one of the strongest personalities in the group, who spoke of a protector bathed in white appearing at many junctures in her life; the head of the congregation spoke of the ‘ingathering of lost Jews’: ‘That’, he said, ‘is what motivates people to move from evangelical to messianic congregations – they do not even realise they are answering God’s call.’ Their small community reinforces their beliefs and hopes and fears; their Sabbath and holiday rituals create bonds of obligation and draw them into a common exploration, and like Pentecostals they have supernatural explanations of what has brought them to this point in their lives.

Finally, what do we make of the obsessively precise arithmetic and chronology of millennial prophecy? Intuitively, one might assume that prophecy would be stated in simple straightforward terms so that it can be easily absorbed and recalled, but instead the opposite is the case. Just as the details and apparently incidental features of ritual are the aspects that ‘really count’, so in prophecy there is no simplified version: at one gathering a congregant wondered ‘how many messiahs [i.e., messianic returns] are there – two or three?’ The books of Daniel and Revelation show the importance of endless details, each inviting interpretation, in building up a millenarian vision. The following computational acrobatics, in a publication from an evangelical/theological university, illustrate the point:

The seventieth week of Daniel 9 will immediately precede that kingdom. During the last three and a half years of that week, 144,000 Israelites will be God’s major witnesses to the world. Revelation 7:1–8 introduces these

12 He also had chosen an example involving a central figure in the genealogy of the Jewish people, and it is well known that in myths of origin such figures often break the rules.

servants of God who are sealed on their foreheads to protect them from God's wrathful visitation against earth's rebels. They will bear the brunt of the dragon's anger while the bulk of believing Israelites find protection from that anger (Rev. 12:17). In their faithful witness for Christ they will suffer martyrdom but subsequently will rise from the dead to join Christ on Mount Zion in His kingdom on earth (Rev. 14:1–5). At some point near the end of that seventieth week, a great revival will come in Jerusalem (Rev. 11:13), perhaps provoking the massive attack on Israel resulting in the battle of Armageddon (cf. Rev 16:16). Then the King of kings and Lord of lords (Rev. 19:16) will usher in the millennial kingdom. In that kingdom Jerusalem, 'the beloved city' (Rev. 20:9), will be the focus of all activity. Christ will rule sitting on David's throne as indicated throughout the Apocalypse (Rev. 1:5; 3:7; 5:5; 22:16) . . . Then the Messiah's salvation will reach to the ends of the earth through the channel of Israel (Isa. 49:6). Israel will fulfil God's purpose for her (Thomas 1997).

The intricacy of the sequence, making it hard to remember in detail, is a structural feature of this type of narrative. (I have heard a similar style of recounting a biblical story from a guide, himself a messianic Israeli Jew, addressing a Brazilian evangelical tour group in Israel.) The detail adds further layers of opacity, as can also be seen in the prophecies of Daniel and in Revelation, which are very long on detail but short on the meaning of their visions. Opacity is a structural element of mythology and of the language of prophecy – hence the word 'delphic', alluding to the opaque soothsaying of the oracle at Delphi. We describe this as a language of prophecy but it is better called a language of soothsaying, standing in contrast to the classically prophetic voices of, for example, Jeremiah and the later Isaiah with their powerful and transparent moral charge.

Foretelling the messianic and millenarian future in this type of language is an interminable inquiry. Scriptural textual fascination plays out in the search for correspondences, as in this exploration of the theme of the shofar and the seven soundings: the seven trumpets sounded as the children of Israel laid siege seven times to the city of Jericho, and the word used to describe their sound is *terouah* ('alarm' – the sound of the trumpets), which also figures in the shofar-blowing at Rosh Hashanah – then reappears in Revelation, in which the number seven makes numerous appearances. The point of the correspondence was to show that Rosh Hashanah heralds the return of the Messiah, or, as mentioned above, is itself the 'day of the Messiah'.

Conclusion

In addition to replacing the Catholic Church, playing the role of powerbroker in high politics and carving out a place in the provision of social services, the IURD is also trying to reshape the cultural substratum of Brazilian life. *Terreiros*

have been closing in the face of the rise of Pentecostal churches for some time (Vital da Cunha, 2015) but the IURD has a strategy to resignify core elements of their pantheon.

Both the IURD and my messianic congregation place themselves in a lineage from the patriarchs of the Old Testament through Moses and Jesus to the modern state of Israel, and in an utterly different way they re-enact the instructions given to the children of Israel in the desert. The messianics do not have power ambitions and they do form a community – they invite each other to birthday parties, they contribute together to a Shabbat meal at their meeting place, their children perform roles during services and they contribute financially to maintaining the premises and their association, which has legal standing (*personalidade jurídica*). The Universal Church recruits its followers into a larger-scale enterprise and is little interested in family or community, as demonstrated by its discouragement of family life among its pastors and bishops.

Whereas in a future political conjuncture the Universal Church's leader could well orient his followers in another direction (with unknowable success), the political inclinations of the messianic congregation members were deeply felt and ideological. Their attachment to Israel was emotional as well as political. Their interaction reinforced their political partisanship and the near-infatuation of some members with Bolsonaro. The Universal Church does not provide an atmosphere for such involvement.

Brazilian politicians ignore the evangelical vote at their peril. Macedo has been successful in placing his nominees in ministerial posts on the basis of the 32 deputies (out of 594) and two senators (out of 82) belonging to his Republicanos party, and in addition the myriad of other chapels and congregations may also create reserves of strong commitment. Recent research based on pre-2018 data has argued that in addition to a tendency for people in the lowest-income groups to vote against parties advocating redistribution – or at least against the PT – the effect of evangelical religious affiliation on voting in presidential elections was strong even when controlled for education, age and social class. This shows Pentecostalism capitalising on the attachment of its poorer and poorly informed followers to conservative personal morality (Araujo, 2019, pp. 35, 106). But it is also possible that, in a clientelistic political culture, Araujo's equating of a vote for PT with a vote for redistribution may be mistaken: those voters may think of redistribution in terms of personal or localised benefits such as low-paid but secure jobs in government agencies, a school, a road, a health centre or even building materials for their church, rather than the PT's universalist project. It seems that if parties of the left (PT, PSOL and PCdoB) are to make headway in this very large constituency in time for the next election they would have to think of cutting a deal with Macedo and, like Lula in his post-2000 campaigns, of neutralising or cordoning off their egalitarian and progressive positions on reproductive rights, gender and

sexuality – thus alienating younger, urban, educated voters. An emollient ‘Lula Paz e Amor’ would help, but still they face a big challenge.

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The horizon ahead: where are we going?

5. After affirmative action: changing racial formations

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Over the past few decades in Brazil, conversations about race have become ubiquitous. Prior to the 1980s, researchers commonly portrayed Brazil as a country in which race was a forbidden word. In contrast, today we see what Calvo-González and Ventura Santos (2018, p. 254) have called an ‘explosion’ of race in Brazil, accompanied by ‘a complex process of sedimentation, in which new (or not so new) narratives and practices about race overlap and/or intermingle with those of old “strata”’. In this chapter, I hope to better understand this ‘sedimentation’ or what can be called, following Omi and Winant’s (1986) classical concept of racial formation, the socio-historical process by which Brazilian racial categories have been created, inhabited, transformed and destroyed over the past few decades.

Brazil is a particularly good case for looking at how race is socially constructed through continuous and changing processes. Presented and studied as an example of racial harmony during most of the first half of the twentieth century (e.g. Freyre, 1933; Pierson, 1942; Tannenbaum, 1946), the country was increasingly described as a case of hidden or cordial racism by the century’s end (e.g. Hasenbalg and Valle e Silva, 1988; Guimarães, 2001; Twine, 1998) and, ultimately, praised as a state committed to racial redress by the beginning of the twenty-first century (Htun, 2004; Lima, 2010; Paschel, 2016). The conservative turn marked by the election of Jair Bolsonaro in 2018 has largely constrained the possibilities of racial inclusion but, as argued later in this chapter, the horizon of possibilities of anti-racism is shaped also by bottom-up mobilisations that have their roots in previous decades.

In order to understand the (im)possibilities of Brazilian racial formations, it is important to keep in mind that they have always unfolded in a broader context of changes in global debates about race. Especially after World War II, and largely following a European lead, the hegemonic goal (and ideal) was to abolish race. The idea was that if we stopped talking about race, racisms were bound to disappear. Accordingly, race was deemed a ‘fiction’ due to the lack of biological basis for its use, and most countries around the world abolished racial classification as official categories, including in their censuses (Morning,

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2008). A broader modernisation framework predicted a world in which we all would be colour-blind, 'raceless' and, though it remained unspoken, Western and Eurocentric.

The persistence of racial tensions without *de jure* racial discrimination made evident that it was racism that created race and not the other way around. In addition, the recognition that diverse paths of development were possible, and that difference and equality could be understood as compatible and complementary in the pursuit of justice, brought 'race' back as an anti-racism weapon (Reis and Moraes Silva, 2015). Many argued that, through affirmative action and other policies that recognised and valued diversity, we would find a new progressive path towards equality in a multicultural world. In the United States, the election of Barack Obama, proudly portrayed as the first African American president of the country, was presented as the ultimate evidence that we had finally reached a post-racial world (Tesler and Sears, 2010). The rise of Donald Trump and his project to Make America Great (and white) Again came as a reminder that history rarely follows a linear path, and the same has been true for anti-racism progress.

As with most Latin American countries, Brazil was caught in those global movements and was even described as exemplary of the multicultural turn towards equality (Paschel, 2016; Loveman, 2014). In spite of the heated debates around the merits of multiculturalism (Hale, 2002), by the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century it seemed that Brazil had chosen 'the prism of race' as a path to social inclusion (Lehmann, 2018). Similar to the US case, Bolsonaro's 2018 election, supported by a campaign with overt expressions of anti-Blackness and anti-indigenous racisms, was a harsh reminder that racialisation remains an important force of social exclusion (Silva and Larkins, 2019).

In the next pages, I take seriously the idea that racial formation happens through ongoing and open-ended processes that create a dynamic horizon of (im)possibilities. Building on the work of Saperstein, Penner and Light (2013), I analyse these (im)possibilities of Brazilian racial formations by focusing on the intersections of macro, meso and micro levels, or on how 'contested categories at the macro level and fluid and complex identities and performance at the micro level coexist with persistent racial inequality in the present' (Saperstein, Penner and Light, 2013, p. 371). I start with the macro-historical narratives, in particular the interactions with global debates on race that, in the words of Htun (2004), allowed Brazil to go from racial democracy to affirmative action. In the second section, I focus on the institutional changes that have permitted Brazil to implement top-down policies (i.e. from the state to society) to tackle structural racial inequalities (arguably successfully). In the third section, I analyse how these global and institutional changes created new tensions and disputes at the micro level – in particular around racial classification – that have also transformed Brazilian racial formations from the bottom up. In

conclusion, I attempt to address this volume's question 'where are we going?' by mapping the ongoing disputes and tensions that have emerged from the current conservative turn that brought to power a government that openly flirts with anti-Blackness and embraces a colour-blind project. I explore how this new project interacts with recent dynamics at the global and local levels and new horizons of (im)possibilities.

Global and local dynamics: the rise and fall of Brazilian racial democracy

Racialisation is at the basis of what we understand today as 'the Americas', a continent constituted through European colonial invasions that led to the genocide, slavery and oppression of indigenous and African peoples. Race was also at the forefront of most wars for independence and civil wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which constituted the American nation states. But while the United States (and Canada in its policies towards the native population) insisted on open and formal racialised policies through most of the mid-twentieth century (e.g. Jim Crow segregation), most Latin American countries followed a different path by embracing, at least discursively, the idea of racial mixture and *mestizaje*.

Mestizaje is commonly presented as the hegemonic building block of Latin American racial formation (Telles and PERLA, 2014), or, to use Omi and Winant's (1986) concepts, its main 'racial project' during most of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. *Mestizaje* often implied a discursive rejection of white supremacy and biological racism, but, in practice, was accompanied by continuing subsidies to European migration, formal and informal privileged access to land and newly created industrial jobs for these migrants, forced assimilation policies for indigenous groups, and the absence of policies to redress centuries of Black slavery (Graham et al., 1990).

In Brazil, *mestizaje*, later celebrated as racial democracy, had a particular and ironic character. As a colony, the country was by far the largest importer of slaves, which, in contrast to other countries in the region, made the 'Black problem' more important than the indigenous one (Wade, 1997).¹ In addition, although it was one of the last countries in the region to abolish slavery (partly due to the lack of an independence war, as argued by Andrews, 2004), Brazil was one of the first to embrace an image of racial democracy. Due

1 Due to space limitations, I focus on issues related to Blackness rather than to indigeneity. It is important to note, however, that the visibility of indigeneity in public policies and in Brazilian racial formation narratives has increased since the indigenous category was included in the 1991 census, increasing the statistical visibility not only of a relatively large (and growing) indigenous population but also of important inequalities between indigenous people and the rest of the population. For a good review of the debates on indigenous invisibility in Brazilian racial projects see Oliveira (1999). Since the beginning of the Bolsonaro government, indigenous populations have also been a target of attacks and killings.

to the inevitable contradictions between this image of racial harmony and a harsh reality of racial inequalities, racial democracy is today largely referred to as a myth (Guimarães, 2001).

Nevertheless, as social scientists know too well, discourses (and myths) have practical consequences. The idea of Brazil as a racial democracy was the basis for the creation of laws that punished blatant racism in the early 1950s, even if they downplayed Black movements' socio-political demands and stressed the exceptionality of racist acts (Dávila, 2017). Concomitantly, the nationalistic policies of the *Estado Novo* relied on national ideas of a colour-blind Brazilianness in labour laws. Limiting the hiring of (mostly white) immigrants to 30 per cent of the workforce, these labour policies created possibilities of upward mobility for the urban lower middle class, especially brown men – part of what Degler (1971) called the 'mulatto escape hatch'. Finally, questioning the idea of race as a biological category allowed racial boundaries to be contextually negotiated in the interface of region, skin colour, cultural habits and socio-economic status (Moraes Silva, 2016). In practice, this meant that more people were allowed to 'become white'.

As discussed by a number of authors (e.g. Hofbauer, 2006; Schwarcz, 2011), the defence of racial mixing meant, in practice, the whitening of the Brazilian population. As shown by the historical series of the census, between 1890 and 1960, the number of people in Brazil who were identified (or self-identified, since 1950) as white grew from 45 to 60 per cent.² Evidencing persistent racial hierarchies, this was celebrated as key to the modernisation of the country – as whiteness was a necessary condition of modernity (Schwarcz, 2011). Although this was partly due to the subsidised European migration, it was also accomplished through individual reclassification. During that same period, the number of people who identified their colour as Black went from 15 per cent to 8 per cent, in what Abdias Nascimento (1989), among others, has labelled the Black 'statistical genocide'.³

Much has been written on the hegemony of the Brazilian racial democracy narrative and its sins in twentieth-century Brazil, and it would be impossible to summarise all the debates here (for a good review, see Guimarães, 2001). Instead, I want to focus on another particularity of the country in relation to other nations that proved to be key to the success of the Brazilian so-called multicultural turn: together with the United States, South Africa and Cuba, Brazil continued to 'count race' through most of the twentieth century (Loveman, 2014; Powell and Moraes Silva, 2018). Despite the fact that in

2 As argued by Carvalho, Wood and Drumond Andrade (2004), these changes cannot be explained by demographic changes alone; at least 50 per cent of the change is attributed to individual reclassification.

3 I refer to 'colour' because until 1980, the census question was 'What is your colour?' Since 1991, with the inclusion of the indigenous category, the question has been changed to 'What is your colour or race?'

1970, the question about 'colour' was excluded from the Brazilian census following a broader Latin American movement (Loveman, 2014), in 1976, at the height of political repression, Brazil conducted a pioneer survey on racial classification. Partly as a result of this survey, the 'colour' question was added back to the census in 1980, asking Brazilians to identify according to four categories: *branca* (white), *preta* (Black), *parda* (brown) and *amarela* (yellow), allowing researchers to measure trends in racial inequalities. As argued elsewhere, this was possible due to an alliance between academics, social movements and census bureaucrats that questioned the project of racial democracy by defining race as a social indicator (Powell and Moraes Silva, 2018). More importantly, this allowed a production of statistical data on racial inequalities that played a key role when the global discourses on race changed at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

The 2001 World Conference against Racism in Durban is an important landmark in the transformation of global discourses on race and racism. Despite many institutional failures and the early exit of the US and Israel from the meeting, Durban pushed the agenda on sensitive topics such as compensation for colonialism and slavery. It also allowed more space for social movements and NGOs to question countries' official narratives about racism and discrimination. In the case of Brazil, it marked the official acknowledgement of the persistence of racial inequalities in the country.⁴ In fact, the Brazilian anti-racism agenda was more visible in the conference than that of other countries of the region, partly because other Latin American Black movements and NGOs arrived with strong political agendas but only anecdotal data on the persistence of racism and discrimination in their countries. Brazilian organisations, in contrast, had more than a century of statistical data to support their arguments.⁵

Paschel (2016) sees Durban as exemplary of a global multicultural alignment, or the strengthening of a transnational anti-racism agenda within local contexts, with strong impacts on Latin America. The global move towards multiculturalism cannot be naively celebrated as a synonym of redistribution and recognition, as thoroughly discussed by Charles Hale (2002), among others. But the multicultural alignment between the global multicultural agenda and a Brazilian local anti-racist project did open space for important transformations within the Brazilian state and concrete anti-racist policies such as racial quotas, as discussed in the next section.

4 See Paschel (2016) and Lehmann (2018) for careful analyses of the Brazilian preparation for and participation in Durban.

5 Paixão and Carvano (2008) and Paixão et al. (2011) are exemplary of the use of descriptive statistical data to push forward the Black movements' agenda and make racial inequalities visible.

Changing race in the state: constructing multiracial Brazil top-down

If the implementation of racial quotas in Brazil might have come as a surprise internationally, domestically the narrative of Brazil as a racist country had been gaining ground throughout the second half of the twentieth century. In this section, I describe different dimensions of this state change, some of the public policies implemented to (un)make race and the institutional limits to changing a racial project from the top, through public policies that were sometimes at odds with beliefs about race entrenched at the bottom.

By the 1990s, a decade before the Durban meeting, referring to racial democracy as a 'myth' had become typical in intellectual and more progressive circles. Nearly all studies in social sciences had strong evidence of racial inequalities and racial discrimination (e.g. Hasenbalg and Valle e Silva, 1988; Valle e Silva and Hasenbalg, 1992; Hasenbalg, Valle e Silva and Lima, 1999). In addition, national polls showed that if most Brazilians did not see themselves as racists, they at least acknowledged the widespread existence of racism in the country (Turra, Venturi and Datafolha, 1995). The 1995 Zumbi march, a call for Black conscientisation with an estimated participation of thirty thousand people, showed the strong organisation of Brazilian Black movements and received widespread coverage in the media, which was unusual for 'racial' issues at that time (Rios, 2012).

In that same year, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a sociologist who had participated in the 1950s UNESCO race study, became Brazil's president. Although a few scholars stress the importance of the Cardoso administration in initiating federal actions targeting the Black population (e.g. Htun, 2004), others emphasise the limits of such initiatives. As Lima (2010, p. 81) puts it: 'The discursive and political strategy of this [Cardoso] government was to promote recognition with little investment in redistributive aspects.' Regardless of the role played by the Cardoso administration, during that period Black movements and civil society organisations mobilised for more concrete actions and arrived well organised at the Durban meeting.

As mentioned, racial statistics played an important role in this preparation. They were also at the core of many of the demands of the Black movements, who were pushing for changes in official ethn racial categories. In the lead-up to the 2000 census, the Black movement defended the inclusion of a more political category, *negro*, in place of the colour categories, *preta* and *parda*. The census technical committee, dominated by social scientists, argued for the need to keep the historical terms and, relying on survey studies, showed that *negro* was not a category that resonated with most of the population (Schwartzman, 1999). A balance was achieved in which the official categories were kept but

increasingly merged in official reports (Powell and Moraes Silva, 2018).⁶ This practice, which can be traced back to IBGE reports from the 1980s, allowed *pretos* and *pardos* to be presented as *negros*, which added up to 46 per cent of the population in 2000 and allowed Brazil to present itself as the country with the largest Black population outside Africa.

With the election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in 2003, race debates were further developed and institutionalised within state institutions. As argued by Lima (2010), the Workers' Party (PT) administration implemented a number of educational, health and labour policies and laws that directly and indirectly benefited the Black population.⁷ More importantly, the PT administration opened space to the Black movements within the state. The creation of the Special Secretary for Public Policies to Promote Racial Equality (SEPPIR), an office with ministerial status, created what Paschel (2016) termed an 'ethnoracial state apparatus'.

The entrenchment of the Black movement within the state has been analysed as co-optation or part of a broader tradition of state corporativism (as insightfully discussed by Lehmann, 2018). As argued by Paschel (2016), it also marks a shift in the approach of many Black militants, as the goal of becoming a mass movement was sidelined and the focus became the implementation of policies. In practice, this allowed individuals and organisations broadly identified as affiliated to Black movements to successfully push forward policies that addressed racial inequalities in Brazil. Even if the PT's track record on indigenous rights is debatable (e.g. the decision to construct the Belo Monte hydroelectric dam), for most anti-racism activists, Lula's administration was a turning point in the Brazilian state's approach to racial inequalities. As Silva and Larkins (2019, p. 18) put it, 'Even though we believe that PT did not go far enough in addressing the brutal consequences of antiBlackness in Brazil, their race-conscious policies did begin to transform Brazilian society in important ways.'

This widespread and constitutionally backed implementation of race-based policies and laws can be read as the final evidence that the racial democracy or *mestizaje* racial project had been left behind. Affirmative action has allowed Brazil to enrol a record number of students who identified as *pretos/os* and *pardos/os* in higher education, not only due to racial quotas

6 This strategy was justified in statistical and consistency terms. Statistically, the number of people who identified as Black was too small in certain categories to allow meaningful analysis. In addition, the similar outcomes of *pretos* and *pardos* allowed these categories to be merged without major consequences for the outputs.

7 For example, the 2003 Law 10.639 including Afro-Brazilian history and culture as part of the mandatory curriculum of basic education; the 2004 University-for-All Programme, ProUni; the 2004 Programme against Institutional Racism; the 2007 Black Population National Health Programme; Law 12.711/2012 creating racial quotas in federal universities; and the 2015 domestic work law. For a review of important racial equalisation policies implemented during the PT administration, see Lima (2010).

but also with the support of University-for-All, or ProUni, a programme that gave scholarships to private universities and also took race into account. Given the importance of educational credentials in the country, this has the potential to reduce racial inequalities in wages and, arguably, create a Black middle class in the country.

Nevertheless, as exhaustively argued by sociologists and anthropologists, the state is not a unidimensional and homogeneous entity (e.g. Gupta, 2012). A number of scholars have analysed the difficulties of different state bureaucracies in dealing with race after decades of silencing it, as one of the effects of the complex process of sedimentation discussed by Calvo-González and Ventura Santos (2018). This is partly because the racial inequality agenda did not evenly penetrate the state. For example, the centrality of race issues in debates about the school curriculum, health and higher education is in stark contrast to its near absence in debates on access to credit and wealth, spheres in which racial inequalities are striking. In addition, it cannot be overlooked how much successful policy implementation depends on interaction and negotiation with other bureaucratic levels (Pires, 2019). For example, since the creation of Law 10.639/2003, which included the history of Africa in the official curriculum of Brazilian schools, evaluations indicate that there is resistance from educators to discussing the subject in the classroom. Conducting fieldwork in six schools in the northern region of Brazil, Coelho and Coelho (2012) identify this resistance: i) by the reproduction of stereotypes about Africa; ii) by the delimitation of the theme to discrimination only; iii) by the allocation of the debate to fairs and during the month of Black consciousness; and iv) by the great difficulty of teachers in dealing with the content outlined in law. Similarly, studies in health policy have analysed how the unified health system (Sistema Único de Saúde – SUS) bureaucracies reacted to the enactment of anti-racist policies in public health. They found that the absence of clear guidelines for handling racial discrimination allowed passive resistance from staff, which in turn reproduced the invisibility of racism in these bureaucracies (Milanezi and Moraes Silva, 2019).

It is also unclear how much the state was successful in legitimising its new approach to race among the general public. Although national surveys have evidenced public support for racial quotas across racial categories, they have also shown strong opposition, particularly among those with university degrees (e.g. Datafolha, 2008). In addition, surveys and in-depth interviews demonstrate the persistent fear of many Brazilians that racial quotas and other racialised discourses might create racism and stronger racial boundaries (Lamont et al., 2016; Moraes Silva, 2016). This raises the question: how have ordinary people engaged with the changing Brazilian racial project at the micro level?

Changing identities and reclassification: negotiating a multiracial Brazil bottom-up

In this section, I turn to changes in the Brazilian racial project at the micro level. A number of authors have discussed the mismatch between the top-down categories mobilised by Brazilian racial policies – in particular racial quotas – and the way Brazilians see race (e.g. Bailey, 2008; Schwartzman, 2009). The focus of this section is on the consequences of the public policy implementation that mobilises the language of race for racial identification. In particular, I focus on multiple explanations for why people increasingly identify as *negra/os*, *preta/os* or *parda/os* and on the role of these changes in the transformation of Brazilian racial formation.

As discussed previously, during the period when the racial democracy project became hegemonic, there was a clear change in the way Brazilians identified themselves: a preference for identifying as *branco* and a rejection of identifying as *preta/o*. Between 1960 and 1991, the number of people who identified their colour as *preta* was declining, reaching its lowest point in 1991 (5.15 per cent). Since 1991, however, there has been an increase in the number of people identifying their colour as *preta*: first to 6.20 per cent in 2000 and to 7.52 per cent in 2010. In the 2019 National Household Survey (PNAD), it was 9 per cent, the highest percentage since 1950. Throughout this period the growth of people who identified their colour as *parda*, meant to include those who saw their skin colour as in between Black and white, or mixed-race, has been the most remarkable: from 21.32 per cent in 1940, it continued increasing to 43.3 per cent in 2010. In the 2019 PNAD it was 47 per cent. In 2010, the sum of those who identified as *preta/os* and those who identified as *parda/os* was already larger than those who identified as whites. The prediction for the next census was that those who identify as *parda* will be the largest group and the sum of *preta/os* and *parda/os* will account for nearly two-thirds of the Brazilian population.⁸

If we look at the growth of people identifying as *parda/o* and *preta/o* from the perspective of the Black activists' campaign launched prior to the 1991 census, this is a huge success. A poster showing the bare torsos of three people with varying skin tones became the iconic image of this campaign (Oliveira, 2001, p. 85). It urged Brazilians: *Não deixa sua cor passar em branco. Responda com bom (C)senso* ('Don't let your colour pass into white [an expression that also means 'passing unnoticed' in Brazil]. Respond with good sense.') By overwriting the 's' with a 'C', the poster cleverly urged Brazilians to use good sense, on the census. (*Senso* and *censo* have the same sound in Portuguese, the latter meaning

8 According to the last PNAD Continua (the official national household survey), *pretos* (9 per cent) and *pardos* (47.1 per cent) already constituted 56 per cent of the population, while whites decreased to 42.9 per cent. IBGE Sidra website (accessed 28 January 2020). By the time this book was sent to press, the 2020 census had not been implemented.

'census' and the former 'sense'.) The goal was to encourage Brazilians with African ancestry not to identify as white, rendering the Blackness of Brazil statistically visible.

As previously discussed, joining *pretos/as* and *pardos/as* in the category of *negra/os* has been common practice in Brazilian social sciences and in many state institutions, dating at least to the 1980s. A similar strategy was commonly used when defining beneficiaries of affirmative action. The 2012 federal decree that made racial quotas mandatory in federal universities defined the size of reserved quotas based on the state percentage of people who identified as *preta*, *parda* and *indígena* according to the 'what is your colour or race?' question on the 2010 census. (These quotas are known by the acronym 'PPI'.)⁹

It must be noted that the first multicultural policies in Latin America aimed mostly at the protection of cultural difference, leading some scholars to label affirmative action 'indigenous inclusion/Black exclusion', since they saw the need to protect the indigenous but largely ignored the Afro population, which was perceived as insufficiently 'ethnic' (Hooker, 2005). By employing self-identification with the census categories, affirmative action policy designers could broaden the policy's scope. Beneficiaries were not defined in terms of cultural difference or racial identity, but simply by their identification with census colour categories that had been roughly the same since 1872. Mobilising simultaneously social and racial quotas was also instrumental in guaranteeing political support. Since the association between colour and disadvantage in Brazil was supported by a plethora of statistical evidence, affirmative action policies gained broad public legitimacy and support. In short, using the IBGE census categories (coupled with socio-economic categories) paved the way for the creation of quotas for urban *pretos* and *pardos* – most of whom (at least until recently) did not possess a distinct political, ethnic or cultural identity (Paschel, 2016), nor did they clearly identify with the more political *negro* category mobilised by the Black movements.

This is particularly important because, despite its widespread use in policy reports and academic papers, until recently the term *negra/o* was not a widespread racial identification for most of the population. The 2003 Brazilian Social Survey (Pesquisa Social Brasileiro, PESB), one of the few surveys to force interviewees to choose between Black and white (i.e. not allowing a mixed

9 See Daflon, Feres Júnior and Campos (2013) for a good discussion of the impact of the 2012 quotas law. In practice, this meant affirmative action policies in Brazil did not differentiate between *pretos/as* and *pardos/as*, all of whom are eligible to be included in racial quotas. Therefore, a state like Rio de Janeiro, which has 0.1 per cent who identify as indigenous, 12.12 per cent who identify as *pretos/as* and 39.6 per cent who identify as *pardos/os* according to the 2010 Census, will have 51.82 per cent of PPI quotas. In contrast, the state of Ceará, which has 0.24 per cent of people who identify as indigenous, 4.56 per cent of people who identify as *preto* and 62.33 per cent who identify as *pardo* in the 2010 Census, will have 67.11 per cent of PPI quotas. Some universities have separate quotas (or additional places) for *indígenas*, partly because this is a much smaller group but also because they are perceived as more 'culturally different' (Telles and Paschel, 2014).

category), found that interviewees who identified as *pardos* according to the census categories were split – 50 per cent chose white and 50 per cent Black (Bailey, 2008). Based on a 2010 survey, Telles and PERLA (2014) found that the percentage of *negros* in the country can vary from 6 per cent (when we rely on spontaneous self-identification as *negro*) to 59.3 per cent (when we classify as *negros* those identified by survey interviewers as *pretos* and *pardos*).

More recent studies have shown that, as with the *preta* category, identification with the term *negro* has been growing. Awareness campaigns, coupled with the availability of transnational repertoires for talking about race and valuing Blackness, have certainly contributed to the increasing number of Brazilians who identify as *preto*, *pardo* and *negro* (Moraes Silva, 2016). Within universities, there has been an expansion of Black collectives and organisations that have pressured universities to include these topics in their course syllabus and public debates, encouraging students to ‘become’ Black. Studies have also shown that identification as *negro* is also correlated with higher levels of education and income (even after controlling for skin colour tone); therefore, the general upward mobility of non-white sectors of the population may have contributed to this change (Telles and Paschel, 2014).

It is also possible, and non-contradictory, to argue that access to affirmative action and racial quotas may have encouraged people to identify as *pretas/os*, *pardas/os* or *negras/os*. Based on a survey experiment, Bailey (2008) found evidence that mentioning quotas before asking people to identify as Black or white nearly doubles the percentage of respondents who choose to identify as Black. Analysing changes in ethno-racial identification after graduation among university students who were enrolled before and after the implementation of quotas, Francis-Tan and Tannuri-Pianto (2015) found that students increasingly identified as *negras/os*, especially after the implementation of quotas.

What do these changes in identification tell us about the broader changes in Brazilian racial formation? On one hand, the increase in people willing to identify as *pretas/os*, *pardas/os* and *negras/os* can be seen as a successful consequence of the policy itself, particularly as the policy has the objective of creating growing awareness about race. As Silva and Larkins (2019) point out, for the first time, there were advantages to being Black in Brazil, and people were willing to embrace that identification. On the other hand, this growth was also received with scepticism and accusations of fraud and ‘afro-convenience’ – or the use of a Black ancestor to claim the rights to quotas (Rosa, 2016). Because self-identification was the only requirement to be included in racial quotas, anyone who identified as *indígena*, *pretas/os* or *pardas/os* could benefit from quotas without the need for any documentation (as was the case for quotas for alumni of public schools or low-income students). But in a country that had for a long time argued that ‘we are all mixed’ – or, as Sovik (2009) puts it, ‘Here [in Brazil], nobody is white (*Aqui ninguém é branco*)’ – who was not entitled to claim being *pardo/o*? Does that mean that all or most Brazilians were

somehow entitled to quotas? Or was a certain degree of Blackness necessary for that?

These questions became even more salient when racial quotas expanded to prestigious civil servant selections, for posts as judges, state prosecutors and university professors. Silva and Larkins (2019, p. 911, n. 6) note: 'Some Brazilians claimed Blackness based on ancestry rather than phenotype to further their careers through the quota system.' The visibility of these positions also raised eyebrows about the lack of 'Black faces'. As Frei David, a Black leader and founder of Educafro, denounced in a recruitment process for the Public Prosecutor's Office, '[Eight] out of 10 selected candidates [through quotas] could not be considered Black under any circumstances' (Conselho Nacional do Ministério Público, 2015). Similarly, Black collectives within the universities started to actively denounce cases of fraud in racial self-identification, in particular in highly selective programmes such as medicine (Rosa, 2016).

These demands have resonated with the state, and in 2016 the Ministry of Education published a directive (Orientação Normativa no. 13, 1 August 2016) mandating procedures for checking the truthfulness (*veracidade*) of the racial self-identification (*auto-declaração racial*) of candidates for civil servant positions. This same document made the establishment of verification commissions (*comissões de verificação da veracidade da auto-declaração racial*) mandatory. Self-identification is still the basis for any inclusion in race-based policies (i.e. no racial identification is imposed on anyone), but because the state's responsibility is to avoid fraud and misuse of public policies, these committees may reject access to racial quotas if candidates for university and civil servant positions do not provide enough evidence that they are Black. Evidence is both embodied in phenotype and argued through narratives about experiences of discrimination and other forms of racial identification.

Verification committees, praised by some and feared by others, signal a radical break with old narratives of racial democracy and mixed racial boundaries. Nevertheless, as these committees were being discussed, President Dilma was being ousted from office, initiating a radical change in the Brazilian federal administration, in particular for the ethno-racial status apparatus. In a reverse from the multiracial narratives of the PSDB and PT eras, in 2019 the Bolsonaro government came to power with a discourse much closer to the old narrative of racial democracy and a campaign fuelled by openly racist statements (Silva and Larkins, 2019).

Recognitions, polarisations and backlashes: what comes next?

Recent changes and their open-ended consequences evidence how much Brazilian racial formations remain under construction. As argued by Omi and Winant (1986), racial formations are continuous and historical projects.

They accumulate previous formations while responding to contemporary dilemmas and power relations. In addition, as argued by Saperstein, Penner and Light (2013), these changes are shaped by the interactions between macro, institutional and micro levels. In this inconclusive conclusion, I return to these three dimensions to identify some of the horizon of (im)possibilities of the Brazilian changing racial formation after its conservative turn.

It is clear that what Calvo-González and Ventura Santos (2018) called 'the explosion of race' in Brazil has links to transnational changes. Brazilian Black and indigenous movements, explicitly mobilising an ethno-racial language, gained more space and formed important alliances in global anti-racist movements. Transnational repertoires about being Black are increasingly visible in the country, not only in aesthetic signals and cultural products consumed in everyday interactions, but also in political mobilisation and narratives. At the same time, the global rise of extreme right-wing political groups, in particular in the form of nationalist and anti-immigration sentiments, has involved more overt expressions of anti-Blackness, identified by Silva and Larkins (2019) in their analysis of the 2018 Brazilian presidential campaign.

The implementation of verification commissions illustrates how the racial boundaries in Brazilian society are under negotiation also through state institutional practices. The consequences of these commissions are open ended.¹⁰ Supporters claim that they may serve to curb fraud and help to further debates about race and white privilege in the country. Because access to public funds is at stake, they argue, some form of control is not only important but necessary. Critics claim that these commissions can become race trials and, by relying on fixed notions of race, discourage people entitled to racial quotas from applying out of fear that they are not Black enough. Perhaps more important is the fear that debates about these commissions may serve as opportunities for an unsympathetic government to question affirmative action policies.

Bolsonaro is openly opposed to affirmative action policies. He also has a long record of racist statements, often using old repertoires of racial democracy (Alfonso, 2020). Although Bolsonaro is not the first to employ these narratives (Cardoso famously mobilised his Black ancestry by claiming he had 'a foot in the kitchen'), his rhetoric is not empty but rather a frame for concrete policies that reproduce racial inequalities and privileges. His public security policies are particularly harmful to Black youth, whose deaths by police reached record highs during his first year in office. His environment policies portray indigenous people either as potential enemies (manipulated by international NGOs who want to 'steal' the Amazon) or as victims of underdevelopment who wish to be assimilated and become 'just like any other Brazilian'. More broadly, his economic liberal policies leave little space for social inclusion and may threaten affirmative action policies not only through the dismantling of

10 Moraes Silva, Toste and Giraut (2018) discusses in detail the practices and potential consequences of these verification committees.

the policies themselves but also through the undermining of public universities and civil service positions. After all, affirmative action only makes sense if there are selective positions to be occupied.

On a more hopeful note, racial formation is also being transformed from the bottom up, partly as a consequence of previous global and state transformations at the macro and meso levels. At the same time as Bolsonaro was elected president, more women, more Black men and more Black women were elected to legislative power (Mazza, 2018). Of course, the under-representation is still striking (and the chance of a Black woman being elected is still more than five times less than that of a white man), but many were elected with an anti-racist agenda that is much more salient in media and public debates today than it was a few decades ago. On the individual level, surveys show that people are also more aware of experiences of racial discrimination and will respond to them more often, including with legal action.

It is clear that in contrast to the optimism of the era of the Brazilian multicultural alignment (Paschel, 2016), there are multiple ‘disalignments’ between global, institutional and everyday debates. In addition, the strengthening and growing visibility of Black movements – at the global level with Black Lives Matter initiatives, at the micro level and within state institutions – are in stark contrast to the government’s conservative turn towards narratives of benevolent miscegenation and towards policies that reinforce racial exclusion. But as the optimism of the previous period was too naive and did not notice the growing power of old and new forms of racism, let’s hope the pessimism of the current moment is underestimating the horizon of possibilities of emerging Brazilian anti-racist racial projects.

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6. From participation to silence: grassroots politics in contemporary Brazil

Andreza Aruska de Souza Santos

Nearly four in ten Brazilians live in cities with fewer than 100,000 inhabitants; those cities total approximately 94 per cent of the 5,568 Brazilian municipalities (IBGE, 2020a). Life in such towns does not always allow any separation between what happens in the private realm and in public interactions. Political exposure can be frightening for those who do not have the privilege of a voice as a citizen without being punished as a worker. In this article I claim that lessons from small towns, where having a public voice can impact different areas of life, are important to understand the current intimidation in contemporary Brazil. In 2017, Brazil's labour reforms (Law 13467, passed on 13 July 2017) made work relations steadily more precarious, and self-censorship became gradually more common to keep an employment position. Guaranteed working rights (secured since the 1940s by the CLT – Consolidated Labour Laws) were replaced by flexible terms to be negotiated between employer and employee. Vacation time, parental leave and full working hours are some of the factors that became unstable. When the 2018 presidential political campaign started, mainly taking place on social media, the various voices that took to the stage across diverse internet platforms may have given the deceptive impression that everybody had an equal ability to strongly express and share political views publicly. However, having a public voice can lead to repercussions in working places, both in small towns where everyone knows everybody else, and in larger cities, because social media can make individuals traceable, and their views could be confronted in insecure working spaces. In what follows, I discuss how we can understand silences in a country previously marked by protests and participatory politics, and more recently by a cacophony on social media. The question I bring to the fore here is: when are the instruments of politics of the governed (such as grassroots activism) used? Which conditions are needed for mobilisation? And when may activism disintegrate? In addressing these questions looking at small municipalities in Brazil, I offer an opportunity to shift the prism of urban literature on Brazil, which has so far focused mainly on large metropolises.

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Introduction

In the early 2000s, Brazil experienced a period of economic prosperity that was largely financed by the exports of commodities. What is not always clear when looking at numbers from those years (2000–12) is that the economic rise was followed by a growth in grassroots politics. This increase, followed by ‘silence’, is the focus of this chapter. When focusing on grassroots politics, the prism I take is that of residents’ associations, as I detail below.

The combination of economic growth and the empowerment of non-state actors is not always easy to come by in the social sciences literature. In Brazil, urban social movements are largely connected to the growth of urban peripheries. The lack of public service provision in these areas, for example garbage collection, public transportation and street lighting, led residents to mobilise to claim for such deliveries. Being deprived of services and the fear of forced relocation gave traction to significant forms of grassroots resistance (Perry, 2016, p. 98). A grievance agenda is certainly an engine for mobilisation, and Brazilian peripheries were never short of demands. However, poverty is also a form of political oppression (de Souza Santos, 2019a; Goldstein, 2003; Scott, 1985), and it compromises the capacity and duration of mobilisation (Dahlum, Knutsen and Wig, 2019). In other words, while the poor may directly profit from grassroots mobilisation to improve housing and living conditions (Bertorelli et al., 2017), it is also true that this group often benefits from their invisibility and avoidance of confrontations.

The complexity I explore in this chapter refers to the powerful coexistence of a grievance agenda on the one hand (claiming access to transportation, education, health and tenure rights, among other services, that were not offered to the standards people needed during the commodities boom cycle), and on the other hand, an ascending socio-economic curve offering a powerful combination of motivation and capacity for political action (Dahlum, Knutsen and Wig, 2019). After that, I discuss the horizons of grassroots (im)possibilities amid socio-economic decline.

Breaking the silence

One remarkable characteristic of politics in small cities in Brazil,¹ as I have discussed at length elsewhere (de Souza Santos, 2019a), is that indignation

1 To classify cities is an arduous endeavour. Brazilian municipal associations usually classify cities according to three categories: small (up to 49,999 inhabitants), medium (between 50,000 and 299,999 inhabitants) and large (more than 300,000 inhabitants). Obviously, this classification has flaws. The dynamics of large metropolitan areas such as São Paulo, with more than 11 million residents, will be vastly different than cities with 300,000 inhabitants, and yet both cases would be considered large. Territorial extension also matters; municipalities can have a densely populated core area despite having few inhabitants, which is not to be confused with cities that have a large territorial basis and a large number of inhabitants who are relatively spread out. Taking into account the caveats in this classification, I refer to Mariana as a small

hardly ever takes the form of direct verbal confrontation when people know each other through a variety of co-dependency ties (Holston, 2008, p. 276). In cities where everyone knows everyone else, and when in times of economic recession, there is a growing reliance on networks to get by, many residents refer to public political participation as false opportunities, when political responsibility is wrapped in economic losses (de Souza Santos, 2019a). Political protests in such contexts can cause short-term loss to participants. To directly confront the state in political action may be costly for those who rely on it for basic public services, particularly where anonymity is not an option and public service can be biased (Eiró, 2019). In addition, to those who rely on informal jobs as well as those who depend on kinship and friendship ties to pay the bills only when 'things get better' (de Souza Santos, 2019a, p. 65), breaking interpersonal networks also jeopardises possible economic and emotional favours (Rebhun, 1999). Grassroots participation in these places, for these reasons, has been marked as a neoliberal project that imagined engaged citizens but instead empowers 'expert citizens' and not everyday residents (Caldeira and Holston, 2015, p. 11). Participatory politics, an instrument to fight for spatial and social inclusion, is thus not possible without costs.

Looking at political indignation from the perspective of small towns ethnographically is therefore a good opportunity to understand a context that is expanding to larger Brazilian cities. While looking for jobs in a shrinking economy (Marquetti, Hoff and Miebach, 2020), openly expressing political views can disrupt employment opportunities, and social media screening prior to job interviews is a common tool (Ebnet, 2012; Hurrell, Scholarios and Richards, 2017; Trottier, 2016). Whether in small cities, where personal ties are intertwined with employment opportunities and economic favours, or in larger urban spaces, with high online connectivity, to publicly discuss political views can impact on employment. I focus on small towns, already struggling with self-censorship before the most recent economic crisis in Brazil, to discuss political silences at times of economic struggles, as well as the tools to break citizens' reservations about getting involved in urban activism.

I learned about small Brazilian towns when in 2013, I spent the year living in Ouro Preto, in the state of Minas Gerais, for my doctoral fieldwork. I returned to Ouro Preto in 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 and have continuous interactions with my informants and friends in town. During the seven years of continuous interactions in person and online, I have also regularly visited nearby Mariana, as these two cities share a university and residents often

city. Mariana has approx. 54,219 inhabitants (IBGE, 2010) and a density of 45 inhabitants per km²; as a means of comparison; São Paulo has a density of 7,398 inhabitants per km². Having a large territory for its relatively small population, the districts of Mariana have a low concentration of people, allowing residents to know each other well. In addition, as a university and touristic town, there is a strong demographic turnover of residents in Mariana, with those considered permanent making a much smaller number.

commute between the two towns and campuses. Both these cities are similar in the number of residents, in having an extensive territory and a relatively small number of inhabitants, they are cities with a mining-based economy, and they both have an elevated number of students and tourists.

When doing fieldwork in that region of Minas Gerais, I engaged with grassroots politics and examined policy councils, where a combination of civil society (community leaders), government employees and politicians meet to determine or suggest policies in different spheres of government, such as health, public security, housing or education. These spaces are organised by the state and, unsurprisingly – given the politics of avoidance in small towns – state bureaucrats are over-represented (de Souza Santos, 2019a). However, residents who do not participate in those spaces are not politically inactive; they know and engage with the place they inhabit. Understanding why they do not participate in policy meetings even when they have a strong interest to speak up, as well as which other channels may be available to them, was also part of my ethnography.

In this chapter, I will look at community association as a form of grassroots politics. Leaders of community associations do not always have a seat on policy councils. Especially in new housing settlements, the new leadership may not have yet gained a seat; those are limited and usually one leader will represent more than one community. New urban settlements can, however, claim a direct contact to the town hall, as was the case here. In 2013, in Mariana, the general fear of eviction among dwellers of an informal periphery changed into action through community organisation. When actions for change took place, I followed the community in their struggle and organised actions.

Motivation and capacity for political mobilisation

During the commodities boom cycle, Brazil experienced sinking levels of unemployment, but workers, regardless, had a difficult time accessing the costly housing market. Housing prices rose across the country (Paes, Besarria and Silva, 2018) and especially in cities hosting the 2014 FIFA World Cup and in locations such as Ouro Preto and Mariana – mining towns, tourist areas and university centres – as all these sectors were in expansion. In such cities, educated and employed families, who would in the past have access to formal housing, moved to informal peripheries. At the same time, long-term inhabitants of the peripheries had greater access to higher education institutions in Brazil (Neves, 2014) and to formal employment (Menezes-Filho and Scorzafave, 2009). Peripheries became a site of ambiguity where socio-economic improvement on a personal level did not necessarily mean better infrastructure.

Mariana is thus an important site to understand grassroots politics following the commodities boom cycle in Brazil. Besides being a mining and university town – two reasons why living there became increasingly expensive in 2013 –

the city is also home to preserved areas in the centre – with Baroque architecture from the eighteenth century, so these areas cannot respond to mounting housing demands by adapting the built environment. As mining and university activities expanded, more workers and students moved to the town, real estate prices boomed and families enjoying formal employment (*emprego com carteira assinada*) could not easily access bank loans for house purchases unless they had a high income. The rental market was equally selective, with students from the expanding university having priority as students rent rooms and not the entire house. Landlords usually prefer students as they can profit more when renting each individual room instead of the full house for a single family. In that context, the peripheries of the city began to house an expanding working class, with some residents of those areas having access to the main university in town. This group of residents faced not only a precarious housing situation but also a shortage of transportation. As peripheries grew, distances increased and public transport or roads did not respond at the same speed. This combination led to the increased politicisation of that space.

Context has also to be considered, and 2013 showed the power of crowds in Brazil. Protests for better transportation prices gained traction in Brazil's streets in 2013. The June protests, as they became known, showed the impact of an urban population who, to access work, education and leisure, would spend up to 'five hours a day and 30 percent of their income on crowded buses and trains' to navigate across the city (Erber, 2019, p. 39). Transportation shows the difficult pathway, quite literally, towards a better life (Purdy, 2019). It was also a political promise: hosting the expensive games was explained in terms of a transportation legacy to be delivered after the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Rio Olympic Games (Pereira, 2018). When it became clear that investments did not resonate with people's everyday needs and, if anything, it was mainly access to sports venues that was improving, people took to the streets to protest against the increasing price and deteriorating quality of transportation (Hunter and Power, 2019).

The fight for inclusion did not happen around transportation only. Consumption, especially of brand-name clothes, is also a way to fit in. The strolling activists of January 2014 (*rolezinhos*) deserve attention as a movement that fought marginalisation in Brazil's periphery through the ascent of the individual's image, e.g. by wearing more expensive clothes and purchasing luxurious brands (Pinheiro-Machado and Scalco, 2014). Residents from impoverished areas organised visits to exclusive malls, but ended up in police stations and newspaper headlines. Strolling around shopping malls in 2014 was not a deliberate political action. When young, mostly dark-skinned boys and girls from Brazil's peripheries mobilised through social media to gather in some of the most upscale malls in their cities, they did not do so to vandalise symbols of the commodification of leisure, but occupying political spaces had impact. The movement showed the ambiguity of an urban periphery that

aspires to become and mimic (what they think are) styles of dress among the upper class (Erber, 2019; Pinheiro-Machado and Scalco, 2014). This urban periphery was racially distant from the upper class and, despite mimicking the dress code, they were easily recognised by private guards in malls. Malls shut down because of the presence in large numbers of poor young people.

The power of the crowds to improve public transportation collectively or to gain inclusion through consumption on an individual level did indeed play a part in the economic and political turning point of 2013–14 in larger cities (Erber, 2019). Small towns, though without malls and with limited access to and support for the June protests (de Souza Santos, 2019a, pp. 62–4), also fought for inclusion, especially for better public services and tenure rights. And their fight, as we have seen above, did not happen in a social vacuum.

The dreams of inclusion, from better clothes to better transportation and housing tenure, reveal more than generational differences; they show the particularities of cities and the spaces they offer for protest. The June protests in Ouro Preto and Mariana, for example, were far from unanimous; they mainly mobilised students, who have privileged access to housing as described above. Different from mass protests and *rolezinhos*, those on the urban periphery in Mariana protested in their own neighbourhoods rather than the city centre, and the aesthetics of inclusion for them were not on an individual level – instead the demand was a city that ‘looks right’.

Alto do Rosário

For those who live in Mariana, a system of acquaintances shapes both the formal and informal economy. People rely on friends for shopping, house construction and job seeking. In the supermarket, for example, residents may have a tab for shopping, instead of a credit card, to allow them to pay later. The poor do not always have access to credit, and having friends means having credit. However, not only those with low incomes benefit from connections. As this is a touristic city, those working as tour guides or in restaurants, shops and hotels (and even other business as owners) have a strong seasonal variation in income. To cope with income fluctuations and avoid high overdraft fees (*cheque especial*), having a tab in the supermarket is convenient. To make local enemies may thus compromise not only future employment but also economic favours across the city. There is also a domino effect in small cities, where the actions of family members, friends and neighbours reflect badly on those around them. Even for those in formal jobs, such as in public service, there is a risk of ‘going into the freezer’ when politically expressing views that may not be aligned with those in power. Going into the freezer (*ir pra geladeira*) means to be removed from core activities, to be precluded from taking meaningful decisions, to be excluded from management; it means to upset the hegemonic narratives of those in power.

For the above reasons, a common saying in the region is: *Manda quem pode, obedece quem tem juízo*, ‘Those who command do so because they can, those who obey do so because they are sensible’ (de Souza Santos, 2019a). This saying represents the need to avoid direct confrontation to escape political persecution, economic isolation or interference in kinship and friendship ties – often one’s source of economic survival. More than that, this saying epitomises asymmetrical power relations that prescribe social positions as well as political capital (Scott, 1985).

For example, to avoid fines or eviction when living in informal settlements, residents often remain quiet, rather than protesting for services, to avoid calling attention to the irregularity of their settlements. Quietly squatting is one example of getting by in cities with great housing deficits and avoiding confrontations. If invisibility in informal house building can be an important resource for guaranteeing a roof, how do residents go from there to grassroots housing movements?

Alto do Rosário offers the answer. This neighbourhood starts where public transport, garbage collection, electricity, sewage and asphalt end (Figure 6.1). One needs to access the area by foot because for vehicles the uneven, labyrinthine and unnamed alleys offer great obstacles. The uneven streets in Alto do Rosário follow the course of the houses, rather than the other way around. Houses are, however, built to remain. No constructions are temporary: they are made of bricks and concrete. Like in other areas of Brazil, housing settlements start in chaotic ways, with small improvements usually made by residents, until the area – looking somehow ‘right’ – becomes legal and people receive tenure rights, or house papers, as they are known.



Figure 6.1 Alto do Rosário, in Mariana, Brazil. Source: Author’s own collection.

In Alto do Rosário, the demand for provision of public services was always counter-balanced by fear of relocation. When in 2013 two UFOP (Federal

University of Ouro Preto, which has a campus in Mariana) graduates decided to form a community association, they changed fear into action.

For Bianca and Camila (I have altered their names to respect their privacy), a community association would allow for urban transformations. With access to higher education, Bianca was a social services student and Camila a history graduate, and as migrants from larger cities in Brazil to Mariana, they both believed in the power of crowds. To them, local fear was an obstacle to be overcome by trust. Trust, in turn, would be achieved by grassroots ownership of the upgrading process.

Their plan was to prepare a local survey to show the prefecture what life in Alto do Rosário was like: how many people lived there, income patterns among residents (to prove people could pay taxes if they became legal) and safety patterns (poor places are often imagined as violent in Brazil (Holston, 2008, p. 281) which harms house tenure). They designed the questionnaire with the help of UFOP professors in a joint effort by the statistics, social services and architecture faculties. Students visited the area to conduct the survey; a resident always accompanied the student to avoid the fear typical of informal areas: that such questions could be followed by eviction (Figure 6.2).

The questionnaire

Students and residents collected data from more than 300 families (each representing one household). Questions addressed gender, age, civil status, education, religion, income, migration patterns, time living in the neighbourhood, reasons for choosing that location, occupation and perceptions about the housing and living area.² The results showed that most residents migrated to the neighbourhood during Brazil's commodities boom cycle, especially to work in the then-prospering mining sector. Accessing the housing market, however, became unattainable even to families who had more than one person in full-time employment. The questionnaire also exposed the fact that despite the lack of public services, residents had invested in house construction and improvements were constantly being made by homeowners (the neighbourhood did not have a significant number of tenants), believing tenure rights would follow. The large number of properties and the lack of council tax, electricity and water bills – among others – collected, as well as perceptions of safety in the area, became a great tool to press for public services.

2 The questionnaire was applied and analysed by NEASPOC (Núcleo de Estudos Aplicados e Sócio-Políticos Comparados, UFOP/Centre for Applied Socio-Political Comparative Research of the Federal University of Ouro Preto). I joined students during the data collection and had access to the detailed results as well as to the community's celebration of the data being published.



Figure 6.2 Questionnaire interviews in Alto do Rosário. Source: Author's own collection.

With those results in mind, the community leaders started a conversation with the prefecture, and infrastructure in Alto do Rosário gained momentum. Politically, infrastructure is appealing, as for each service provided, there is room for political publicity. As shown in Figure 6.3, the process of urban development in Alto do Rosário was featured in political ads.



Figure 6.3 Political ads promoting infrastructure improvements. Source: Author's own collection.

Nonetheless, despite the successful mobilisation and the subsequent service delivery, the pace of the transformations as well as the negotiation over the

future of the area showed that grassroots mobilisation is no guarantee to having ownership of the upgrading process.

Infrastructure timing

When infrastructure provision started, oddly, the community association lost strength. With the introduction of asphalt, one of the most highly anticipated provisions, some residents sold their houses (which gained value), and most stopped pressing for housing regulation. The importance of transportation is discussed above, and centrifugal growth in cities puts pressure on roads and public transport, as the 2013 protests showed. Other authors have also scrutinised infrastructure and transportation policies in Brazil, focusing on hurried interventions prior to the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games (Genasci, 2012) and the legacies of those events (Pereira, 2018); underperformance and corruption (Armijo and Rhodes, 2017); the Growth Acceleration Programme implemented under the Workers' Party (PT) governments (Mourougane and Pisu, 2011); and transportation costs, which are considered a bottleneck in Brazil's development (Quadros and Nassi, 2015). I add to this literature by analysing the material of roads, and asphalt is a key category of analysis. Because it can speed up transportation as well as reducing the amount of dust that the poor carry in their shoes – a reason for stigmatisation in Brazil, as I have mentioned elsewhere (de Souza Santos, 2019a) – asphalt is politically appealing (Borges, 2003, p. 121). While asphalt is well liked by those providing infrastructure services, there is a lack of discussion about the potential destruction the material generates in community activism. Camila explained her apprehension to me by saying that if asphalt were implemented too early, the community would settle for just that and stop pressing the government for further improvements; they could move out or demobilise, and tenure rights might never follow.

The order in which public services are put in place matters, but the community association was far from being in charge of this. The government laid down asphalt, and some of the apprehensions mentioned above became a reality: other, less visible services, such as sewage and housing papers, lingered unresolved.

Another controversy was related to the university. An important actor in the negotiation between the community and the government, the university arrived before services were put in place. However, when the government began to implement public services, the partnership between these actors weakened. Researchers wanted to design a city plan with open areas and green spaces, but the government prioritised a different list of improvements, valuing first and foremost visual and impactful improvements such as asphalt; for the community leaders, tenure rights were the most important. In addition, students, who received course credits and a small bursary to work in the

neighbourhood as part of their university course, stopped activities when the semester ended. Despite this departure from the university, community leaders remained committed to the delivery of infrastructure and housing papers, but their work in the community association encountered a growing number of challenges.

Community leadership

The two leaders from the community association were women, Black and mixed-race, mothers and migrants. Poverty in Brazil is Black (Perry, 2016, p. 99). Poor and dark-skinned women are particularly at risk from the perils of the city. Accumulating caring and earning demands, women lack a steady routine and for that reason are more susceptible to inefficient public transportation (Chant, 2013; McIlwaine, 2013). Such inefficiency in public transportation impacts on childcare, work and personal security. Nursery provision and public lighting equally impact on women's routines greatly, and fear of crime impacts on access and use of transportation (Koskela and Pain, 2000; Heinrichs and Bernet, 2014). If class cannot be ignored in grassroots politics, as it affects motivation and the capacity for mobilisation, gender should also be a focus of analysis, as the dynamics of women in towns are different from those of men, with women often mediating family interests in the community, or, in other words, the fluid borders between public and private spaces (Perry, 2016).

The fact that dark-skinned women are often in a privileged position to be aware of the problems of their community and know the families inhabiting the area, and may lead community associations, does not, however, mean they will be recognised when in positions of power (Perry, 2016). The two community leaders faced challenges to their posts which included 'jokes' about the lack of time they spent at home, thus implying their relationships with their partners were not going well. They were also tested as migrants; their accent not only signified the reason why they would take the leadership – coming from larger towns, they would not be subdued by the *manda quem pode* – but also caused estrangement, and trust had to be constantly negotiated.

When the first outcomes of the community initiative took place, the leaders used the local school to announce results. The upgrades to the community, however, were publicised by white male faculty members from the university, and not by the leaders themselves. Black women's mobilisation in Alto do Rosário, as well as in Salvador and other places in Brazil, brings to the fore

limited images of Black women . . . although people accustomed to seeing them occupy the support bases of social movements – those masses who participate in community assemblies and street protests – they are not envisioned as leaders. And yet the political organisation of Black urban neighbourhoods has depended largely on the leadership and mass participation of women, who use their local wisdom and social networks

within their communities to galvanize political support when their homes and lands are under siege (Perry, 2016, p. 14).

However, not only the outcomes but also the process matters. Political literacy and a change in the landscape from silence into action in that urban periphery were the immediate results of this community activism. This activism allows us to learn from Mariana and understand the subsequent years in Brazilian politics, from 2013 to 2018.

Learning from small cities

Despite the large number of small and medium towns in Brazil (94 per cent of municipalities have under 100,000 inhabitants), the vast majority of the political economy literature on Brazil focuses on state capitals or metropolitan areas. The no more than 16 municipalities and the Federal District that have more than a million inhabitants occupy most urban and political scholarship, despite representing an urban reality of far less than 1 per cent of Brazil's municipalities. This paper argues that small cities are territorially, demographically and politically meaningful. There is much to be learned from these cities for the rest of the country. The system of networks that shapes both the formal and informal economy makes it difficult for citizens to speak out publicly, as this might create disruptions in their work life. Citizens in positions of privilege may alone hold the ability to strongly express and share their political views in public, dominating and shaping the political discourse. This situation has expanded to state capitals in Brazil.

Especially following 2014 and 2016, when Brazil's economy experienced negative growth (IBGE, 2020b), unemployment and informality have been on the rise. This context leads individuals to a situation of political vulnerability, which was visible during the presidential political campaign in 2018. Even though that campaign was widely spread on social media and Brazilians were to a large extent using their virtual space to declare their political views, the space was not egalitarian. Social media was frightening for those who did not have the privilege of a voice as a citizen without the risk of being identified as a sister, parent, employee or partner. Despite the illusion of anonymity and privacy that fosters expression, previously kept in private, to gain public viewers, the illusion is short-lived. As much as the internet has challenged hegemonic narratives, and in peripheral areas of Brazil demands have been politicised and broadcasted online (Levy, 2018), 'the poor majority are outside of formal mechanisms of rights and claims-making' (Baiochi and Corrado, 2010). Survival strategies leading to silence, as well as the impenetrability of the political world (laws, institutions and a bureaucratic language), make political participation often unattainable (Baiochi and Corrado, 2010). White, male and upper-class Brazilians, not by chance, but by virtue of their position, launched themselves headstrong into social media campaigns during the years of economic crisis

in Brazil. Jair Bolsonaro, now Brazil's president, who attracted most of these voters, had a phenomenally successful social media campaign.

During the twilight of Dilma's impeachment, some public servants were 'sent into the fridge', some asked to change positions, while others, perhaps, built new – still to be examined – activism strategies (Abers, 2019, p. 39). A famous case in the early days of the Bolsonaro administration which marked a new moment when doing one's job may lead to being dismissed was the sacking of Ricardo Galvão, head of the National Institute for Research on the Amazon, after he released an annual report. The data in the report showed an increase in deforestation, and instead of diminishing deforestation, the idea was to diminish comments on it by sacking Galvão (Phillips, 2019). To avoid a similar fate, when Brazilian diplomats wanted to criticise the then Brazilian Foreign Minister Ernesto Araújo and President Bolsonaro's view on Brazil's military dictatorship, they wrote an anonymous letter (*Folha de São Paulo*, 2019). Inhabitants of large cities such as scientists and diplomats, who retain economic, cultural and, for those reasons, also political capital (Cornwall and Shankland, 2013), have started using anonymous confrontation as a form of resistance. This form of defiance, however, has long been typical in small towns. Long-term non-confrontational resistance – such as quietly squatting – shows some of the benefits of silence, before opportunities for direct confrontation emerge.

What this chapter shows is that economic affluence can increase political exposure (Mangonnet and Murillo, 2019). When James Scott (1985) famously wrote on peasant resistance, direct verbal engagement was not among their weapons. Student and labour movements (Dahlum, Knutsen and Wig, 2019) on the other hand, are famous for their capacity to mobilise and sustain mobilisation. In Minas Gerais, economic dependency and political silence are often summarised in the saying: 'those who command do so because they can, those who obey do so because they are sensible' (de Souza Santos, 2019a). Publicly voicing interests, such as demanding better public services in informal urban settlements, is balanced against fear of eviction.

What do residents do when they lack economic affluence and political capital to protest in the face of political injustice? This question should be answered on a case-by-case basis; economic growth, employment stability, gender, race and urban demography matter if we want to understand how indignation is expressed and why it is at times 'swallowed'. Residents in Alto do Rosário, though negatively affected by the commodities boom cycle in housing prices, had employment and study opportunities associated with the mining and university expansion in town; they did not have to *engolir sapo*, which literally means 'to swallow a frog' (Rebhun, 1994), or suppress their anger about poor services in their neighbourhood. With leadership and guidance from the two community leaders and the university, they pressed for improvements. This situation is different from what I have described elsewhere (de Souza Santos, 2019b).

In Ouro Preto's Miguel Burnier, a mining community that faced economic and social decline during the 2000–12 commodity cycle, the community did not freely speak up for their needs. Afraid of housing removal and trying to gain a job at the one company in town, those residents remained apprehensive when they had an opportunity to negotiate infrastructure improvements. The capacity to mobilise is important, as much as it is complex to assess. The economically and intellectually emerging group of residents in Mariana, under the leadership of two migrant women (coming from larger cities and as such unused to the feeling of censorship that comes with life in small towns), organised the community's agenda for urban improvements and achieved infrastructure service provision. The community association did not gain ownership of improvements and they did not set a timeline or sequence for improvements. This analysis, therefore, moves from economic affluence towards gender and race in grassroots leadership.

While recent scholarship with a focus on Latin America has shown the importance of prosperity and membership homogeneity in grassroots politics (Mangonnet and Murillo, 2019), a focus on race and gender shows the limits to capitalising on grassroots activism outcomes. In Alto do Rosário, the leaders, dark-skinned women, were not associated with positions of power (Perry, 2016); they renounced the important opportunity to announce the gains of their mandate to the community. Others announced the results for them. Male university faculty took to the stage and explained to the community the results of the community survey as well as the first upgrades made by the prefecture. They spoke the language of statistics and politics, with the credibility that comes with their race and position; there were no questions as to their place on the stage. In addition, when negotiating with the prefecture, community leaders' schedule for improvements was not followed. Service provision happened, but not at the pace that the association had in mind, which would favour the implementation of less visible services first and not those with more political weight, such as laying down asphalt.

If economic affluence, gender and racial equality matter when it comes to increasing grassroots participation, it is fair to say that we are in a descending curve to achieving greater social mobilisation in Brazil. In early 2020, before the Covid-19 pandemic, some economic numbers had shown signs of improvement (IBGE, 2020b), but the expression of numbers did not account for the experience on the ground: growing informality, inequality and poverty. With Brazil being one of the most severely affected countries by the Covid-19 pandemic, poverty and job insecurity have further increased. In addition, gender and racial politics are not at the top of Bolsonaro's agenda, to put it mildly.

Conclusion

The cycle of prosperity was not equally experienced across Brazil, and locations where commodities were produced were often places of contestation. Mining

areas were impacted by environmental disaster and extraction techniques were not as labour intensive as before and profitable industries are not to be confused with direct jobs and better life quality (de Souza Santos, 2019b). Even in locations that were directly prospering during the commodity cycle years, such as Mariana, a grievance agenda was still present, focusing on access to affordable housing, better infrastructure, access to health centres and better transportation. However, motivation alone does not explain grassroots mobilisation, especially in small towns where people often retreat from public confrontations (*manda quem pode*); however, in a scenario of prosperity and with the leadership of migrant individuals and nodal actors such as the local university, fear gave way to action and Alto do Rosário mobilised. The role of the university, however, was a double-edged sword. Although key in the early stages of data collection, students as well as professors had a timeline set by the university calendar, and some of their involvement could not extend outside term-time. In addition, professors have credibility in the public eye. They used this to present data to the community, which, unintentionally as it might have been, weakened community leaders. Communitarian gains were thereafter limited.

The case of Alto do Rosário is important in discussions of grassroots mobilisation in Brazil in general. When prosperity declines – as it did in Brazil recently – and inequality and poverty levels increase, it is expected that the grievance agenda upsurges. More people depending on public services amid less tax spending on such provisions can only lead to turmoil. And yet, protests in 2015–16 (years of intense economic decline) were nothing like those experienced in 2013. What Alto do Rosário exemplifies, adding to the existing literature, is that to understand political mobilisation it is necessary to bear in mind the costs of protesting (de Souza Santos, 2019a; Mangonnet and Murillo, 2019), because the price of activism can be socially and economically high for vulnerable participants. For that reason, social movements often encourage taking leadership turns to avoid singling out a few individuals as ‘trouble-makers’, and as such, having them punished (de Souza Santos, 2019b; Escoffier, 2018). This chapter seeks to add to the literature on grassroots movements by bringing in other caveats, such as urban demographics, gender and race as important co-variables.

This study also points to the importance of addressing development policies through a temporal prism (Raco, Henderson and Bowlby, 2008). In Alto do Rosário, the implementation of asphalt led to a shortage in community support; asphalt should have followed, not preceded, house regulation.

Looking at political indignation through economic, political, temporal, racial and gender lenses (and their intersectionality, rejecting the separation of these prisms) allows a discussion of the living situation of those who verbally manifest their indignation and of those who do not. We may indeed need to get used to studying silences in the Brazilian grassroots scene. Not only is

economic dependency a great form of oppression, but the Brazilian army and police are also scarcely known for their listening skills – and their representation in the corridors of power is in the ascendant.

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7. Development opportunity or national crisis? The implications of Brazil's political shift for elite philanthropy and civil society organising

Jessica Sklair

The election of Jair Bolsonaro (and events leading up to it) saw Brazil's political landscape transformed, from that of a leading nation in the rise of Latin America's 'pink tide', to the regional embodiment of a global wave of alt-right populist politics. In their analysis of this shift, scholars have tended to focus on either the machinations of the country's political elite or the apparent ideological about-turn among its electorate. Limited attention has been paid to the role and position of Brazil's powerful corporate and financial elite. This chapter will examine the current political scenario through a focus on this group, or more specifically, on those among them who engage in the practice of philanthropy. I will argue that while the philanthropic project of Brazil's national elite has not endorsed the recent political turn, trends seen within it clearly reflect the country's current economic path. In the context of recent events, the fault lines between elite Brazilian philanthropy and alternative projects for social and economic development pursued by organised civil society¹ have become ever more apparent.

In Brazil, elite philanthropic organisations are usually called *institutos* (institutes), and occasionally *fundações* (foundations). Elite philanthropy in Brazil is generally a corporate affair and most *institutos* are run by large Brazilian businesses, many of which are family owned.² Family business *institutos* blur the typical British and North American distinction between 'family' and 'corporate' philanthropy, which is based on a separation between

- 1 The boundaries of the term 'organised civil society' are contested and encompass a diverse range of organisations working for different causes and motivated by different ideological beliefs. In this chapter I use the term to refer to social movements, grassroots civil society organisations and other forms of third-sector activism that have their roots in the progressive non-governmental organisation (NGO) sector that emerged during Brazil's military dictatorship from 1964 to 1985.
- 2 Many foreign multinational corporations also run branches of their philanthropic foundations in Brazil, but my focus in this chapter is on the philanthropy of Brazilian corporations.

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family wealth and corporate wealth that rarely figures in the Brazilian context (see Sklair, 2018). The most reliable source of data on Brazilian philanthropy is the biannual census conducted by GIFE, the Grupo de Institutos, Fundações e Empresas (Group of Institutes, Foundations and Businesses), which counts the country's largest and most influential philanthropic organisations among its members. The 133 respondents to GIFE's last census reported that they invested a total of R\$3.25 billion (£590 million) in 2018, with the most popular causes for philanthropic activity listed as education, professional training for young people, income generation programmes and culture and the arts (GIFE, 2019).

Also in divergence from the British and North American model (but in common with other Latin American countries), most Brazilian foundations are 'operating' rather than 'grant-making'. This means that while most British and North American philanthropy takes the form of grant-making to fund the work of civil society organisations (CSOs) and other third-sector actors, most Brazilian foundations design and run their own philanthropic programmes, either exclusively or alongside grant-making activities. While grant-making does therefore take place in Brazil and has increased in recent years (GIFE, 2019, p. 42), it still tends to be a secondary philanthropic practice for Brazilian foundations. As I will examine in more detail below, this means that elite Brazilian philanthropy has never been a primary source of funding for the country's civil society sector, and has instead pursued a broadly autonomous programme of activity within the country's development landscape.³

Brazilian philanthropists represent a small and comparatively progressive strand of Brazil's corporate and financial elite, and they are deeply committed to tackling the country's development challenges through the activities of their philanthropic foundations. Few among their ranks have explicitly endorsed the recent political shift, and many are profoundly disturbed by the repressive cultural-political turn taken by the country since the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff and the fall from grace of her Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores or PT) in March 2016. I will argue below, however, that the *economic* consequences of the recent shift are very much in the interests of these philanthropists, and the wider corporate and financial networks of which they form part. In addition, recent events have consolidated a political-economic environment in which current trends within elite philanthropy (and the particular aspirations for national development contained in those trends) can thrive. Given these circumstances, there exists little incentive for elite philanthropy to mobilise in opposition to recent events. These political shifts have thus exposed the fault lines between elite philanthropy and the activities of Brazil's social movements and activist CSOs, struggling to

3 There are a handful of elite Brazilian philanthropists who play a key role in supporting social movements and activist CSOs, and whose important work in this respect should be recognised. They are, however, exceptions within the broader landscape of elite philanthropy that is the focus of this chapter.

defend an alternative rights- and justice-based agenda in the context of the recent political turn. In doing so, they have also brought into sharper focus the ‘horizon of (im)possibilities’ that lies ahead for Brazil, as explored in the collective contributions to the current volume. In the distinct visions for Brazilian economic and social development contained in the projects of elite philanthropy and organised civil society, the shifting line between possible and impossible comes clearly into view, even as it is repeatedly redrawn across the country’s unstable political landscape.

This chapter is based on observations during two periods of field research on changing trends in elite Brazilian philanthropy. The first of these comprised eight months of ethnographic fieldwork in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, carried out between 2008 and 2010 as the second term of PT President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (commonly known as Lula) was coming to a close, and just before the election of his successor Dilma Rousseff (known as Dilma). The second comprised two shorter fieldtrips to São Paulo in April and September of 2018, in the lead-up to the election of Jair Bolsonaro in October 2018. My arguments draw on this research alongside broader reflections on the very different consequences of recent political events for, respectively, elite philanthropy and radical civil society organising in Brazil.

I begin this chapter with a short overview of the parallel histories of elite philanthropy and civil society organising in Brazil, which I argue sheds light on Brazilian philanthropy’s reluctance to fund CSOs. In the next section I examine the conceptual distance between Brazil’s elite philanthropic project and the counter-movements for social and economic development pursued over recent decades by the country’s social movements and activist CSOs. I examine how, unlike the rights- and justice-based models promoted by the latter during and after Brazil’s military dictatorship (1964–85), elite philanthropy has pursued an approach to development based on deeper incorporation of the entrepreneurial poor into the country’s capitalist marketplace.

Against this historical backdrop, the second half of this chapter will examine the consequences of recent political and economic shifts for civil society organising, for Brazil’s financial and corporate elite and for elite philanthropy. I begin this part of the chapter with a brief overview of the precarious situation of social movements and civil society organising in the current political climate. I then examine recent events in Brazil from the perspective of financial capital, and the ways in which the deepening financialisation of the Brazilian economy has influenced elite philanthropy. I will argue that recent trends seen in elite philanthropy over the last few years – and particularly the rise of ‘impact investing’, in which philanthropists invest in social businesses in the pursuit of both social impact and financial return – reflect broader processes of financialisation, and emerge as preferred development strategies in the new political and economic climate. In conclusion to this chapter, I return to my argument that while elite philanthropy may not serve as an explicit endorsement

of the recent political turn in Brazil, a closer examination of the influences shaping its practice reveals broad alignment with the economic trends playing out in parallel to shifts within the country's political landscape. The alignment between elite philanthropy and current economic trends contrasts sharply with the situation of civil society organising in this new landscape, thus also revealing the contrasting visions – and horizons of (im)possibility – for national development underlying the projects of elite philanthropists and activist social movements and CSOs.

Elite philanthropy and civil society organising in historical perspective

In order to understand the reasons for elite philanthropy's reluctance to support Brazil's CSOs through grant-making activities, it is useful to examine the conditions under which the latter were first consolidated into an organised sector. Brazil's civil society sector emerged within the politically charged landscape of the country's military dictatorship. Under military rule, growing discontent with the suppression of political and human rights led to the emergence of a wave of small popular movements. Often taking place under the radar of the military government, they took the form of informal community groups, self-organising to meet their own needs in the absence of state provision. These focused on a wide range of issues. While landless workers in the countryside carried out land occupations,⁴ *associações de moradores* (residents' associations) on the outskirts and in the shanty towns (*periferias* and *favelas*) of Brazil's rapidly growing cities held collective *mutirões* to build each other's houses, opened community crèches and organised access to water and electricity (Fernandes, 1994, pp. 42–6). These movements were supported by the Catholic Church, particularly by followers of the progressive liberation theology movement (Fernandes, 1994, pp. 36–42; Landim, 1988, pp. 30–58). The first wave of Brazilian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (although they didn't adopt this terminology until later on) began to appear on this scene in the mid-1970s. These small, informal organisations were created by middle-class intellectuals opposed to the military dictatorship, many of whom were engaged in resistance activities or had recently returned from political exile abroad (Landim, 1998, pp. 40–4). The NGOs they created were designed to support the popular movements outlined above, providing them with technical and financial *assessoria* (assistance or advice).

Brazil's emerging NGO sector and the country's older institutions of local elite philanthropy, however, were characterised by radically different aims and ideologies. Elite philanthropy at this time was channelled through a

4 Land occupations during the 1970s foregrounded the emergence of the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), the Brazilian Landless Workers' Movement (see Wright and Wolford, 2003).

variety of projects. These included support for religious charitable institutions such as Brazil's network of Santa Casa hospitals, the charitable projects of commercially successful immigrants directed towards poor members of their own communities (such as the prestigious hospitals run by São Paulo's wealthy Syrian-Lebanese and Jewish elites), and the activities of early Brazilian business foundations, run by human resources departments and designed to provide benefits to company employees. While the military state cultivated close relations with the corporate philanthropic elite behind these projects, the identity of the emerging NGO sector was – as discussed above – defined explicitly in opposition to the state (Fernandes, 1994, p. 129). Local elite philanthropy was not therefore a significant source of funding for Brazil's early NGOs. These organisations depended instead on the funding and institutional support of foreign NGOs and philanthropic foundations, which in Brazil was termed *cooperação internacional* (international cooperation). Major British funders at this time were the religious development NGOs Cafod and Christian Aid and the secular NGO Oxfam, and funders in the USA included the Ford, Kellogg, Rockefeller and MacArthur Foundations (Fernandes, 1994, pp. 80–2).

The NGO sector played an important part in the collapse of Brazil's military dictatorship in 1985, and quickly assumed a central role in the building of Brazil's new democracy. By the early 1990s, NGOs had gained extensive visibility and influence in Brazil, and increased state funding for their activities – a radical change in status from the semi-clandestine militancy of ten years earlier. Brazil's new political landscape also created the conditions for the emergence of new forms of elite philanthropy and corporate social responsibility (CSR) programmes. The advent of a new era of democratic politics and neoliberal economic policy had seen significant deregulation of business activity. Unfettered by state control, the Brazilian business sector could now concentrate on building a strong capitalist economy under the newly democratised state, and wider involvement in social issues was seen as an important element of this project. In particular, investment and intervention in education was considered a national priority, as a better-educated society would lead to a more skilled and productive workforce, and thus to economic growth (Agüero, 2005; Sanborn, 2005; Rossetti, 2010).

The Brazilian elite's new interest in social issues, however, did not extend to those on the agendas of the NGOs and social movements founded under military rule, which continued to rely predominantly during this period on funding from foreign NGOs and development agencies. This reliance on foreign donors was soon to become a problem for Brazilian NGOs, as improved economic performance and democratic stability during the 1990s and early 2000s saw Brazil lose its status as a priority country for international development funding, leading to significant withdrawal of funding streams. In preparation for their departure, some of these foreign funders began to

train Brazilian NGOs in techniques for the diversification of local funding sources (Daniliauskas and Gouveia, 2010, p. 34), and in parallel, they also began to explicitly support the consolidation of Brazil's (closely related) CSR and institutionalised philanthropy sectors. Most notable among these funders were the Kellogg and Ford Foundations and the Synergos Institute (all North American foundations), Avina (Swiss entrepreneur Stephan Schmidheiny's foundation) and the US government's Inter-American Foundation, who all provided seed funding, formed partnerships and funded research into Brazilian CSR and elite philanthropy at this time (Fernandes, 1994, p. 99; Falconer and Vilela, 2001, p. 13; Rossetti, 2010, p. 276).

By the mid-2000s, CSR and philanthropic organisations in Brazil formed part of a wide network of international funders, foundations, NGOs, universities, think tanks and research centres. This network was explicitly global in its objectives, and Brazilian advocates of CSR and corporate philanthropy have enthusiastically adopted what Garsten and Jacobsson (2011, p. 381) have identified as a discourse on CSR's globality or 'worldism', reflected in the common pursuit of a homogenisation of standards and norms for its practice. Despite growing calls from Brazilian CSOs for more local funding of their activities in the wake of the withdrawal of international funders, however, this burgeoning philanthropy sector showed little sign of stepping in to take the place of its foreign partners. Instead (as mentioned above), the Brazilian philanthropy sector was rapidly consolidating its own form of operating (rather than grant-making) philanthropy, based on the design and rollout of its own philanthropic programmes. These in-house philanthropy programmes bore little resemblance to the rights and social justice development initiatives pursued by many in Brazil's civil society sector. Instead, these programmes were usually founded on the premise that solutions to Brazil's development problems were to be found within the expanding neoliberal market economy, particularly in its provision of economic 'opportunities' and its fostering of entrepreneurialism among the poor.

Brazilian philanthrocapitalism and the fashioning of the entrepreneurial poor

In this section I will draw on ethnographic research carried out among elite philanthropists and their foundations in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro between 2008 and 2010. Much of the elite philanthropy I observed during this time was predicated on the idea that by providing the right 'opportunities', philanthropists could aid the poor in lifting themselves out of poverty. In the programmes I observed in Brazilian philanthropic foundations, such opportunities usually took the form of educational or professional training activities that would improve participants' chances of finding paid employment in the formal job market. By accessing formal employment opportunities, it

was assumed that the poor participants in these programmes would become able to support themselves and their families, and to increase their capacity for consumption. Philanthropic programmes designed in this vein took on a variety of forms. These included training programmes for work in areas such as hospitality and the service sector, and the promotion of small-scale income generation projects and business initiatives designed to create new markets for the poor. In an article on new forms of Brazilian philanthropy, Marcos Kisil (2006, p. 6), one of Brazil's most prominent philanthropy advisors, explained that 'the redistribution of wealth takes place when marginalised groups are stimulated to create income generation projects. In this case, philanthropic funding works as a lever for new business opportunities, generating wealth and a new circuit of accumulation.'

At this time, this approach to philanthropy was also common to the new global breed of elite philanthropists working under the banner of 'philanthrocapitalism'. Although most commonly associated with widely recognised philanthropists such as Bill and Melinda Gates and Mark Zuckerberg, the term philanthrocapitalism was first coined in 2008 by *Economist* journalist Matthew Bishop and Michael Green, ex-head of communications at the UK's Department for International Development, in their book of the same name (Bishop and Green, 2008). Based on the idea that philanthropists were leading a new movement of social change via the application of corporate practices to the solution of social problems, these authors placed the philanthrocapitalist firmly in the ranks of the transnational corporate elite, and grounded their arguments explicitly in the political and cultural ideology of global capitalism. The philanthropic strategies promoted by this movement are based on the assumption that the most effective way to further development aims is by further entrenching the capitalist project – and by entrenching the poor more deeply within it.

The practices and premises of philanthrocapitalism have been critiqued from a number of perspectives, ranging from examination of the hubristic claim that business can offer superior solutions to global development challenges (Edwards, 2010) to analysis of how philanthrocapitalism serves to legitimise the accumulation of wealth among the super-rich (McGoey and Thiel, 2018). Particularly striking during my research in Brazil, however, were the ways in which philanthrocapitalist discourse intersected with ideas about philanthropy's role in encouraging entrepreneurialism among the poor. Central to many of the philanthropic programmes I observed in Brazil was the idea that the opportunities offered by philanthropy can only lift people out of poverty if they are approached with the right attitude; the poor beneficiaries of philanthropy were expected to display high levels of entrepreneurialism and to apply motivation and individual effort to the project of their own transformation. Responsibility was thus placed on the beneficiaries of philanthropy for lifting themselves out of the conditions of poverty, and philanthropic programmes

were tasked not only with the provision of opportunities for the integration of the poor into Brazil's formal economy, but also with teaching and encouraging values of entrepreneurship and motivation to their participants.

These ideas can be seen in an example from the philanthropic foundation of a leading Brazilian asset management and investment banking firm that I visited during my research in São Paulo. In the foundation's annual report, a photograph and quote showcased a successful example of the process of philanthropic 'transformation' from dependent poverty to proactive economic inclusion. The photograph featured a participant in one of the foundation's programmes, which offered training for jobs in the hospitality sector to young people. Previously unemployed, one of the programme's beneficiaries was pictured proudly at work in her new job as a waitress in a cafe, dressed in the cafe's uniform, holding a tray laden with coffee and snacks and smiling broadly. The caption under the photo stated that 'Alexandra' was 'now employed, and very happy', and quoted her as follows: 'I feel like I took advantage of all the opportunities, because I used to feel weak and like I didn't have the means to achieve anything. But just look at what happened: now I feel strong and able to achieve what I want to with my own will and perseverance. Today, I'm a new Alexandra' (Instituto Hedging-Griffo, 2007, p. 26).

In São Paulo, one Brazilian philanthropist that I interviewed elaborated on this notion of the personal effort required for the transcendence of poverty, stressing that philanthropy can only go so far in providing opportunities for this highly individualised endeavour. He told me, 'I'm here to help people make their dreams come true, [but] not everyone's . . . I'm not going to go around [the shanty town] banging on everyone's door . . . It's got to be for people who want to get themselves out of this situation. Because just like in all social classes, there are people who are interested in their own evolution and people who aren't.'⁵ Similar ideological approaches to the alleviation of poverty through entrepreneurial self-transformation have been noted by scholars such as Kohl-Arenas (2016) in her study of philanthropic programmes in California's Central Valley, and in work on Bottom of the Pyramid (BoP)⁶ initiatives such as that carried out by Dolan and Rajak (2016) and Dolan and Roll (2013) in sub-Saharan Africa. These programmes reflect conceptual shifts in international development over recent decades, from earlier macro-economic approaches based on the implementation of structural adjustment policies to a market-based approach posited on the entrepreneurial potential of the world's poor to create and sustain new global markets.

5 Quotation reproduced from an earlier research project carried out in São Paulo (see Sklair, 2010, pp. 217–18).

6 The BoP model seeks to access the 'fortune at the bottom of the pyramid' (Prahalad and Hart, 2002) by tapping into frontier markets among the poor with products and services designed for their needs and priced within their economic means, while also creating opportunities for the 'entrepreneurial poor' in the marketing of these products.

While the ideological framework underlying Brazilian philanthropic discourse thus attributes the country's development challenges to a lack of economic opportunities and to individual behaviours and attitudes among the poor, those leading the country's social movements and progressive CSOs have located the roots of these challenges elsewhere. For these grassroots activists, Brazil's social problems are the result of the country's unequal economic and social structures, widespread tolerance of human rights abuse and disregard for issues of social justice (see e.g. Mendonça, Alves and Nogueira, 2016; Araújo and Junqueira, 2018). I suggest that this ideological mismatch goes far in explaining Brazilian philanthropy's continued resistance to supporting the work of local social movements and CSOs, even as events of recent years have seen many of these movements and organisations plunged into crisis. In the second half of this chapter I will give a brief overview of this crisis, before returning to the question of elite philanthropy's lack of mobilisation in support of civil society organising in the current political landscape.

Civil society organising in the shifting political climate

While Brazil's PT governments introduced significant changes in social policy, particularly through the roll out of welfare initiatives such as the *Bolsa Família* conditional cash transfer programme, the expansion of access to higher education, improved labour rights and increases in the minimum wage, these did not live up to the expectations for deeper structural reform held by many within the country's CSOs and social movements. Many members of these movements and organisations had been closely connected to the PT during its formation and early history, helping to define the Party's agenda and bring it to power with Lula's presidential election in late 2002. These civil society actors were thus disappointed to find themselves granted limited opportunities to engage with the new government. By the end of Lula's first term in office, Hochstetler (2008, p. 34) notes that CSOs had 'abandoned the presumption that a PT government will resolve all their problems and now are looking for alternative conceptions of how they might interject their views into national politics'. Such hopes for greater incorporation into the political landscape, however, were to be further dashed by what was to come.

If many civil society actors found their demands falling on deaf ears under the administrations of Lula and Dilma, the period since Dilma's impeachment in 2016 has been one of increasing direct repression of CSOs and social movements by both state and non-state actors. Amnesty International (2019b) has reported that Brazil is now 'one of the most dangerous countries in the Americas for human rights defenders, and . . . the riskiest in the world for defenders of human rights relating to land or the environment'. In particular, social movements and NGOs engaged in long-term projects for the articulation of alternative social models based on social and economic

justice have increasingly come under attack. Members of the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), Brazil's widespread Landless Workers' Movement, have suffered growing numbers of arrests and murders, with 71 violent deaths of people involved in land conflict recorded in 2017 (Human Rights Watch, 2019; Silva, 2019). Similarly, the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Teto (MTST), the urban housing movement now active in 14 Brazilian states, has seen rising incidence of arrests and intimidation (Fox, 2019).

CSOs promoting the protection of Brazil's most vulnerable populations have fared equally badly during this period. Those working to prevent gender-based violence, for example, have been frustrated by the lack of implementation of the landmark Maria da Penha law, which – after years of campaigning by CSOs – introduced more stringent measures against domestic violence in 2006. Reduced government funding also saw the closure in 2017 of 23 shelters for women and children at risk of violence, leaving only 74 shelters in a country that officially registered 1,133 femicides in the same year (Human Rights Watch, 2019; see also *Jornal Nacional*, 2019). The period since 2016 has also been characterised by a broad trend towards the criminalisation of poverty. Following interim President Michel Temer's decision to transfer the policing of Rio de Janeiro and its violent drug trade to the military in 2018, Amnesty International (2019a) reports that 1,249 people were killed at the hands of the state in Rio in 2019, 'the highest amount since records began in 1998'. The majority of these killings have been of young, Black men in the city's impoverished *favelas* (shanty towns).

For his part, incoming President Jair Bolsonaro made clear his own approach to human rights and progressive civil society activity shortly after his success in the first round of the presidential elections in October 2018, when he labelled social movements a form of 'terrorism' and pledged to 'end activism in Brazil' if elected to office. This statement provoked an open letter from three thousand NGOs and social movements, expressing concern for their freedom as enshrined in the Brazilian Constitution (see Conectas, 2018). Such objections, however, had little effect and Bolsonaro's first year in office saw various moves to reform legislation designed to protect human rights. These were accompanied by a rise in rhetoric on the part of the president and those close to him against diverse marginalised populations, including indigenous groups and the LGBT+ community. INCRA, the government's National Institute of Colonisation and Agrarian Reform, attempted (unsuccessfully) to evict the MST's largest rural training centre (Valadares, 2019), and across the board, state monitoring of activist organising began to rise, as did incidences of hate crime and threatening behaviour directed towards social movements and the CSOs that support them (personal communications to the author; see also Amnesty International, 2019b; Fox, 2019). Most emblematic of the crackdown on human rights activism in Brazil in the period leading up to and following the election of Bolsonaro, however, was the professional killing

of Rio city councillor and activist Marielle Franco. An outspoken critic of violence against women and Black and LGBT+ communities, and of police brutality in Rio's *favelas* like the one in which she was brought up, Franco was gunned down alongside her driver by two ex-military policemen on her way home from giving a speech in March 2018.

It is possible to imagine that the precarious situation in which Brazil's social movements and CSOs now find themselves might have spurred the country's elite philanthropists to put aside their ideological differences, and come to the aid of those grassroots actors concerned with the issues of social development and the alleviation of poverty that ostensibly occupy their own philanthropic foundations. While the historical differences between elite philanthropy and civil society organising outlined in the first half of this chapter go some way towards explaining why philanthropy has not mobilised in support of these movements, further analysis of two factors – to which I will now turn – adds to our understanding of philanthropy's reticence in this respect. The first concerns the ways in which the economic interests of Brazil's wealthy elites have been served by the deepening financialisation of the economy over the last two decades, and the second concerns the ways in which these trends for financialisation have directly influenced the landscape of elite philanthropy, taking the elite's philanthropic project even further away from the alternative projects for social development promoted by Brazil's social movements and CSOs.

The Brazilian elite and the rise of financial capital

Even before he was elected to office, Lula had made clear his intentions of combining a progressive social welfare agenda with a corporate-friendly economic policy. Attempting to assuage fears within the national business community about the potential economic consequences of a left-wing political shift, Lula issued an open letter to the Brazilian people in June 2002. This reassured financial markets and investors that he was committed to maintaining the conservative economic policy of his predecessors if he were to be elected in the upcoming presidential elections. True to Lula's word, the PT's economic agenda over its three terms in government amounted broadly to what has since been described as a 'poverty-reducing variety of neoliberalism' (Loureiro, 2019) and the lion's share of the financial gains brought about by Brazil's economic boom was channelled directly into the pockets of the financial and corporate elite. The Brazilian stock exchange grew by 523 per cent during Lula's time in office, delivering enormous gains to shareholders (Anderson, 2011, p. 8) and the early 2000s saw growth in the numbers of new millionaires, private helicopters and security guards in Brazil (Oliveira, 2006, pp. 17–18).

These elite gains were in large part due to the deepening financialisation of the Brazilian economy over recent decades, a period in which finance has

become the strongest faction of capital in Brazil. This process has seen the growing influence of financial markets and institutions, delivering rising profits to investors, traders in financial assets and those engaged in other rentier activities. As Perry Anderson (2016, p. 3) has noted:

The combined capitalisation of [Brazil's] two largest private banks, Itaú and Bradesco, is now twice that of Petrobras and Vale, its two biggest extractive firms, and far sounder. The fortunes of these and other banks have been made from the highest long-term interest regime in the world – crippling for investors, manna for rentiers – and staggering spreads between deposits and loans, with borrowers paying anything from five to twenty times the cost of the same money to lenders. Flanking this complex is the sixth largest bloc of mutual and pension funds in the world, not to speak of the biggest investment bank in Latin America, and a swarm of private equity and hedge funds.

Boosted by these staggering interest rates, financial capitalisation has become a key source of income not just for banks, but also for corporate elites within Brazil's older factions of capital, including agribusiness, industry and commerce. Brazilian sociologist Jessé Souza (2019, p. 174) has drawn attention to the fact that these elite financiers now count the public budget among their most lucrative assets. Under the PT rentier incomes from payments on the public debt, received mostly by an estimated ten to fifteen thousand Brazilian families, accounted for 6 to 7 per cent of GDP or US\$120 billion annually. In contrast, spending on the *Bolsa Família* accounted for 0.5 per cent of GDP, or around US\$6–9 billion annually (Anderson, 2011, p. 8). Meanwhile, Brazil's deeply regressive tax system has ensured that the wealthy contribute proportionally far less than the poor to the state budget and the servicing of its debts – and this of course when the wealthy meet their fiscal obligations. Souza (2019, p. 173) draws attention to the scale of tax evasion in Brazil, which in 2018 accounted for R\$345 billion of lost revenue for the state.⁷ In the comparative light of the nearly R\$1 billion recuperated (by mid-2017) as a result of the *Lava Jato* corruption investigations (Janot, 2017), Souza (2019, pp. 173–4) argues that the economic significance of political corruption in Brazil dwindles alongside the various mechanisms for the capture of capital by the elite, and their crippling consequences for the Brazilian state. In addition, Lena Lavinas has explored how financialisation also shaped social policy under the PT. Like other conditional cash transfer programmes popular throughout Latin America at this time, the *Bolsa Família* depended on a vision of social inclusion based not on increased provision of public services, but on deeper integration of the poor into the Brazilian economy of consumption. Alongside the rapid expansion of consumer credit, the *Bolsa Família* has thus seen the Brazilian state become the

7 Data supplied by the National Union of the Counsel for the Federal Treasury (Sindicato Nacional dos Procuradores da Fazenda Nacional) and reported in an online article by *Economia Ao Minuto* (2019).

guarantor for a financialised programme of debt-fuelled consumption among the poor (Lavinás, 2013, 2018).

If economic, fiscal and even social policy under the PT were broadly aligned with trends for deepening financialisation, things have only got better for the financial elite with the fall of the left. Dilma's impeachment in 2016 saw the installation of interim President Michel Temer (formerly Dilma's vice-president). During the eighteen months of his tenure, Temer successfully dismantled much of the progressive social policy put in place by his predecessors, as well as pushing through deregulatory reform of the *Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho* (CLT), Brazil's labour legislation package. Of even greater benefit to the country's elite, however, was Temer's passing of the constitutional amendment PEC 55. This limited growth in annual federal expenditure to the inflation rate of 2016 until 2037, thereby freezing public spending for 20 years. In effect, PEC 55 guarantees payment of the public debt to the state's financiers (Souza, 2019, p. 174), thus taking state support for the interests of financial capital to a level far beyond that seen under the PT administration, while further restricting the state's capacity to respond to escalating social need among the poor (Prandini Assis, 2016; Carta Capital, 2016).

In the new political era cemented by the election of Jair Bolsonaro in 2018, the financial elite look set to further deepen their grip on the national economy. On gaining office, Bolsonaro's Finance Minister Paulo Guedes (a Chicago-trained economist who taught in Chile during the Pinochet regime and later co-founded BTG Pactual, Brazil's largest private investment bank) set out an orthodox neoliberal vision for Brazilian economic policy, including plans for tax reform and further privatisation of state assets. Brazil's fiscal crisis and attempts to placate the concerns of international investors have provided further legitimation for a retreat from investment in social policies. Civil society organisations have seen cuts in funding from government sources, deepening a funding crisis already exacerbated by the steady reduction in international development aid over the last two decades (Mendonça, Alves and Nogueira, 2016). In the final section of this chapter, I explore the ways in which these trends have been mirrored in the emergence of new practices in Brazil's elite philanthropy sector over the last decade. I argue that, while it will be catastrophic for many of the country's social movements and CSOs, the current political and economic landscape may well be one in which these new philanthropic practices will thrive.

The financialisation of Brazilian philanthropy

As outlined above, elite Brazilian philanthropy in the first decade of the twenty-first century was posited on the capacity of the entrepreneurial poor to effect their own social and economic development, through greater incorporation into the precarious marketplace of the national capitalist project. In line with

economic trends among the country's corporate and financial elite, however, the decade from 2010 saw the emergence of new trends within the country's philanthropy sector. In this section, I will argue that these trends reflect ambitions for the financialisation of philanthropy itself.

Shifts seen in the Brazilian philanthropy sector during this time are part of a wider global trend, defined by Emma Mawdsley (2016, p. 265) as 'a distinctive acceleration and deepening of the financialisation-development nexus'. This, in turn, is one (increasingly, the defining) aspect of the changing role of business in international development, in which private-sector actors have been called upon to provide both market-based development policy solutions and the financing necessary to implement them. The corporate sector thus played a significant role in designing the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015 (Scheyvens, Banks and Hughes, 2016), and UNCTAD (the UN Conference on Trade and Development) has claimed that private finance will be essential to meeting an estimated US\$2.5 trillion annual funding gap for achieving them (UNCTAD, 2018). In the conception of Michael Blowfield and Catherine Dolan (2014), the role of business has now shifted from that of a 'development actor' to a 'development agent'.

As the development industry had increasingly turned towards the private sector to help shape and fund its activities, so too have the logics of financialisation permeated development discourse and practice. This trend has seen the task of foreign aid redefined as one of leveraging private capital into new investment opportunities, providing development outcomes alongside financial incentives to investors (Carroll and Jarvis, 2014, p. 538; Mawdsley et al., 2017). In parallel, the development industry has seen the emergence of new forms of public-private partnership (Bayliss and Waeyenberge, 2018), a proliferation of new investment mechanisms and financial technologies (fintech) (Gabor and Brooks, 2017) and multiple variations of microfinance (Roy, 2010), green finance (Scales, 2015) and blended finance.

Among these new development finance models sits 'impact investing', a practice at the forefront of recent trends in the elite Brazilian philanthropy sector. Impact investing sees individual and institutional investors – including multilateral aid agencies, philanthropic foundations, wealthy individuals and family offices – invest capital into social businesses and Bottom of the Pyramid initiatives, in the pursuit of both 'social impact' and financial return. Impact investing is a fast-growing global trend, already attracting considerable financial resources around the world. In 2019, the Global Impact Investing Network estimated the value of the impact investing market at over US\$502 billion (GIIN, 2019) and the B Corporation initiative, which provides certification for social businesses – the main recipients of impact investing – had certified more than three thousand companies across 71 countries.⁸

8 See <<https://bcorporation.net/>> (accessed 30 March 2021).

Over the last decade, Brazil has emerged as a regional hub for experiments in both social enterprise and impact investing. The country's impact investing market is small but growing; in 2016–17 a survey conducted in Brazil by the Aspen Network of Development Entrepreneurs (ANDE) recorded 69 impact investment deals totalling US\$131 million, and US\$343 million of assets under management dedicated to impact investing (ANDE, 2018, p. 10). Providing investment opportunities for this market, 122 social businesses held certification in 2018 from Sistema B (the Brazilian affiliation of B Corporation) (GIFE, 2018). This market represented a diversity of private and institutional investors, both Brazilian and foreign, investing in a range of local social enterprises, particularly in the fields of information and communication technology, education, health, financial inclusion, housing, renewable energy and biodiversity conservation (ANDE, 2018, p. 11). The discourse surrounding impact investment in Brazil clearly reflects ambitions for the financialisation of philanthropy. During an interview carried out in São Paulo in 2018, one wealth manager explained to me that earlier models for philanthropy always involved the loss of capital, whereas impact investing means 'I can give [the investor] the chance to recuperate all or part of this capital, which is an idea that, until recently, wasn't part of the philanthropic mindset . . . So now I'm saying to families, "Look, you can make money by doing good."' In parallel, the website of one of Brazil's leading social business 'incubators' promotes the message: 'Between making money and changing the world, choose both.'⁹

The financialising logics inherent to impact investing also dictate that investors must turn to the creation of metrics and tools for the measurement of social impact and environmental sustainability alongside financial profits. In this, impact investors follow financial modellers working at the service of diverse development initiatives – particularly in the arena of microfinance – through which poverty itself is financialised (Schwittay, 2014; Roy, 2010, p. 31) and defined in terms of globalised metrics. The imperative for rendering 'social impact' both scalable and financially accountable has thus seen social businesses and impact investors prioritise areas of development amenable to the application of technology and the measurement of results. In Brazil, this has led to a proliferation of social businesses providing microfinance schemes, solar panels and other alternative energy systems, and tech solutions for education and healthcare. Leading examples include Geekie, which builds bespoke online educational tools for use in classrooms and claims to have reached more than 12 million students,¹⁰ and Dr Consulta, a low-cost healthcare provider. Drawing on digitalised patient data and machine learning algorithms, Dr

9 See <<https://artemisia.org.br/quemsomos/>> (accessed 30 March 2021).

10 See <<https://www.geekie.com.br/sobre-a-geekie/>> (accessed 30 March 2021).

Consulta operates through private walk-in clinics on the high street and has a customer base of over a million patients (Crichton, 2018).

In its redefinition of philanthropic practice to encompass capital investment into social businesses such as these, Brazilian impact investing thus emerges as a form of financialised philanthropy. Through their endorsement of impact investment and related practices, Brazilian philanthropic elites demonstrate their commitment to the deepening financialisation of the economy, promoting the idea that financial capitalisation holds the key not only to economic growth but also to the achievement of social development outcomes on a national scale.

Conclusions

This chapter has explored how an analysis of elite philanthropy might contribute to debates on recent and unexpected shifts within Brazil's political landscape. Taking as my starting point the ambiguous position of the country's philanthropic elite, who have been broadly tolerant of recent political events despite not offering a wholehearted endorsement of the new political climate, I have examined the parallel but distinct projects for national development pursued by elite philanthropy and organised civil society during and since the fall of the country's military dictatorship. Building on this historical perspective, I have explored the consequences of political events since Dilma's impeachment in 2016 for civil society organising and elite philanthropy respectively. I have argued that while the country's political shift to the alt-right has resulted in wide-scale oppression and intimidation of Brazil's social movements and activist CSOs, it has created an environment that has been both favourable to the economic interests of the corporate and financial elite, and broadly conducive to their pursuit of new philanthropic practices. Unlike the alternative rights- and justice-based models for social development promoted by organised civil society, recent philanthropic trends such as impact investing aspire to the financialisation of philanthropy, in line with broader trends for the deepening financialisation of the Brazilian economy. I have thus argued that, in a continuation of the historical fissions characterising the relationship between elite philanthropy and civil society organising in Brazil, recent trends towards the financialisation of philanthropy do not emerge as a movement towards greater philanthropic support of Brazil's social movements and CSOs. Instead, these trends appear to run counter to the possibility of future forms of collaboration between these sectors and their divergent aspirations for national development, or of the mobilisation of the philanthropic elite in resistance to the political and economic scenario currently playing out in Brazil.

As this chapter goes to press, uncertainties around the future of Brazil's CSOs and social movements have been thrown even more sharply into relief by the Covid-19 pandemic sweeping the planet. Brazil's underfunded public health system, alongside Bolsonaro's denial of the severity of the crisis

and adamant refusal to mount a concerted national response, have seen the pandemic rip through the population with devastating effects, both aided by and exacerbating existing social and economic inequalities (Phillips, 2021). As many working in Brazil's organised civil society sector have noted, this could be an ideal moment for elite philanthropy to reconsider its relationship with rights-based CSOs and social movements (Krämer, Hopstein and Mahomed, 2020). Given the historical and ideological barriers to greater collaboration between these sectors, however, and a political climate broadly hostile to attempts to overcome them, it remains to be seen whether this (im)possibility is on the horizon.

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8. Politics and collective mobilisation in post-PT Brazil

Jeff Garmany

When it comes to Brazilian historical figures, few are as compelling as the great Dr Sócrates.¹ Named after the Greek philosopher, trained as a medical doctor, famous for his football talents, legendary for bacchanalia, Sócrates was also a key political activist during the final years of Brazil's military dictatorship (1964–85). In addition to participating with the *Direitas Já* protests for direct presidential elections in 1984, Sócrates worked to develop 'Corinthians Democracy', a radical movement within his São Paulo-based football club that was openly critical of the military government. Beyond simply challenging the authoritarian cultures of Brazilian football and politics, Corinthians Democracy was an ideological movement committed to equal rights and horizontal decision-making. It called attention to political tyranny in Brazil and argued that everyone should have an equal say in democratic processes.

As Andrew Downie (2017) notes, however, the actual practice of Corinthians Democracy may not have been so egalitarian. Many of the players shied away from expressing their opinions, deferring instead to team leaders they considered more knowledgeable (viz., Sócrates). As told by Zé Maria, a star defender for Corinthians, 'We knew very little about democracy . . . We wanted a democracy but we didn't really understand it, we weren't aware what it was' (Downie, 2017, p. 200). In this way, one could argue that Corinthians Democracy foreshadowed what would later characterise Brazilian democracy

1 Sócrates was well known for his Apollonian and Dionysian personality traits. As just one example, in 1984, he stated publicly that if Brazil's congress would not pass a constitutional amendment allowing for direct elections, he would leave Brazil to play abroad. When Brazil's military dictatorship killed the amendment, Sócrates, true to his word, left Corinthians to play for Fiorentina in Italy. His Apollonian side was committed to political activism, but, as Andrew Downie notes, his Dionysian side was equally committed to shenanigans: 'On the first official day at his new club Sócrates joined his teammates for a thorough preseason medical. As he waited to step on the treadmill for respiratory and cardiology tests, he calmly lit up a cigarette and started puffing away. The team doctor walked in and could hardly believe his eyes. "What are you doing smoking? We're about to test your breathing!" he cried. "But, Doctor, I'm warming up my lungs for the exam," Sócrates deadpanned. His teammates fell about laughing and the doctor stormed out in disgust' (Downie, 2017, p. 235).

J. Garmany, 'Politics and collective mobilisation in post-PT Brazil' in *A Horizon of (Im)possibilities: A Chronicle of Brazil's Conservative Turn*, ed. K. Hatzikidi and E. Dullo (London, 2021), pp. 181–200. License: CC BY-NC-ND 4.0.

more generally, where clientelism and asymmetric power relations folded into democratic processes of voting and politics (see e.g. Gay, 1990, 1994). Like elsewhere in Latin America, voting became not so much an expression of one's own political will, but rather a form of exchange, where in return for conceding authority to someone else, one could count on something in return (cf. Auyero, 2000, 2007). For many in the working and lower classes, this is how state engagement works: not on supposedly equal terms, but through intermediary actors that, provided they deliver on specific promises, are deferred to in political decision-making processes (cf. Brysk, 2000).

Why is this important for considering politics and collective mobilisation in Brazil today?² First, as I argue in this chapter, Brazil's 2018 presidential election may signal a pivotal moment in the country's democracy, whereby long-held, vertically assembled political networks are beginning to break down. To be clear, this is not to say that what comes next will be better, but instead to suggest that the end of the Workers' Party (PT) era, and the rise of Jair Bolsonaro, *may* signal a fundamental shift in the way people engage with politics, voting and the state. This is likely to have profound implications for the left – and also for the right – for years to come. And, second, if indeed Brazil's political landscape is shifting, what might this mean for collective action and progressive social movements in the twenty-first century? Again, my arguments are tentative, but here I speculate that in the current era of post-PT governance, where state–society linkages are very much in flux (Saad-Filho, 2018) – and new communication technologies are changing processes of collective mobilisation (Joia, 2016) – the current moment may be a watershed for Brazilian social movements, both in the ways they organise and communicate, as well as how they interact with the state.

To better explore these arguments, this chapter is animated by three overarching questions. First, as I consider in the next section, does Brazil's 2018 presidential election represent more than just a political loss for the PT, and signal, instead, a downward trend for the party? In other words, and very fundamentally, is Brazil now entering a post-PT era? Second, if indeed it is fair to say that Brazil faces a post-PT future, what will become of the Brazilian left? For decades, the PT has been the political centre of gravity for the left (Miguel, 2019); so how might the left organise politically if not through the PT? And

2 Along with his involvement with Corinthians Democracy, there are additional reasons to remember Sócrates when considering the Brazilian left. Sócrates was not only a hero to leftist football fans: he was in many ways a tragic hero in the Aristotelian sense. In 1982, he helped lead what many consider the best ever World Cup team *not* to win the World Cup. Refusing to compromise their free-flowing and improvisational style of play, they lost a heart-breaking match to Italy in the quarter-finals. Then, only two years later, at the peak of his career, Sócrates kept his promise to leave Brazil and play abroad when direct elections were not reinstated by the military dictatorship. But that marked the beginning of the end for him. He was a disappointment in Europe, and when he returned to Brazil less than two years later, he was past his prime, began to suffer injuries and play sluggishly, and never again regained his form.

finally, what does this indicate for collective mobilisation in Brazil? Given that Brazilian social movements have traditionally focused on gaining access to the state (Lehmann, 2018), how might a post-PT landscape, *and* a right-wing government, push activist leaders in new directions? Related to this are issues of communication, and how the organisational tactics of social movements are changing in the wake of new technologies (Ribeiro, 2018). By exploring these different questions, my goal in this chapter is to unpack a series of political changes that, I argue, are currently underway in Brazil (and elsewhere). In particular, I focus on the ways people engage with democracy and the state, and the evolving roles of collective mobilisation in these political processes.

A post-PT Brazil?

To ask if Brazil's 2018 presidential election signifies more than just a single election loss for the PT and represents, instead, the beginning of a post-PT future, it is useful to reflect on key factors that help explain the election loss, as well as more fundamental, structural problems faced by the party going forward. My reasons for considering these issues are twofold: first, it helps respond to my broader question regarding the possibility of an ongoing post-PT future, and second, it establishes the first of my two arguments, that Brazilian democracy and state–society relations are undergoing profound change.

Efforts by conservative parties and judiciary representatives to undermine the PT in recent years are well known (Anderson, 2019). Dilma Rousseff's impeachment in 2016 was highly controversial, with many Brazilians arguing it represented a political coup (Saad-Filho, 2018). Likewise, in 2018, former president Lula was sentenced to 12 years in prison in a move that was equally contentious. Given how quickly his case went to trial, some of the actions of the overseeing federal judge, Sergio Moro, and the unusually harsh sentence Lula received, it is understandable many Brazilians think Lula's case showed political bias (Jinkings, Doria and Cleto, 2016; Pereira, 2018). Despite a recommendation from the United Nations Human Rights Committee that Lula's candidacy for president should not be prevented while his case was still under appeal, Brazil's Superior Electoral Court overruled, eliminating Lula from the presidential race. When he officially ended his campaign only one month before the election, Lula was the clear favourite (Garmany and Pereira, 2019, p. 227). One can only speculate, but it seems likely he would have won the election had his candidacy not been prevented.

So, if Lula was the clear favourite with only a month to go, why was he unable to get his handpicked successor, Fernando Haddad, elected? There existed, admittedly, some upfront obstacles, like the short timeframe, and the fact that Haddad was little known outside his home state of São Paulo (Phillips, 2018). But if Lula was able to shift his electoral support to Rousseff in 2010 – a candidate renowned for her lack of charisma, voter appeal and national

notoriety – why did it not work with Haddad in 2018? Well known, of course, were corruption scandals associated with the PT in 2018, fuelling intense anti-PT sentiment (Borges and Vidigal, 2018). With the exception of Lula, few PT candidates were able to distance themselves from these scandals. More directly, perhaps *no* PT candidate – again, except for Lula – stood a legitimate chance in 2018. As Borges and Vidigal (2018) show, those who dislike the PT are not confined to the political right, and include voters with divergent political ideologies and dissimilar socio-economic backgrounds. These factors should not be ignored and are crucial for explaining the PT's presidential election loss in 2018.

Important also was the PT's mismanagement of the economy, as well as rising levels of violent crime in Brazil. For those in the lower and working classes, these issues are significant, and help to explain Bolsonaro's popularity, particularly in urban areas (Richmond, 2018). According to Alfredo Valladão (2018), the PT rode a wave of good fortune with the commodities boom during the first decade of the twenty-first century, but the party's long-term economic strategy was exhausted by 2010. Likewise, little effort was made to address Brazil's growing federal pension crisis. Related to this, rather than investing in much-needed public infrastructure, the PT promoted mega-events and the building of new sporting stadia. Alex Cuadros (2016) suggests that perhaps most infuriating for the working classes and those on the left were corporate tax breaks given to industries like agrobusiness and construction, which sent money flowing upward to elites while the national debt ballooned. Not surprisingly, this worked to alienate many working-class and left-leaning Brazilians. All this came to a head rather famously in June 2013, when millions took to streets around the country in an outpouring of widespread anger at government policy and spending priorities (along with pretty much every other grievance imaginable). The right was able to channel this frustration from 2013 onward, profiting, in a political sense, from protests that were initiated, somewhat ironically, by *left-leaning* groups (Pereira, 2013).

Still, frequently overlooked are other factors every bit as substantial when considering the PT's political future. Valladão (2018) argues that Lula's 'scorched earth tactic' with centre-left political parties drove a definitive wedge into the Brazilian left. According to Valladão, this represents more than just the PT's refusal to align with parties like the Democratic Labour Party (PDT) and the Sustainability Party (REDE): it reveals a concerted effort by Lula to undermine these parties in the run-up to the 2018 election. Valladão suggests that Lula engaged in such tactics to help escape his prison sentence, as well as to ensure he was the only viable leftist candidate in the second round of the election. Bolsonaro's victory, he argues, can be partially explained by such tactics, yet going further, it also raises serious questions for the PT's political future. For example, if Lula is the only PT candidate with a chance of winning the presidency – and the left remains fragmented, with the PT refusing to reach

out to other parties – what will become of the PT (and also the left) when Lula can no longer lead the party? (Regardless of what happens with Lula's legal case, he turned 75 in 2020.)

Related to this are questions about the PT's organisational structure and the development of future party leaders. What has become clear in the wake of Brazil's 2018 election is that Lula remains firmly at the helm of the PT, with little work done to develop future leaders or horizontalise the party's leadership. Despite a host of highly qualified rank-and-file party members, it is difficult to one day imagine the PT directed by anyone other than Lula. The party's leadership remains rigidly vertical, with Lula executing top-level decisions and representing the public face of the PT (Valladão, 2018). This was made especially clear in September 2018, when Haddad launched his presidential campaign under the slogan, '*Haddad é Lula*' ('Haddad is Lula'). Without the cultivation of new party leaders – and, arguably, attention paid to leadership hierarchies – the PT is likely to have a diminished presence on the national stage going forward, even if they continue to win seats in municipal and state-level elections (as it did in the Northeast in 2018).

Noteworthy here is that the PT's organisational model is by no means unique in Brazil. Such tactics have a long history, exemplified most famously in the corporatist politics of Getúlio Vargas in the mid-twentieth century. By co-opting labour unions and their leaders into a vertically assembled political structure that included industrialists, economic elites, military leaders and the state, Vargas helped pave the way for contemporary state-society relationships in Brazil. As just one example, under Vargas, a system known as *peleguismo* was established to mediate relationships between labour unions and the state (Wolfe, 1993). Under this model, intermediary actors (referred to as *pelegos*) represented labour unions in official legislation with the state, seeking compromises that would assuage union activists without actually threatening Brazil's socio-economic class structure. The term *pelego* was therefore an unflattering one among certain activists, used to describe union representatives that were not always faithful to the working classes (Rodrigues, 1968). Like many intermediaries, *pelegos* were perceived as necessary for their links to state actors, but mostly concerned with their own interests and access to power.

Why is this important for making sense of the present? It would be unfair to call contemporary union representatives and social movement leaders *pelegos*, but in some ways Brazil's tradition for *peleguismo* lives on, helping to explain some of the PT's electoral success. For example, political parties continue to rely on intermediaries (e.g. social movement leaders, union representatives, community leaders) to engage their constituencies, and activist groups involved with collective mobilisation still articulate around the state. As David Lehmann (2018, p. 15) writes, 'Rather than building a mass base by mobilising a vast potential following, [social movement] leaders build a strategic base through the opening up of opportunities for advancement to make their voices heard

and enable their followers and constituencies to gain access to state resources and entitlements.’ In other words, in Brazil, social movements rarely seek autonomy or anarcho-governance through mass mobilisation, but rather access to the state and its resources through vertically assembled leadership networks. In semi-corporatist fashion, the benefits are mutual: social movements secure additional resources and political inclusion, and state actors build faithful political networks that can be counted on during elections. This is one of several factors helping to explain the PT’s electoral success in recent years, as the party was able to build a diverse support network that included both left-wing and centrist interest groups (cf. Nogueira, 2017).

To be clear, this is not to suggest that pure Vargas-style corporatism lives on in contemporary Brazil. There have been significant changes, and the PT, in particular, worked to break with corporatist traditions and *peleguismo*, championing alternative movements like ‘new unionism’ in the 1980s (Antunes and Santana, 2014). Still, as Lehmann (2018) and others note (e.g. Antunes and Santana, 2014), corporatist legacies continue to survive in twenty-first-century Brazil, raising questions of how Bolsonaro, representing a small party (which he later quit in 2019) with few political networks, won the 2018 presidential election? Significant, of course, was the PT’s diminished strength on account of political corruption scandals addressed already in this chapter. Equally important was Bolsonaro’s support from conservative lobby factions known collectively as the BBB: the religious right (*a bancada da Bíblia*), agribusiness (*a bancada do Boi*) and the pro-armament sector (*a bancada da Bala*). Without these groups, Bolsonaro’s victory would have been impossible (Prévoit, 2018). Still, it bears asking how an undistinguished politician, representing a virtually unknown party, was able to secure nearly 58 million votes. In past elections, such an outcome would have been unthinkable. Without the platform and political machinery of one of the major parties – including national exposure via the Globo television network – one could not hope to win the presidency. So, what changed in 2018?

On the one hand there is the emerging role of social media. Through Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, YouTube and so on, Bolsonaro connected with Brazilian voters in ways that were impossible only a few years beforehand (Belli, 2018). As his following grew, his need for traditional networks diminished, allowing him to bypass a host of intermediaries central to political machinery in the past. This represents a fundamental shift in the way state actors like Bolsonaro engage their constituencies, highlighting a decisive change in Brazilian democratic processes. More bluntly, it is hard to imagine how Bolsonaro would have won the election in an era before WhatsApp (Nemer, 2018). Social media technologies are changing how political campaigns are waged, and just like in other countries, the repercussions of such change are still being grappled with in Brazil.

Related to this, and on the other hand, is the possibility that traditional political networks may be undergoing fundamental change in Brazil. This is not to say they will disappear altogether, but instead to suggest that Brazil's corporatist legacies, highlighted by researchers like Lehmann (2018), are now shifting on account of new communication technologies. In short, the intermediary actors of the past, so crucial for linking Brazil's vertically assembled political networks, may not be so necessary in the future. Politicians can now communicate directly with their constituencies, reducing the need for brokers who disseminate their messages and steer voters their way. More generally, the ways people engage with the state, and how Brazilian democracy operates on the ground – whether corporatist, clientelist, Corinthians or otherwise – are evolving rapidly. It is still too early to say, but as Garmany and Pereira (2019, p. 229) argue, 'This could be what 2018 is most remembered for in Brazil: not Bolsonaro the president, but rather the context that enabled his candidacy.' For researchers hoping to make sense of this context, the rise of social media cannot be underestimated, including its potential to alter political networks linking the state with different polities.

Returning to the broader question that animates this section, what does this mean for the PT going forward? If, indeed, as I have argued here, traditional political networks and corporatist legacies are very much in flux, the PT may struggle to adapt. The party's vertical hierarchy and linkages with different polities represent a passing era of political mobilisation, which, while not obsolete, is perhaps no longer such a strength. Additionally, if the PT's leadership remains rigid and articulated around Lula, it seems unlikely the party will win back the presidency, unless Lula wins again in 2022. To do otherwise would require the cultivation of new party leaders, which the PT has not proven committed to in recent years. This is not to say the PT will vanish entirely: indeed, in regions such as the Northeast, the party continues to win seats in municipal and state elections. But at the executive level, the PT's future is cloudy, and without meaningful change, the current post-PT-presidential era could extend indefinitely into the future. This, obviously, is consequential for the Brazilian left, and it is to this issue I now turn.

What now for the left?

What the PT was able to accomplish in terms of social programmes and poverty reduction in Brazil between 2003 and 2016 was, in retrospect, pretty remarkable. In addition to well-known anti-poverty programs such as *Bolsa Família* (Brazil's conditional cash transfer initiative, consolidated in 2003) and steady increases to the minimum wage, the PT also undertook a series of additional measures meant to address poverty and underdevelopment in Brazil. This included, at the international scale, linkages with other developing countries in an effort to establish south–south cooperation, and more focused

initiatives within Brazil meant to address historically marginalised populations such as Afro-Brazilians, rural workers and indigenous groups. Perry Anderson (2011, p. 9) notes that the PT's legacy is by no means a socialist one, or even distinguished by significant changes to Brazil's socio-economic class structure, but that 'The fate of the poor in Brazil had been a kind of apartheid, and Lula had ended that.' So, how did the PT lose the support of so many working-class voters in this process, fuelling a political identity crisis that now confronts the Brazilian left?

Again, many of these issues have already been addressed and go beyond the scope of this chapter. This includes the corruption scandals that brought down Rousseff's government and sent Lula to prison, and intense anti-PT sentiment that extends across most social classes (Borges and Vidigal, 2018). Important also was the mismanagement of Brazil's economy, and the consequences this held for working- and middle-class Brazilians. This included a failure to improve public infrastructure, healthcare and education, as well as the PT's miscalculated emphasis on mega-events like the World Cup and the Olympics. Not to be overlooked was the influence of voting blocs such as the religious right, as well as serious issues of violent crime experienced by millions of people. These issues, of course, are well known, and when combined with Brazil's ongoing corruption scandals, they go a long way toward explaining working-class frustration with the PT.

At a deeper level, though, is the question of Brazil's broader development strategy, which reveals a decisive shift to the political centre and the abandonment of a clearly leftist economic agenda. As Pedro Loureiro notes (2018), the PT consistently followed a depoliticised development strategy that, while promoting social inclusion and poverty relief, made no attempt to fundamentally alter Brazil's socio-economic class structure. In more simple terms, the poor made gains, but the rich made even bigger gains. This helps to explain the political void currently facing the Brazilian left, where the party that has ostensibly represented the left in Brazilian politics for years (i.e. the PT) – and which criticised centre-left parties for being too conservative – has become a centrist party with no clear commitment to a radical or leftist agenda. Such a legacy has led Brazilian scholars such as Alfredo Saad-Filho and Armando Boito (2016) to criticise the PT for following a fundamentally neoliberal path, and for abandoning the radical politics upon which the party was built.

The political void identified by Loureiro is concerning on many levels, and not least in how it coincides with the rise of Bolsonaro, a leader who openly embraces misogynistic, homophobic, racist and right-wing authoritarian views. While such a political vacuum is certainly not unique to Brazil, it has erupted rather suddenly and offers few quick-fix solutions. Again, returning to Loureiro (2018), rebuilding from this void will take time, and the future of the Brazilian left will likely look different from the Brazilian left of today. The silver lining, argues Loureiro, is that the left's future almost certainly lies with more radical

groups fighting for racial and gender equality in Brazil. Included here are long-established social movements dating back to the 1970s and 1980s (i.e. the end of the military dictatorship), as well as emergent groups that have formed in the twenty-first century and have avoided co-optation by state actors.

This 'new left', so to speak, is distinguished not necessarily by the causes it represents (e.g. racial and gender equality, indigenous rights, radical eco-socialism), but more by the distance it maintains from political parties and corporatist networks. Many of its activists – for example, pro-Black activists in cities such as Rio de Janeiro (Rodgers, 2019) – came of age during the PT years and have seen first-hand the costs of political co-optation. If, indeed, Loureiro is right, and these groups represent the future of the Brazilian left, it will be interesting to see how – or *if* – they organise politically. Considering these activists have tended to be wary of existing political parties, it could mean that a new party – or *parties* – will emerge to represent the left. Given Brazil's history of 'extreme multipartyism' (Garmany and Pereira, 2019, p. 35), such a development would hardly be surprising. Then again, as I explore in the next section, these groups may also continue to keep the state at arm's length, refusing to reproduce political and corporatist legacies of the past.

To briefly sum up, I have thus far suggested that a PT candidate other than Lula is unlikely to capture Brazil's presidency, and while this represents a political crisis for the Brazilian left, the future is not without hope for those fighting for radical change. Just as Brazil's political landscape is moving rapidly, so too are the platforms upon which left and right currently stand. This may indicate the emergence of a 'new left' in years to come, though whether Brazil's system of 'coalitional presidentialism' (Melo and Pereira, 2013) can survive increasing political polarisation remains to be seen. Related to this, I have also argued that the current moment represents a decisive one in Brazilian politics, where legacies of corporatism are shifting, and long-established state–society linkages are being disrupted. This political shift leads to the second of my two main arguments: namely, that collective mobilisation is also at a crossroads, exemplified in how groups organise and communicate internally, as well as how they engage the state and position themselves politically. It is to this argument I turn my attention in the penultimate section of the chapter.

What now for collective mobilisation?

In hindsight, Brazil's street protests of 2013 were a harbinger for the presidential election of 2018. Both were unprecedented, both unleashed new waves of political tension, and both would have been impossible in an era before social media and smartphone technology. More to the point, given how social media enabled new forms of collective mobilisation and unforeseeable political unrest in 2013 (Garmany and Pereira, 2019, p. 136; Joia, 2016), perhaps it should not have been surprising when, in 2018, similar forces produced an unprecedented

election result. Again, the role of information technology and communication is central to this debate: it provided new methods for different groups to share ideas, come together and organise – whether virtually or in public space – and to link with others instantaneously across great distances.

On the one hand, this new communication landscape allows for alternative forms of social organisation and engagement and changes how people gather and spread information, *and* offers new platforms for resistance and modes of collective mobilisation (Cardoso, Lapa and Di Fátima, 2016). But on the other, it also provides the state with new surveillance technologies (see e.g. Morozov, 2011), as well as creating new tactics for spreading misinformation and skewing election results (Magenta, Gragnani and Souza, 2018). Arguably, social media has been harnessed, and manipulated, more effectively by the right than the left (Fisher and Taub, 2019). According to Luca Belli (2018), this helps to explain Bolsonaro's victory in 2018.

The purpose of this section is to explore these issues and, specifically, to argue that the current moment represents a watershed for collective mobilisation (in Brazil as well as elsewhere). To illustrate this point, I consider contemporary collective mobilisation in Brazil from two classic theoretical viewpoints: first, from the perspective of resource mobilisation theory, I show how social media is changing the ways groups communicate and organise, helping to establish new practices and spatialities of activism in Brazil; and second, from the perspective of political opportunity theory, I suggest that social movements are, today, engaging differently with the state, as well as developing new methods for organisation that attend to diversities within and across different activist groups. This, of course, is not to say these changes will necessarily produce 'better' or more effective forms of social resistance, but instead to draw attention to recent developments that are changing the face of collective mobilisation in Brazil.

To begin, from the viewpoint of resource mobilisation theory – which links the success of social movements with their capacity to secure and make use of resources (see Miller, 2000) – recent developments in social media and communication technology (*viz.*, smartphones) have helped bring about a new tactical era in collective mobilisation. For example, until very recently, activist groups required at least three key material resources to mobilise: physical space to coalesce; established social networks to facilitate organisation; and media resources to communicate more broadly. Brazilian social movements during the second half of the twentieth century provide an illustration of this: without private space to meet and strategise, as well as public space to manifest and occupy, it was impossible to achieve collective mobilisation. For example, social movements like the MST (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra – Landless Workers' Movement) relied on institutions like the progressive Catholic Church for organisational/spatial resources (see e.g. Stedile and Fernandes, 1999). Nowadays, social movements can coalesce online and are less bounded by questions of physical space. Social media may not have eliminated the

need for *public* space to manifest and occupy, but it has definitely provided an alternative *private* space for meeting and strategising. Likewise, when it comes to social networks, Brazilian activists were historically dependent upon labour unions and political parties for organisational resources. This changed in recent decades with the rise of 'New Social Movements' (see e.g. Cupples, 2013), but even as activist groups grew more independent from labour unions and political parties, they maintained similar traditions of vertical organisation and linkages with state actors (Lehmann, 2018; Nogueira, 2017). The emergence of contemporary social media, however, has changed this, offering activist groups even more independence from established social networks, and, potentially, new opportunities for horizontal organisation and leadership. Whether or not such possibilities will produce alternative hierarchies remains to be seen, but the growth of new social networks – enabled by information technology – has no doubt opened a new organisational landscape for collective mobilisation.

Thirdly, online resources have greatly expanded the communication and media possibilities available to social movements. Activists are no longer so dependent on material resources like pamphlets, signage and word-of-mouth communication, nor do they require media attention or broadcasting resources to raise awareness. With resources like WhatsApp, Twitter and Facebook, they can enter into dialogue with millions instantaneously, and organise, adjust and respond in a fraction of the time that was required in the past. This allows groups to articulate their messages broadly, bypassing certain material requirements that, until just a few years ago, were crucial for broader communication (Cardoso, Lapa and Di Fátima, 2016). Again, Brazil's protests of 2013 help to illustrate this, where mobilisations that would have been impossible at the start of the twenty-first century became an overnight reality only ten years later. 'In previous decades, these protests would have taken weeks (if not months) to organise. In 2013, people connected over social media, and could then assemble nationwide within *hours*' (Garmany and Pereira, 2019, p. 122 – italics original).

Arguing that changes in social media and information technology are hugely significant for collective mobilisation is hardly new (see e.g. Gerbaudo, 2012). Predicting what it will mean for Brazilian social movements more specifically, however, is harder to forecast. While it is clearly a dynamic time for collective mobilisation in Brazil, it is not just progressive social movements that harness these new technologies. Right-wing activists have also been successful at spreading their messages through social media, helping to elect extremist leaders like Jair Bolsonaro (Fisher and Taub, 2019). Additionally, argues Evgeny Morozov (2011), online communication hardly promises a more progressive or democratic future. In this respect, resource mobilisation theory is useful for highlighting some of the changes brought on by communication technology – and, more specifically, how these resources produce new methods of collective mobilisation – but not necessarily for unpacking the political ramifications of

such change (viz., the relationships between social movements and the state). To better consider these factors, and to examine the ways social movements engage the state while balancing socially and politically diverse participant bases, it is useful to also consider the political opportunities involved.

From the perspective of political opportunity theory – which links the success of social movements to political opportunities available to them (again, see Miller, 2000) – information technology would appear to be shifting relationships between civil society, social movements and the state. In much the same way that Bolsonaro's presidency was enabled by communication technologies like WhatsApp, Facebook and Twitter, so too have these technologies enabled new political opportunities for collective mobilisation. To better understand this, it is useful to return to Lehmann's (2018) observation regarding social movements and the state: rather than pursuing autonomy or anarcho-governance through mass mobilisation, Brazilian social movements have tended to seek access to the state and its resources through vertically assembled leadership networks. With the PT government, the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso before that, and so on, social movements have typically sought to make inroads with state actors. In this way, Brazilian collective mobilisation is historically characterised by appeals for state action and/or resources, with leaders of these movements typically serving as intermediaries between the state and members of their respective movements (similar to 'Corinthians Democracy').

Today, however, thanks to new technologies and political opportunities that appear to be altering corporatist legacies noted by Lehmann (2018), Brazilian social movements are confronted with new possibilities for collective mobilisation. More to the point, if a right-wing candidate can bypass traditional intermediaries and still win the presidency, then why should social activists not also seek alternative communication strategies and methods of engagement with civil society? State resources are still crucial to social movements, but, as I have argued in this chapter, if Bolsonaro's presidency represents a fundamental shift in contemporary Brazilian politics, then so too should it represent a decisive moment for collective mobilisation. For example, in recent years, Brazilian social movements have begun to align more often with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) than with the state. This has been triggered by two main factors: fewer state resources available to social movements, and new opportunities and resources made available by NGOs. As Carlyn Rodgers (2019) argues, this provides collective mobilisation with new opportunities *and* new pitfalls, as activists struggle to learn and negotiate new landscapes of alignment and solidarity. Whether or not this means that social movements will grow more autonomous and break with traditional networks remains to be seen, but it is being made possible thanks to emergent communication resources and political opportunities. Thus, from the perspective of political opportunity theory, recent changes in Brazil – a right-wing government and shifting political networks that link the state and civil society – point to a future

where, perhaps, social movements could pursue more autonomous forms of collective action (rather than, as they have in the past, establishing direct links with state actors and institutions). This is not to say social movements will end all relationships with the state: as Adrian Gurza Lavalle and José Szwako (2015) point out, ‘autonomy’ is not simply the absence of a relationship with the state, since material and epistemological linkages must also be accounted for. But, to be sure, institutional linkages between activists, civil society and the state have undergone important changes in recent years, and the implications for collective action are still being grappled with (see, for example, Gurza Lavalle et al., 2019).

Building on this, and exploring further my second argument that collective mobilisation faces a pivotal moment with respect to state engagement, what new political opportunities are emerging for social movements? Most obvious, perhaps, are alternative organisational networks: in much the same way that information technology is enabling new forms of resource mobilisation, so, too, are shifting state–society networks offering dynamic political opportunities for social movements (e.g. Szwako and Gurza Lavalle, 2019). For example, in the past – and thanks again to legacies of corporatism in Brazil – labour unions and political parties were crucial to the organisational tactics of collective mobilisation. Without these networks, activists struggled to mobilise and make linkages with the state. Again, this began to change in the 1980s and 1990s with the emergence of ‘New Social Movements’ (NSMs), but unlike in Europe and North America, where NSMs began focusing their attention on issues such as civil rights, anti-discrimination and environmental protection, NSMs in Brazil and Latin America tended to coalesce over material concerns such as housing, human rights, land rights and access to natural resources (cf. Cupples, 2013). Effective as these social movements have been in making gains, they have also struggled to make advancements in areas such as anti-discrimination legislation, protection for historically marginalised groups, and recognition of gender diversity, as well as addressing issues of intersectionality (that is, the ways different forms of discrimination – race-based, class-based, gender-based, etc. – tend to combine and overlap) within and across activist groups (Garmany and Pereira, 2019, p. 134).

New political opportunities, however, may be changing this. Where social movements, until recently, tended to focus on access to state institutions to address material gains, this could change as activists become less concerned with building state linkages. Again, it is early to say, but there exists the possibility that collective mobilisation, when unmoored from institutional state networks, could focus more directly on issues addressed by contemporary social movements in the global north (e.g. gender inequality, racial discrimination, state violence and police brutality). Reasons for this are diverse, but can be attributed largely to two main factors: first, if social movements grow more autonomous, there is reason to believe they may also grow more radical

(Katsiaficas, 2006); and second, with increased autonomy and fewer state resources, social movements may be forced to work horizontally, potentially negotiating issues of intersectionality that remain unaddressed on account of material and class-based objectives (Bernardino-Costa, 2014; Garmany and Pereira, 2019). Brazil's contemporary pro-Black movement appears to evidence this, with many activists now working to address multiple layers of discrimination (gender, class, spiritual, etc.) rather than racial inequality in and of itself (Rodgers, 2019; Alves, 2018). Looking over Brazil's contemporary landscape of collective mobilisation – where groups are finding new ways to organise that attend to intersectional identities and diverse support bases (Bernardino-Costa, 2014; Cicalo, 2012; Perry, 2016) – there is reason to believe that significant changes are underway within Brazil's progressive and activist left (see also Lima, 2018).

Before moving to some conclusions, however, there are a few points that bear re-emphasising. First, to suggest that social movements may grow more autonomous, radical and/or horizontal is not to say they will also become more effective in achieving their goals. While there is evidence to suggest that Brazilian social movements are undergoing significant change, trying to predict whether or not they will be more effective is another question altogether. Given mounting antagonism towards collective action from a multitude of conservative forces – including extreme violence still suffered by Afro-Brazilians at the hands of the state (Alves, 2018) – it would be naive to suggest the left will simply regroup, reorganise and stage a quick comeback.

Moreover, there are good reasons for why the Brazilian left, for decades, sought inroads with state actors through vertically assembled networks. It proved effective at holding out against the military dictatorship; it was crucial during Brazil's democratic transition; and it helped bring about Lula's victory in 2002. Related to this, and turning now to social media, for all the opportunities online communication presents, it offers just as many drawbacks. As just one example, right-wing groups have been hugely effective in harnessing social media to achieve their goals (Belli, 2018; Fisher and Taub, 2019; Nemer, 2018). All this suggests that researchers must use extreme caution when trying to forecast where Brazil will turn next. It is no doubt a dynamic time for Brazilian social movements, but it remains to be seen if emergent groups will achieve the success of long-established ones like the Landless Workers' Movement.

Conclusions

Reflecting on where this chapter began, with a discussion of Corinthians Democracy and the 'intermediaries' that link the state and civil society in Brazil, it bears re-emphasising that the current political moment is both highly unpredictable and historically unprecedented. I have tried to explore the deeper implications of these changes throughout this chapter, focusing on

the linkages between the state, civil society and democratic practice. Analysing these changes and their potential implications has led me to consider several possible directions for Brazilian democracy, even going so far as to speculate what the future might hold for collective mobilisation and leftist politics. But these arguments are tentative. Trying to predict the future of state–society relationships in Brazil, or what social media will mean for collective mobilisation, is a speculative exercise, and one that requires constant revision as new events unfold.

I have attempted to make two key arguments. First, that Brazil's 2018 presidential election may indicate a pivotal moment in the country's democracy, whereby a fundamental shift is taking place in the ways people engage with politics, voting and the state; and second, that the current moment is likely a watershed for Brazilian social movements, both in the ways they organise and communicate, as well as how they engage with the state. To make these arguments, I addressed three broad questions that helped to animate the chapter and facilitate critical discussion. The first, which queried the future of the PT, led me to suggest that 2018 may, indeed, signal the beginning of an ongoing (and indefinite) post-PT presidential era. In response to the second question, which asked what will become of the Brazilian left, I followed Loureiro's argument (2018) that the future lies with more radical and progressive leftist groups (such as movements for racial and gender equality), and will likely produce new political parties to rival the PT. And for the third question, in which I considered the implications for collective mobilisation, I argued that new communication technologies are producing alternative methods of organisation and engagement, where, potentially, social movements could grow more autonomous from state institutions, and focus more specifically on issues such as intersectional inequality and anti-discrimination. To distil these arguments more concisely, and to paraphrase Garmany and Pereira (2019), it may be that, in the long run, 2018 is remembered not just for Bolsonaro's victory, but also for the decisive shift within Brazil's socio-political landscape that contributed to his election.

There are a host of broader ramifications that stem from this, but to conclude, I focus my attention on three key points. First is the issue of social media and its effects on politics and collective mobilisation. Social media is not just changing the ways people communicate; it is also changing how people organise and interact with political institutions and state actors. In some ways, this offers opportunities to horizontalise and democratise communication and state–society relationships. But in other ways, it presents new methods for co-optation and state surveillance. Thus, social media is neither a 'good' technology or a 'bad' one, but rather an *important* technology that requires more attention from academic researchers.

Second, Brazil is by no means the only country where relationships between the state and civil society are in flux. Again, this is not to say that what comes

next will be better or more democratic, but simply to point out that relationships linking the state with civil society are undergoing important changes, and the consequences of these changes are bound to be significant. These issues will remain important for researchers around the world for years to come, with questions over democracy, governance and state formation connected tightly to them.

And finally, for those hoping to understand political and social change in diverse countries like Brazil, there remain important lessons to keep in mind. For example, just as ‘the left’ and ‘social movements’ are often discussed in ways that homogenise their participant bases, so too are groups like ‘evangelicals’ and ‘the right’ characterised in ways that ignore their internal diversities. More specifically, evangelicals in Brazil are often written off as right-wing and conservative, yet this overlooks the massive growth of evangelical participants in many of Brazil’s most radical and progressive social movements (Burdick, 2005; Cicalo, 2012). This is significant for researchers exploring political and social change around the world, and connects on several levels with arguments presented in this chapter: namely, that leftist politics are changing, and that collective mobilisation faces a transitional moment with respect to communication, organisation and engagement with non-state actors. For researchers seeking to understand radical politics, whether in Brazil or elsewhere, these will remain important issues for years to come.

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Conclusion: shifting horizons

Katerina Hatzikidi and Eduardo Dullo

As the wide-ranging discussions in this volume's chapters have shown, several of the central political issues Brazil is facing today are not entirely new but rather rooted in the country's deep-seated socio-economic and ethno-racial inequalities and authoritarian tradition. However, we also wish to emphasise that while it is important to identify and understand certain continuities, it is equally important to comprehend the distinctiveness and gravity of the present moment, which, as Garmany highlights in his chapter, is in certain ways 'highly unpredictable and historically unprecedented'. Recognising the structural and conjunctural elements that inform this moment, as we have tried to do throughout this volume, allows us to better distinguish and determine the horizon of political possibilities that crops up.

The presidency of Jair Bolsonaro, although still ongoing at the moment of writing, has had far-reaching effects on fundamental aspects of daily life that, independently of the outcome of the 2022 presidential elections, will undoubtedly leave their mark for years to come. The filmmaker and essayist João Moreira Salles (2020) wrote that:

In less than two years, Bolsonaro has deteriorated [Brazilian] culture, education, environmental policy, the Federal Police, Ibama [the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources], Itamaraty [the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Funai [the National Indian Foundation], the Attorney General's Office, Iphan [the National Institute of Historic and Artistic Heritage], Funarte [the National Foundation for the Arts], Ancine [the National Film Agency], the Casa Rui Barbosa, the Palmares Cultural Foundation, the National Library, the Brazilian Cinematheque, the Ministry of Health, the Armed Forces.

It is not a work of engineering. It is demolition.

From dismantling environmental policies and preservation mechanisms to underfunding public education and cultural initiatives to increasing extreme poverty and deepening inequalities, the government that came to power in 2018 has remained faithful to its promise to 'deconstruct' before beginning the work of construction. In the notorious cabinet meeting of 22 April 2020, the Minister of the Environment, Ricardo Salles, urged for further deregulation

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of environmental policy while the media was ‘distracted’ by the Covid-19 pandemic. In response to a series of events that severely harmed environmental protection, while the ministry took no preventive action or acted to its detriment, the Public Prosecutor’s Office (MPF) asked, albeit unsuccessfully, for Salles’s removal. Monitoring the onslaught on the environment, some spoke of an authoritarian approach to environmental policy (Sanctis and Mendes, 2020) while countless reports denounced the government’s deliberate inaction or action in favour of one of the most environmentally destructive phases in the country’s recent history. The impact of deforestation, illegal mining and rampant fires on Brazil’s biodiversity concerns everyone, yet it disproportionately affects indigenous people, *quilombolas* and other populations who live in and directly depend on the natural resources of many of those areas most devastated.

Combined with the effects of the pandemic, indigenous and *quilombola* movements speak of deliberate attempts of destruction of their forms of living and indeed of genocidal attacks against entire populations and ecosystems (see especially this volume’s afterword and Arruti et al., 2021). In July 2020, Supreme Court Justice Gilmar Mendes publicly expressed his preoccupation with the inertia of the Ministry of Health in tackling the soaring cases of coronavirus infection among Brazil’s indigenous populations, and warned the armed forces against being associated with a possible genocide. For some, the Brazilian president has long flirted with genocide and made it explicit in his electoral discourse when he routinely dehumanised *quilombolas* and indigenous Brazilians or when joking about shooting at *petistas* (Gherman, 2020). Yet for others, such an abominable perspective only emerged as potential reality after the government’s stance on the pandemic and Bolsonaro’s apparent indifference towards the victims. Eventually, and in light of ever-growing infection and death rates throughout the country, discussion of genocide exceeded the confines of any one particular social group and morphed into a heated national debate. Anti-government protests, such as *panelaços*, and discussions of impeachment also gained relevance.

Reacting to criticisms and accusations of genocide, the government often used authoritarian measures to silence dissent. For example, in early March 2021, Pedro Hallal, epidemiology professor and former dean of the Federal University of Pelotas (UFPEl), was asked to sign an adjustment of behaviour agreement (*Termo de Ajustamento de Conduta*), after being accused of speaking inappropriately about the president in a webinar on the government’s response to the pandemic. Hallal has been coordinating Epicovid-19, the largest epidemiological study of Covid-19 in Brazil (Hallal, 2021). On the webinar, he was speaking as an expert concerned with public health and yet felt that the accusation could cost him his job in the federal civil service (Alessi, 2021). By the end of the same month, in another high-profile case, the social media

influencer Felipe Neto was accused of committing a crime against national security for calling Bolsonaro genocidal, and was subpoenaed.

Although this volume is dedicated to understanding the specific conjunctive and historical conditions that enabled and fostered the rise and election of Jair Bolsonaro to Brazil's presidency, it is impossible to foresee what the rest of his time in office will bring and whether or not his phenomenal popularity will allow him to win re-election. In the first months after the Covid-19 outbreak, the president's approval rate appeared to be dwindling as he was losing key former allies, such as Sergio Moro. Bolsonaro also appeared to be losing the support of the middle and upper-middle classes, in response to what many saw as a disastrous handling of the pandemic and unresponsiveness to the collective suffering (Singer, 2020). As the death toll surpassed 100,000 victims, however, a Datafolha survey showed Bolsonaro's approval rate at its highest since the beginning of his term (Leite, 2020). As we write this conclusion in March 2021, Bolsonaro's rejection rate reached a 54 per cent high, with over 40 per cent of Brazilians pointing to him as the main culprit behind the worsening of the Covid-19 crisis (Gielow, 2021).

What Bolsonaro's fluctuating popularity makes clear is a sense of instability, which was certainly aggravated by the pandemic. A set of inter-related phenomena ranging from unemployment to diplomatic crises to former President Lula recovering his political rights (and therefore being eligible to run for president in 2022) have once again shifted the horizon of political possibilities in Brazil. The president doubled down on his refusal to take the pandemic seriously by presenting a false dichotomy between 'saving lives' and 'saving the economy' – false because the two cannot be dissociated from one another but are intricately connected. He favoured quick solutions offered by alleged magic bullets, such as antimalarial drugs with proven inefficiency against the coronavirus, and nasal sprays, even as the pandemic was spreading fast (Hatzikidi, 2020). But his polarising message, which refused to acknowledge the gravity of the situation, was becoming less influential as more Brazilians were impacted by the coronavirus.

The politics of transgression, including denialism, gradually lose their shock value when they become a sustained feature of political life. As Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) compellingly argued, the constant violation of democratic norms by would-be authoritarians in power often leads to public desensitisation and indifference. While the 'normalisation' of previously aberrant behaviour is a likely corollary of the 'bad boy' type of far-right populist conduct we have been seeing in recent years, what we are witnessing in Brazil seems to suggest otherwise. Indeed, an increasingly larger part of the population seems to react to the government's denialism by insisting on urgent everyday questions that will not and cannot simply be made to go away by looking away.

In a recent interview, the political scientist Fernando Abrucio suggested that 'the social question' has made a forceful comeback and will likely determine the

2022 presidential elections (Rebello, 2020). For Abrucio, Bolsonaro's efforts to maintain his faithful 'ideological base' by centring on conservative moralist values and culture wars distance him from a growing part of the electorate, for which healthcare, employment and schooling are pressing issues that demand urgent solutions. Furthermore, the incumbent government is also distant from (if not hostile to) questions of racial equality and justice that gained new impetus with the growth of the Black Lives Matter movement in the United States, and the equivalent *Vidas Negras Importam* in Brazil, as Moraes Silva also discusses in her chapter.

Analysts and commentators have also observed that the anti-political and anti-expert climate that was in vogue before 2018 has been succeeded by a renewed interest (and trust) in experts – especially in light of non-experts involved in Brazil's inefficient response to the pandemic – and even in professional politicians. After Lula re-entered the political field as a potentially powerful presidential candidate with a pro-vaccination discourse that was met with enthusiasm, Bolsonaro appointed the fourth Minister of Health during his administration in an effort to counter criticisms without displeasing his most faithful 'ideological' constituency. Throughout this time, he has continued to claim to be with 'the Brazilian people' (acting for their benefit and speaking on their behalf) and saving the country from a series of disasters. While he and members of his family are involved in ongoing investigations on corruption and money-laundering schemes, Bolsonaro and *bolsonaristas* claim that his administration remains faithful to the values that got him elected in the first place: anti-corruption, anti-communism and pro-traditional family. Symptomatic of this stance is the president's declaration in October 2020 about the Car Wash investigation: 'I ended Lava Jato because there is no longer corruption in the government.'¹

Since the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, many commentators, especially in the press, have proclaimed (once more) the death of populism. Yet, as Cas Mudde (2020) observed, the reality is much more complex. It is true that issues that were highly polemical before the pandemic and politicised by far-right populist movements – such as public security and 'gender ideology' in Brazil, and fears of 'Islamisation' in Europe – no longer resonate so strongly. At the same time, however, the post-pandemic world will likely re-politicise issues of economic crisis, inequality and the welfare state, and populist movements across the political spectrum may successfully tap into these questions. The victory of the Democratic candidate Joe Biden in the 2020 presidential elections in the US may have ended a highly polarised Trump era, but it does not mean that would-be authoritarians will not continue to come to power via democratic elections in the US and elsewhere. As Viktor Orbán's popularity in

1 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pc-ADrWSOJs&ab_channel=UOL> (accessed 29 March 2021).

Hungary or the results of the Dutch elections in March 2021 indicate, far-right populist movements remain strong in many parts of the world.

A possible threat to Brazil's democracy in the near future lies in the possibility that Jair Bolsonaro's pandemic denialism be succeeded by 'electoral denialism'. As the Brazilian president has alluded to many times in the past, and again more recently, he may not trust the results of the elections if they are not favourable to him. Already in 2018, and despite winning, he falsely claimed that he had won in the first round without ever presenting evidence that corroborated his claim. During Trump's months-long refusal to accept the electoral result, Bolsonaro resumed his unfounded allegations that the electronic ballots were not reliable. A hacker attack (denial-of-service) against the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) in the last municipal elections gave the opportunity for fraud conspiracies to spread widely. Police investigation of the attacks, however, suggested that their aim was likely to instil doubt and discredit the reliability of the voting system, as Supreme Court Justice and TSE President Luís Roberto Barroso affirmed (Benites, 2020). Commenting on the US Capitol invasion of 6 January 2021, President Bolsonaro declared that if Brazil does not have paper ballots (*voto impresso*) the 'same thing' will happen or 'we are going to have a worse problem than in the United States' (Carvalho and Teixeira, 2021).

Bolsonaro's election in 2018 might be seen as the consolidation of a 'conservative return' that started at the time of the 2013 street demonstrations. In the course of the last decade, the process of re-democratisation has been undermined by weakening and attacking some of its central tenets, namely the expansion of social and human rights and the transformation of authoritarian sociality. One might even say (as do Arruti and Held, this volume) that Brazil is facing a de-democratisation moment. What is certain is that the horizon of possibilities keeps shifting and that Brazil is no longer 'a land of the future'. In moments like these, it is important, however, to hold on to a politics of hope, as Paulo Freire advised.

In her discussion of the Estado Novo period (1937–45), historian Angela de Castro Gomes (2014) suggested that its popularity left a dangerous legacy: the belief that only an authoritarian state can be efficient, given the 'inherent' corruption of professional politicians. This belief, however, was tragically proved false by the 1964–85 military regime, which showed that 'an authoritarian State can be extremely inefficient and unjust, besides being incommensurably violent, as was already known from the Estado Novo experience' (Gomes, 2014, p. 34). If memory of this experience is preserved, then Brazil may safely continue on its path to democratisation, Gomes forecast. Often, the horizon of political possibilities is blurry, reflecting a moving ground of pivotal events happening at a dramatic pace. Sometimes, however, we witness 'the emergence of a social and political constellation in which a clustered and concatenated series of events' becomes 'thinkable rather than unthinkable' (Brubaker, 2017, p. 368). In 2018 this constellation permitted the election of Jair Bolsonaro, who

became, for the first time in his long political career, ‘thinkable’ as presidential candidate. Although memory may sometimes be profoundly subjective and distorted by subsequent events, we hope, together with Gomes, that a collective experience of inefficient and unjust regimes will continue to guide the horizon of political (im)possibilities away from authoritarian adventures in the future.

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Afterword: no matter who won, indigenous resistance will always continue

Taily Terena, João Tikuna and Gabriel Soares

Brazil has gone through social transformations that have not only affected its day-to-day politics; we will continue to feel their impact for a long while. While our discussion here is focused on the period from 2010 to the present day, we find it important to state that from an indigenous perspective there is far *less* rupture between the present and the past than many would care to admit. While it may be tempting to isolate Brazil's tumultuous past decade, we, like other authors in this book, believe it to be blurred with prior events. Our problems began to accumulate not with elections or impeachment, but with the European invasion of our territories in April 1500.

Colony, monarchy, dictatorship, democracy: for the peoples in the margin the process of genocide may wear new clothes, but it has not stopped for five hundred years. Indeed, given the government's response to the recent pandemic, the state seems to have found a renewed enthusiasm and even joy in its ability to promote and observe mass death and suffering of indigenous people. But even before these recent events we have, in truth, become invisible in our own land, being as we are continuously deterritorialised. The current agency in charge of indigenous affairs, FUNAI (Fundação Nacional do Índio or National Foundation of the Indian) was originally called SPILTIN (Serviço de Proteção dos Índios e Localização de Trabalhadores Nacionais or Service for the Protection of Indians and Localisation of National Labourers). Like the missions of centuries past, it seeks to control and transform indigenous communities into fonts of labour. In some ways the cycle has already come back around: following the Guarani war and the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1759, Brazil's state gradually secularised its mechanisms for control of indigenous populations (Cunha, 1992). Now it increasingly puts these populations at the mercy of religious organisations by, for example, hiring evangelical NGOs such as Caiuá as healthcare providers for indigenous populations.

The most recent dictatorship, when it came, was explicit in its 'integrationist' goals: in the words of General Ismarth de Araújo, head of FUNAI, 'an integrated Indian is the one that converts himself into labour', and while this project

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failed, it was also never abandoned.¹ This period also provides a clear example of a poisonous long-running characteristic of Brazil's indigenous policy: at least 8,300 indigenous people were murdered and at least two concentration camps were created, while several indigenous territories were recognised (Comissão Nacional da Verdade, 2014).² Violence masquerading as false protectionism is a staple of Brazil's indigenous policy. For us this is nothing new, having occurred since the colonial period.

The transition to democracy, inaugurated by the ratification of a new constitution in 1988, was considered an important marker for the rights of indigenous peoples: for the first time we were seen as rights-bearing persons by the state, which once again sought to transform us, now into 'citizens'. The relationship with the State has changed since then: indigenous persons, now recognised as autonomous subjects, have opened a new period in Brazil's history, fighting for their rights to be respected. Hundreds of new demarcation processes were initiated thanks to the internal organisation of indigenous communities, but the majority of these are paralysed due to adversarial interests within the state, which is guided by opposing political forces. But the massacres have never stopped: even as the process of demarcation of Yanomami territory was ongoing, roughly 20 per cent of the Yanomami were killed by gold prospectors.³ And the tendency has been not to combat illicit mining, but to legalise and condone it while refusing to recognise the wishes of indigenous communities over their own lands. And so now 40 per cent of the Yanomami live in the proximity of illicit gold mines, suffering from contaminated water and air. Their territory has been invaded by an estimated twenty thousand miners (Castro, 2021). A year does not go by when Brazil does not witness organised mass violence against indigenous communities.

Bolsonaro, in his 2019 speech to the UN, as well as in numerous statements before and after, has made clear that his interest is not in forests or indigenous peoples but in the minerals and natural resources of the Amazon (Betim and Marreiro, 2019). The uncomfortable question is this: how does this differ from previous governments? In an interview with the BBC, cacique Raoni of the Kayapó said that his fight against Bolsonaro is the same as it was against Lula and Dilma (Fellet, 2019). During Dilma's government, while there were social programmes that were beneficial to indigenous populations, the Belo Monte Dam was built on the Xingu river despite the condemnation and active resistance of traditional communities, social movements and academics against the initiative.

1 'Índio integrado é aquele que se converte em mão de obra'. See <<http://memoriasdaditadura.org.br/indigenas/>> (accessed 30 March 2021).

2 See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FwSoU3r1O-Q&t=3s&ab_channel=Ag%C3%AAnciaP%C3%BAblica> (accessed 30 March 2021).

3 <<https://www.survivalinternational.org/tribes/yanomami>> (accessed 30 March 2021).

During his election campaign, Bolsonaro made many anti-indigenous declarations to signal his government's plans, should he be elected: 'Minorities must either bow or disappear'; 'It's a pity Brazil's cavalry was not as efficient as America's, which exterminated the Indians'; 'There will not be a centimetre demarcated for indigenous reservations or for *quilombola* territory.'⁴ The current president has gone to great lengths to put his words into practice, be it directly (illegally attempting to transfer the responsibility for demarcation to the Ministry of Agriculture, and attempting to legalise mining in indigenous territories) or indirectly, incentivising violence against traditional populations and invasions of their territories. This was exemplified dramatically when the world witnessed what had been one of the largest acts of criminal arson in human history, the fires in the Amazon during the summer of 2019 and Pantanal in 2020. The municipality with the second-largest number of arsons (1,630) and the most deforestation (297.3 km²) was Altamira, where Belo Monte Dam was built (*Globo*, 2019).

Despite the government's genocidal actions, it has not completely abandoned Brazil's traditional farcical strategy of keeping up appearances. Indigenous persons associated with evangelical churches and/or fascist militarism (fellow travellers in Brazil as elsewhere) have been placed in strategic positions within the government. Therefore the government cynically argues that it does indeed maintain good relations with indigenous people and defends the rights of indigenous persons to not be cavemen. In the hallucinations of the current government, demarcated lands are equivalent to zoos dominated by NGOs and foreign governments. Simply put, the ideology of the regime is that the only indigenous persons who can exist are those who wish to be white, both in terms of identity and by integrating into market economies as cheap labour, embracing capitalism, denying their roots, practices, beliefs, livelihoods, and – even worse – putting into practice the ideal of a '*capitão do mato*'.⁵ The ones who bow.

The perspective of economic interest renders indigenous communities invisible. When they do appear, it is as an inconvenience or barrier to the necessary economic development of this perpetually underdeveloped country. Indigenous activity is worthless because it does not generate profit for capital, their produce is not available in supermarkets and their rituals are not on a streaming service. Whenever culture is mentioned, indigenous people disappear, because 'real' culture is imported from faraway shores. Whenever

4 *Quilombola* is a term which denotes the descendants of enslaved persons who escaped bondage and formed free communities, often closely allied to local indigenous peoples. The first quotation is from Bolsonaro's speech at a rally in 2017, the second from an address to the lower house in April 1998 while the third is from a speech he gave at the Clube Hebraica in April 2017.

5 Literally: captain of the woods. In a large plantation this was the person, usually poor and of 'mixed' parentage, in charge of kidnapping and apprehending new and runaway enslaved persons.

rights are mentioned, indigenous people disappear, because their rights are an inconvenience to the full expression of the rights of the 'real' citizens, born entitled to all and everything.

With this in mind, we have opted to focus on a few themes in this afterword: territory, education and healthcare. They are pertinent issues that are considered the basis for a decent life by indigenous communities and necessary for continued resilience post-contact.

Territory

In order to speak about territory we must first attempt to understand what land means to indigenous people. It cannot be reduced to something material or physical; the experience of living with and in relation to land is cosmological, spiritual and ancestral. Territory for us is understood as an integral part of our being, our body, because we are in constant coexistence and communication. Put another way: Western medicine has slowly come to recognise that bodies are composed of different micro-organisms which are simultaneously vital and distinct. In much the same way we compose, and are composed by, land. As indigenous persons have long explained, and numerous ethnographies have already discussed, understanding this relation is fundamental to understanding why territorial conflict, the fight for healthy (and not just extant) land, is the mother of all fights. It is starting from territory that we can guarantee the decent livelihood of our peoples and that we may speak of healthcare, education, culture and autonomy. Given the vast body of anthropological literature on this issue, and the countless discourses from indigenous persons, this should hopefully come as no surprise. There can be no understanding of indigenous political involvement divorced from the relationship with land.⁶

Article 231 of Brazil's constitution states that the social organisation, customs, languages, beliefs and traditions, as well as originary⁷ rights over traditionally occupied lands of indigenous peoples, are recognised. It is the state's task to demarcate, protect and enforce all these rights. This is a fairly broad and sweeping provision, and it has been continuously undermined by a series of interpretative tricks. First, the order was inverted: instead of a broad recognition of rights in situ, territorial recognition was made conditional upon demarcation. Then demarcation was turned into a bureaucratic process which has continuously grown in complexity, bloated by the inclusion of over a dozen intermediary steps, taking teams of researchers years to complete. Then funding and resources for demarcation were continuously slashed,

6 For a fairly recent anthropological dossier on the issue, see Fonseca Iubel and Soares Pinto (2017).

7 *Direitos originários*, which has been crudely translated here as 'originary rights', refers to the rights conferred on indigenous people by virtue of them having already been in Brazil at the time of Portuguese arrival. Indigenous people in Brazil are occasionally called *povos originários*, original peoples.

making it virtually impossible to comply with all demands. Lastly the process was increasingly judicialised, with hostile parties able to ‘contest’ ongoing processes and concluded demarcations overturned in courts. Slowly then, the state’s role mutated from recognition to definition, from protection to arbiter. And all of this was accomplished without any legislation, just cowardice and reinterpretation.

Demarcation of our territories is also the work of recognising our lands under our own conceptions: what we understand as limits, which are not measured physically, but in all our specificities that each of us, originating groups, define as such. Regardless, though it may be the most important ongoing fight today, demarcation should also be seen in other perspectives, since demarcating also signifies limiting our modes of existence to within a territory that is often small, and this does not adequately address how population growth impacts the modes of living of these peoples. For example, many once-nomadic peoples, with no experience of territorial limits in a life of constant flux, comprehend land as a whole. Aside from them, there are also people who were forcibly relocated from their traditional territories to demarcated areas, as is the case of some of the people who inhabit Xingu Indigenous Park and lands that were demarcated in much-reduced size, such as TI Taunay Ipegue-MS, TI Jaraguá-SP and TI Coroa Vermelha-BA.⁸

Another reservation is the legal ownership of indigenous land. By law, demarcated lands are the patrimony of the Union (a term which roughly denotes the federal government) for material and immaterial reproduction, which is to say that while indigenous persons live in and utilise their land, they are not the legal owners. The state always mediates and restricts autonomy. Whether it is well intentioned or not, the protectionist legal approach shows itself as another form of tutelage. Brazil’s government has always maintained a tutelary attitude towards indigenous populations, which is complemented by incentivising dependence. SPILTN explicitly positioned itself as the parent of the Indians and while FUNAI was created at least in part to alter these parameters, it has not been able to do so. An agency that seeks to ‘defend and protect’ a people will always attempt to control and restrict their autonomy. Many of these initiatives, such as cash transfer or housing programmes, are very helpful to many indigenous persons, but they also create and increase dependence.

Education

Through education we obtain access to all kinds of information relating to the outside world, and without it our knowledge of what is being done to us and others like us would be severely lacking, not to mention that we would be

8 TI stands for *Terra Indígena*, Indigenous Land, and the two letters at the end designate the state they are located in.

even more dependent on non-indigenous persons to speak and represent us in decision-making spaces. Learning new knowledges allows us to participate in and occupy different political, social and economic roles, and it is important to recognise that often the majority of our fighting is not in the forest with bows and spears, as ancient leaders did, but through dialogue, documents and the utilisation of information systems to our advantage. We are striving to handle these new tools, integrating and moulding them on our terms so that we may speak and fight for ourselves.

We recognise the importance of these tools since they have entered our daily life, be it with children in indigenous schools strengthening our traditional knowledge or through allowing access to universities. In this territorialisation of knowledge, globalisation has even reached the villages. But indigenous scholastic education – indigenous persons teaching indigenous persons within the school system – remains rare, due to the low priority afforded to it within the educational system.

In the last six years, initiatives aiming towards maintaining indigenous persons within universities have been fundamental, as has expanded access. Given pre-existing problems due to the low number of scholarships offered, lack of diversity in available courses and few universities with affirmative action or differentiated entry processes, it is unsurprising that indigenous education worsened in 2020. Cuts in education spending have hit indigenous schools hard because of their low priority status, leading to a lack of teachers as well as funds to maintain students in cities.

Despite Law 11.645/2008, which mandates the teaching of 'Afro-Brazilian and Indigenous history and culture' in schools, few have included this topic or attempted to work in any differentiating way with their students. Indigenous education needs to have a dual character, where not only do indigenous persons have to adapt and learn Western disciplines, but education itself needs to be thought of from their perspective, as well as non-indigenous schools also recognising indigenous knowledge beyond history classes. Be it in sciences, mathematics, geography or any other discipline, it is important to consider what our contributions are.

But no discussion of indigenous education can occur without discussing language. In 1500 it is estimated that there were roughly 600 languages spoken in what is today Brazil. Currently the estimate is that there are between 150 and 180 languages, many of which are endangered or no longer primarily used in their own communities. On average, an indigenous language in Brazil has between 250 and 270 speakers, which is tenuous at best. Of these 21 per cent are considered in immediate danger because of a low number of speakers and low rate of transmission.

Indigenous education overcomes barriers. Intercultural and transdisciplinary, it is a tool that can increase awareness of others and deepen their understanding

of our cosmologies. It is by our occupying scholastic and academic spaces that we not only acquire knowledge, but also share.

Healthcare

If we return to the history of Brazil's colonisation, the pathologies originating in Europe that have been so devastating were unknown to most of the indigenous population. Smallpox, measles, influenza and the common cold were only a few of the illnesses responsible for the extermination of entire peoples and much of the indigenous population of the Americas during the period of colonisation. And as disease was carried by multiple vectors, contact with illness significantly pre-dated contact with humans.

For centuries it was thought that natives themselves were to blame for these diseases, but in truth they were a weapon used to decimate entire ethnicities. Contaminated clothes and blankets were given with the deliberate intent to infect, and even unintentional contact transmitted these diseases, forcing native populations to develop new measures to control and treat these new infirmities.

As time passed and the government transformed at the national level, the forms of healthcare available to communities and the necessity to end some of these diseases eventually culminated with the creation of the first governmental agency devoted specifically to indigenous healthcare in 2010, SESAI, attached to the larger Ministry of Healthcare. However, this deliberately differentiated healthcare system has encountered difficulties from the outset in its implementation, and has in just ten years of existence been systematically weakened. In particular, as was mentioned above, many of SESAI's services have been contracted to private providers, many of whom are directly tied to evangelical organisations.

In 2018–19, indigenous healthcare suffered the loss of the *Mais Médicos* (More Doctors) programme, a partnership between Brazil and Cuba that brought healthcare professionals to remote areas of the country that still have large vacancies at the moment of writing, vacancies that can frequently lead to entire communities not having any access to treatment. Truth be told, the regime did not much bother to justify this action or remedy its effects: it was simply an opportunity to attack a perceived political enemy (Cuba) and perform cruelty to indigenous and poor communities. And fascists relish such opportunities. More subtly, one of the principal planks of the government's anti-indigenous strategy has been the 'municipalisation' of indigenous healthcare, devolving responsibility to the local level, increasing the precarity of services, excluding the specialised department that was specifically created for this purpose and has a duty to provide for indigenous communities. Despite not achieving its goal to formally dissolve SESAI's administrative functions, the current government and SESAI itself have taken steps to weaken the healthcare

available to communities, cutting funding for procuring medicines, limiting access to vehicles and transportation and directly threatening and politically persecuting healthcare professionals that do not subscribe to the government's initiatives – firing older, experienced civil servants who have developed a long-running commitment to indigenous communities and suspending contracts won by bidders deemed undesirable. Missão Evangélica Caiuá (Evangelical Mission Caiuá), the largest of these religious NGOs, received R\$2 billion in state funds between 2012 and 2017, despite a raft of denunciations and irregularities (Angelo, 2017).

All of this was thrown into sharp relief when Brazil became the epicentre of the Covid-19 pandemic (Neiva et al., 2020). Not only did SESA collapse, but the healthcare system of entire regions collapsed under the strain of what initially seemed to be monstrous incompetence. Here the termination of the 'More Doctors' programme is illuminating, insofar as it illustrates that the priority of healthcare policy was not actually improving or protecting people's health, but rather simply another 'front', another opportunity for conflict. Thus Brazil's healthcare system became the stage for a morbid parade as images of mass graves and daily death tolls became the scenery on which Bolsonaro would perform his defiance of his academic and scientific enemies, denouncing masks, vaccines, lockdowns, social distancing and even that the pandemic was being reported at all (Valfré and Behnke, 2021).

It is important that we defend a differentiated healthcare system, just as it is important to consider medicine from different perspectives, traditional and Western, as well as in combination. We have already mentioned that Western medicine is important to handle these other, once unknown, infirmities. It is also important to have access to quality treatment within hospitals and other medicinal centres. In regard to traditional medicine, it not only cares for the health of our bodies but also for our spirit through prayer, shamanism and medicine. The relation between these two forms of healthcare has been rife with conflict and the perception that they could not coexist. This non-relation of competition led to a distancing of traditional medicine and the persecution of shamans in many communities. This has of course often occurred due to the presence of missionaries, but also due to the prejudices of healthcare and state workers regardless of religious affiliation. Beyond this, the lack of dialogue between both traditions led many indigenous persons to become dependent on Western medicine and unable to provide basic treatments.

This has contributed to a numbness in all manner of social practices including those relating to bodily care – the use of teas, baths and other sacred medicines, for example (though the pandemic has led to many of these customs being put into practice again, as a way to heal the invisible). Today much of the work being done goes beyond simply valuing such knowledge and also attempts to recover and reformulate such practices, including all manners of persons such as midwives, healers and shamans.

Conclusion

If there has been a theme to this afterword, it has been the defence of that which is imperfect in the face of what promises to be much worse. Since 1988, the staple of Brazilian politics has been to ask indigenous people ‘What are you willing to lose?’, ‘What concessions are you willing to make?’, without ever entertaining the notion of a positive, amplifying message. And while it is distressing to have a president who openly fantasises about genocide, as many of the chapters of this book have attempted to show, this is far closer to the norm of Brazilian politics than most would like to acknowledge.

It is quite possible that readers may feel confused or even frustrated by an afterword that has a section on healthcare and yet only briefly mentions the Covid-19 pandemic that has killed hundreds of thousands of persons in Brazil. If something positive can be said of the past year’s events, it is that they have demoralised the feeling of horror and vulnerability common to indigenous populations. Now all can witness the genocidal spectacle of state power delighting in its callousness, and suffer the consequences. And what joy these fascists feel, when answering questions about (at the time) 160,000 deaths, with ‘This has to stop being a country of wusses’ (Gomes, 2020). If Bolsonaro is the culmination of a long-running trend in Brazil’s history, he also represents an important change: from the sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of bodies in the service of the pleasures of a small autocratic minority, to a delight *in* the sacrifice itself. As always with fascism, the means have become the end.

And so the pandemic can be seen as a conflict between meaning and pleasure. On one side autocracy, unwilling to sacrifice any personal delight while delighting in cruelty. On the other side the indigenous refusal of a naturalism that seeks to reduce humanity to meaningless gratification, while maintaining community, relations and reciprocity. No matter who won, indigenous resistance will always continue, because it is a resistance of meaning itself.

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